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Abstract
The first half of the 20th century was an era of weathering heights. As the development of powered flight
made the free atmosphere militarily and economically relevant, meteorologists encountered new kinds of
weather conditions at altitude. Pilots also learned to weather heights, as they struggled to survive in an
atmosphere that revealed surprising dangers like squall lines, fog, icing, and turbulence. Aeronautical
meteorology evolved out of these encounters, a heterogeneous body of knowledge that included
guidelines for routing aircraft, networks for observing the upper air using scientific instruments, and
procedures for synthesizing those observations into weather forecasts designed for pilots. As
meteorologists worked to make the skies safe for aircraft, they remade their science around the physics
of the free atmosphere. The dissertation tracks a small group of Scandinavian meteorologists, the
“Bergen School,” who came to be the dominant force in world meteorology by forecasting for Arctic
exploration flights, designing airline weather services, and training thousands of military weather officers
during World War II. After the war, some of these military meteorologists invented the TV weather report
(now the most widely consumed genre of popular science) by combining the narrative of the pre-fight
weather briefing with the visual style of comic-illustrated training manuals. The dissertation argues that
aeronautical meteorology is representative of what I call the “infrastructural sciences,” a set of
organizationally intensive, purposefully invisible, applied sciences. These sciences enable the reliable
operation of large technological systems by integrating theory-derived knowledge with routine
environmental observation. The dissertation articulates a set of characteristics for identifying and
understanding infrastructural science, and then argues that these culturally modest technical practices
play a pervasive role in maintaining industrial lifeways. It concludes by noting that while meteorology
successfully helped aviation become a reliable, taken-for-granted part of the transportation system, the
interests of aviation created a meteorology that centered on the needs of pilots, to the detriment of fields
like agricultural climatology.
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ABSTRACT

WEATHERING HEIGHTS: THE EMERGENCE OF AERONAUTICAL
METEOROLOGY AS AN INFRASTRUCTURAL SCIENCE
Roger Turner
M. Susan Lindee

The first half of the 20th century was an era of weathering heights. As the development of
powered flight made the free atmosphere militarily and economically relevant,
meteorologists encountered new kinds of weather conditions at altitude. Pilots also
learned to weather heights, as they struggled to survive in an atmosphere that revealed
surprising dangers like squall lines, fog, icing, and turbulence. Aeronautical meteorology
evolved out of these encounters, a heterogeneous body of knowledge that included
guidelines for routing aircraft, networks for observing the upper air using scientific
instruments, and procedures for synthesizing those observations into weather forecasts
designed for pilots. As meteorologists worked to make the skies safe for aircraft, they
remade their science around the physics of the free atmosphere. The dissertation tracks a
small group of Scandinavian meteorologists, the “Bergen School,” who came to be the
dominant force in world meteorology by forecasting for Arctic exploration flights,
designing airline weather services, and training thousands of military weather officers
during World War II. After the war, some of these military meteorologists invented the
TV weather report (now the most widely consumed genre of popular science) by
combining the narrative of the pre-fight weather briefing with the visual style of comic-

x
illustrated training manuals. The dissertation argues that aeronautical meteorology is
representative of what I call the “infrastructural sciences,” a set of organizationally
intensive, purposefully invisible, applied sciences. These sciences enable the reliable
operation of large technological systems by integrating theory-derived knowledge with
routine environmental observation. The dissertation articulates a set of characteristics for
identifying and understanding infrastructural science, and then argues that these
culturally modest technical practices play a pervasive role in maintaining industrial
lifeways. It concludes by noting that while meteorology successfully helped aviation
become a reliable, taken-for-granted part of the transportation system, the interests of
aviation created a meteorology that centered on the needs of pilots, to the detriment of
fields like agricultural climatology.
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Introduction
Uncovering Infrastructural Science
In November 1933, the National Academy’s Science Advisory Board, made up of
some of the most distinguished scientists in the United States, reported on the
temperature sensitivity of bananas. “Bananas,” they wrote, “require very careful handling
and must be kept at a temperature of 58 degrees to 65° F during shipment,” lest they
become discolored or ripen too quickly. Bananas were just one of many industrial
products that were sensitive to temperature extremes. The Advisory Board’s report was
titled “The Work of the Weather Bureau,” and it began by describing how a single
temperature forecast rippled through a city. On the prediction of a cold wave,
Greenhouses are closed and boilers fired. Preparations are made at once by
heating and lighting plants, whether gas, electric, steam or hot water, to meet the
increased demands that will follow. Fire hydrants, exposed mains and general
plumbing are protected. Small householders as well as large stockyards drain
their mains. Gasoline engines are drained and water-cooling systems are protected
by the use of anti-freeze solutions. Work in concrete is stopped. Street-car railway
companies arrange for more heat in their cars. … Merchants direct their
advertising and attention largely to cold weather articles. Oyster dealers increase
their reserve stocks. Coal dealers supply partial orders to all customers needing
fuel … Ice factories reduce their output. … Charity organizations prepare to meet
increased demands for food and fuel, and thus minimize the suffering of the poor.
Outside the city, railroads rerouted cattle, fruit and vegetable shipments, or moved their
cargoes into roundhouses for protection. While only shippers directly saw the impact of a
forecast, “its benefits are felt by every one both in the price and quality of our food
stuffs.” 1

1

Isaiah Bowman et al., "The Work of the Weather Bureau," Science 78 (1933), Nos 2034 and 2035: 582585, 604-607: quotations on 582, 583.

In fact, the Advisory Board argued, the Weather Bureau “probably touches
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directly the immediate needs of more of the people of the United States than do all other
federal services combined,” excepting the postal service. However, there was “little
general realization either of the extent of the personal interest of the whole population in
this service or of the magnitude of the organization and the labor involved in serving this
universal individual need.” People rarely thought much about it, but meteorology
required thousands of observers distributed across the hemisphere, who twice a day made
routine weather observations. Communicated by telegraph to the Central Office in
Washington DC, these observations made possible daily forecasts that affected the
operation of the infrastructure on which everyone’s daily life depended. In short,
meteorology was pervasive but little noticed, an unobtrusive science crucial to regulating
the flows of industrial society.
Little noticed, that was, until it failed. The Advisory Board’s report had been
triggered by the worst aviation disaster in American history. Seventy-three men,
including Admiral William Moffett, in charge of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, had
died when the dirigible Akron crashed in a storm off the coast of New Jersey on April 3rd,
1933. How, the Board asked, should the Weather Bureau more effectively understand
and predict conditions above the earth’s surface?
Answering this question were three of America’s most distinguished scientists.
One was Robert Millikan, the nation’s leading physicist, the chairman of the California
Institute of Technology, and the man who had supervised a weather observation network
in France as the Army’s Chief scientist during World War I. The second was Isaiah
Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University and geographical advisor to President

Wilson during the Versailles Treaty negotiations. Third was physicist Karl Compton,
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recently installed as president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a
mandate to improve the school’s standing in scientific research. To ensure the Weather
Bureau was represented, Charles D. Reed was added, bringing his long experience as a
forecaster in the midwest.2
After describing the uses of forecasts, the committee recommended changes that
would reorient the Weather Bureau’s attention from predicting conditions at the surface
towards charting and understanding the behavior of the upper air, the part of the
atmosphere that moved largely free of the inference of obstructions at ground level.
“Every one knows that the accuracy of weather forecasting is far from perfect,” wrote the
committee, but “in recent years there have been developed and tested new methods of
forecasting which increase this accuracy.”3 The bureau needed to adopt “air-mass
analysis,” a set of concepts developed by Norwegian theoretical meteorologists that used
upper air observations and models of atmospheric dynamics to predict the weather. Air
mass analysis would require establishing twenty to twenty-five aerological stations that
would launch daily flights to record conditions at ascending heights. To save government
money, the committee naively suggested the Army and Navy make these flights as part of
their normal operations. Weather Bureau instruments should be moved from city centers
to airports, thus eliminating the turbulence and radiation effects produced by large, heated
buildings. To take full advantage of air mass analysis, the drawing of synoptic maps
2

On Compton and Bowman, see Robert H. Kargon and Elizabeth Hodes, "Karl Compton, Isaiah Bowman,
and the Politics of Science in the Great Depression," Isis 76 (1985) 301-318; and Neil Smith, American
empire : Roosevelt’s geographer and the prelude to globalization (Berkeley : University of California
Press, 2003). On Millikan, see Daniel Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in
Modern America (Harard University Press, 1995). This must be a later edition, since it was published
about 1980 I think.
3
Bowman et al, “Work of the Weather Bureau,” 584.

should be increased, from two maps daily to three or even four. A modern weather
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service also needed a unified and efficient communications system. The Civil
Aeronautics Authority should give its airways teletype weather reporting system to the
Weather Bureau for regular operation, and the Weather Bureau should adopt the
numerical code agreed upon by the International Meteorological Organization for
transmitting weather observations. The committee also recommended that the Weather
Bureau establish a system of postgraduate training, sending its best young men to
educational institutions “of recognized leadership” in meteorology for formal instruction
in the more modern methods of weather prediction. (Both Caltech and MIT were
developing graduate programs in meteorology in 1933.) Finally, the committee
recommended, a permanent committee “composed of four or five of the outstanding
scientists of the country” should be established to advise the Weather Bureau and present
its claims to the government and general public.
In the bland tones typical of committee work, the committee thus recommended a
transformation in how the government managed the nation’s relationship to weather. For
decades, Congress had poured cold water on the Weather Bureau’s occasional efforts to
support theoretical research in meteorology.4 Now, in support of aviation safety, the
government needed to create new data on the free atmosphere and to train meteorologists
in how to use them. The government should import a set of foreign scientific practices
and make them central to American weather forecasting. The seat of weather prediction,
the instruments and local offices of the Weather Bureau, should be moved away from
concentrations of people, off of the tall buildings in the center of cities, to the new
4

Edmund P. Willis and William H. Hooke, “Cleveland Abbe and American Meteorology, 1871–1901,”
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 87, 3 (March 2006): 315–326.

airfields springing up at the sparsely populated edges. The report thus marks a
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transformational period in the history of science, when the upper air became the focus of
meteorology.

Weathering Heights
This dissertation demonstrates a novel approach for thinking about the importance
of science in industrialized societies. The history of aeronautical meteorology reveals
how powerful material effects can be produced by integrating large technological systems
with pervasive but little noticed environmental surveillance systems. This dissertation
shows how a small group of obscure experts, coordinating the activities of government
bureaus, commercial firms and academic departments, transformed aeronautical
meteorology from a scientific curiosity into an influential body of knowledge crucial for
operating a set of technologies essential to global military and economic power. During
the first half of the 20th century, the period on which this dissertation focuses, the material
and environmental consequences of this emergence far outweighed the cultural ones.
Meteorology was essential to managing the world long before most people realized it.
Only towards the end of the 20th century did atmospheric science, built in part on the
knowledge practices of aeronautical meteorology, produce the culturally disruptive
theory of anthropogenic climate change that made it an ascendant subject of critical
discourse. During the first half of the century, meteorology lay camouflaged under the
routine measurement and prediction work that enabled a thousand environmentally
sensitive activities upon which industrial lifeways depended.

The first half of the 20th century was an era of weathering heights. As the
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development of powered flight made the upper atmosphere more readily accessible,
meteorologists discovered new kinds of weather conditions at altitude, for example,
narrow bands of 200 mile-per-hour winds and clouds that froze as soon as they touched
airplane wings. Pilots also learned to weather heights, as they struggled to survive in an
atmosphere that revealed surprising dangers: squall lines, fog, icing, turbulence and
lightning. Even maneuvers as seemingly simple as flying through an unbroken stretch of
cloud turned out to be hazardous; many pilots were killed before the physiological causes
of the “death spiral” were unraveled.5 As flying organizations turned to meteorologists
for advice and training, aviation displaced agriculture and shipping as the most influential
usage of meteorological knowledge. Proposals like the Science Advisory Board’s, carried
out in many places around the world, directed scientific attention towards the upper
atmosphere, reordered the social hierarchy of meteorology, and in time, transformed the
way that the general public experienced and interacted with the weather. Understanding
modern atmospheric science thus requires tracing the history of aeronautical
meteorology.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, aerology and aeronautics had been linked from the
beginnings of human flight. From the Montgolfier’s first hot air balloon flights in 1783

5

From World War I into the 1920s, many planes were observed plunging out of a cloud layer, upside down
and spinning, locked in the so-called “death spiral.” Inspections of the wreckage showed no mechanical
reason why these planes should have crashed. The cause of these crashes was only discovered after tests
with dual control planes, where the first pilot had a hood placed over his cockpit, and a second pilot who
could see the ground in case things got out of hand. The first pilot would adjust the flight path according to
his sense of balance, but without the horizon as a reference point, he rapidly lost track of up and down.
Many a hooded pilot was astonished when told he was diving upside down, though his sense of balance
told him he was flying straight and level. Only the invention of artificial horizon instruments in the mid1920s, and the rigorous training of pilots to trust their instruments, not their senses, could make it possible
to safely fly through fog and clouds.

and throughout the 19th century, scientists used balloons to access the upper air,
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collecting gas samples and carrying aloft thermometers and barometers. Balloonists cited
their contributions to the progress of aerology (the study of upper air) when they argued
for public support. Meteorology justified aviation research. The development of powered,
guided flight at the start of the 20th century, both heavier-than-air craft like the Wright
Flyer and lighter-than-air ships like Count Zeppelin’s dirigibles, began to change this
relationship.
The development of powered flight transformed aerology from a minor research
interest within a diffuse science into the heart of meteorology. The application of aviation
to military purposes intensified rapidly as the Great War stabilized into trench warfare.
Among the many weapons developed to defeat trenches, aviation and long-range
(ballistic) artillery stood out as weapons designed to use the third dimension to overcome
armies stalemated on the ground.6 The unpredictable behavior of the free atmosphere,
however, could render these weapons ineffective. To overcome this problem, all fighting
nations established weather reporting services to cover the front lines, mobilized their
meteorologists, and began to train new ones.
This posed particular problems for Americans. The United States entered the war
with only a small community of domestic weather forecasters and almost no
meteorological researchers. It had to train hundreds of new officers to handle the Army

6

While poison gas certainly had important meteorological interactions (which are succinctly described in
Kristine C. Harper, “Meteorology’s Struggle for Professional Recognition in the USA, 1900-1950,” Annals
of Science 63, 2 (April 2006): 179-199), my preliminary reading of the evidence suggests it had a rather
separate history from meteorological support for aviation. The development of micrometeorology has not
been traced in detail, but it seems to have diverged from aerology institutionally as well as intellectually
after World War I. The two were re-integrated institutionally in academic meteorology departments after
World War II, as meteorologists took advantage of funding for studying the distribution of radioactive
fallout.

and Navy’s weather needs. As chief scientist for the Army, physicist Robert Millikan
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headed this training program; Harvard’s Alexander McAdie led the Navy’s separate
training program, while a small number of Weather Bureau forecasters like Edward
Bowie were sent to France to guide the operational work.
For European nations, the war meant adapting their domestic weather services.
Forced from his German university position by wartime shortages, Vilhelm Bjerknes and
his colleagues in neutral Norway put their upper air studies in service of the state. As
military-imposed information blockades hampered synoptic weather mapping, Bjerknes
applied theories of atmospheric physics to compensate, moving from the realm of pure
theory into operational forecasting. The Triple Entente mobilized its meteorologists,
including Vilhelm Bjerknes’s German research assistants. By war’s end, it was clear that
meteorological knowledge was needed for aviation operations. Where in the age of
balloons, meteorology had justified flight, flight now justified meteorology.
Flight was a potent justification. “Aviation,” Michael Dennis writes, “was to
interwar America what guided missiles and atomic energy were to post-WWII America:
technologies of immense strategic and commercial value developed through a complex
interplay among a variety of organizations, both public and private, civilian and
military.”7 Interwar aircraft were not as menacing as guided missiles, however, at least
until the bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War. Despite their use in the
Great War, planes were more often seem as a hopeful symbol of innovation and
modernity. “We fly no airplanes,” admitted Freihofer’s Fine Bread in a 1928 ad, “but in

7

Michael Aaron Dennis, A Change of State: Political Culture, Technical Practice, and the Origins of Cold
War America (Johns Hopkins University Press, Forthcoming): 50. I thank Dr. Dennis for sharing a draft of
his first chapter with me.

our own way we too are setting the standards of these modern times.” (Figure 1.1) The
value of stock in aviation companies ballooned between Lindbergh’s flight in May 1927
and the market crash in October 1929, buoyed by as irrational an exuberance as dotcom
stocks were in the late 1990s. Though aircraft projected modernity, they were more
powerful as symbols than as objects before they were integrated into systems that made
them reliable and useful.

Figure 1.1: Excitement over the potential of flight made aviation nearly synonymous with innovation
during the late 1920s. Even bread advertisements traded on that enthusiasm. (Freihofer Fine Bread
advertisement, published in Laws, Ordinances and Regulations of the Department of Public Health of
the City of Philadelphia, 1928.)

9

During the 1920s, aeronautical meteorology emerged as a heterogeneous body
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of knowledge that drew upon the experience of pilots as well as the observations and
theories of meteorologists. It combined abstract formulas and theoretical science with
practical instructions for doing things in the world. Aeronautical meteorology was
knowledge held inside heads, written into texts, or deployed in procedures. Some of its
procedures involved guidelines for deciding when to launch aircraft, how to route them,
and how to pilot them. Other procedures related to the collection, dissemination and
interpretation of atmospheric observations made with scientific instruments. Aeronautical
meteorology combined knowledge derived from theories of atmospheric physics with
knowledge generated from direct interactions with the upper air, as experienced by pilots
and balloonists. Weather forecasting was a central technical practice. 8
As aircraft became crucial to commerce, military power, exploration, and leisure
during the 20th century, aeronautical meteorology grew rapidly. Governments around the
world moved their weather services from scientific or agricultural ministries to military
or aviation divisions. The most influential scientific leaders of this transformation were a
group of mostly Scandinavian geophysicists who had trained under Vilhelm Bjerknes at

8

A note on the differences between weather forecasting and meteorology: weather forecasting is a technical
practice that is largely but only partially built on scientific knowledge, while meteorology describes a
science that is substantially broader. Atmospheric science, as meteorology has been renamed since the late
1950s, includes: theoretical studies of atmospheric dynamics; quantitative measurements of the planet’s
radiation budget; studies of the chemistry of the atmosphere’s constituent gases; climatological surveys of
the distribution of temperature, precipitation, or humidity; radar-based studies of the life cycle of tornadoes,
and many other subjects. Some parts of this knowledge are combined to enable weather forecasting, a
technical practice that could be separated from theoretical science (there are many folk and vernacular
forecasting techniques unconnected to scientific meteorology) but in most places is not. On the tensions
between weather prediction and meteorological science, see Katharine Anderson, Predicting the Weather:
Victorians and the Science of Meteorology (University of Chicago Press, 2005). For insight into the
conflicted relationship that current weather forecasters have with meteorological science, see Gary Alan
Fine, Authors of the Storm: Meteorologists and the Culture of Prediction (University of Chicago Press,
2007): chapter 2.

Bergen, Norway. 9 The “Bergen School” sought to develop quantitative explanations of
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the behavior of the oceans and atmosphere using hydro- and thermo-dynamics. Though
prizing abstract research, they regularly worked with weather forecasters, aviation
organizations, and militaries to solve practical problems. Through these connections,
members of the Bergen School became leaders of academic and government
meteorological institutions, responsible for training the next generation of meteorologists.
Bergen School ideals thus became organizing principles in modern meteorology;
mathematically adept, theoretical researchers were the most celebrated scientists,
standing above the “operational” meteorologists who predicted the weather from day to
day. The emerging social hierarchy of meteorologists came to mirror an ontological
hierarchy that permeated their science: the ultimate causes of the atmosphere’s behavior
lay in the dynamics of the upper air, while the weather most people experienced at the
Earth’s surface was merely a secondary effect of the atmosphere’s general circulation.
This principle has guided the construction of the numerical models that are the
foundation for both contemporary weather forecasting and for understanding climate
change.10 As meteorologist Horace Byers put it in 1955, computer models simulated the
atmosphere at the hemispheric level, but there remained “a second step, such as
pinpointing cloud, rain, and temperature areas, [that] is left for the harassed local
weatherman.” 11 The privileging of the global over the local has guided the construction

9

Robert Marc Friedman, Appropriating the Weather: The Construction of a Modern Meteorology (Cornell
University Press, 1989).
10
Kristine C. Harper, Weather By the Numbers: The Genesis of Modern Meteorology (MIT Press, 2008).
11
Horace R. Byers, “Chairman’s Prefatory Remarks,” prior to the Symposium on Modern Concepts in
Meteorology, April 27th, 1955. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, v. 41, n. 11 (November
15th, 1955): 797.

of the numerical models that are the foundation for both contemporary weather
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forecasting and for understanding climate change.
The most immediate consequence of advances in aeronautical meteorology was
an improvement in the safety and reliability of air travel. As aircraft became capable of
completing missions more reliably, even when confronted by adverse weather conditions,
they became integral to daily life in industrialized societies.12 The United States Post
Office pioneered the use of regularly scheduled aviation, making airmail an essential part
of the communications system.13 Airmail contracts supported the development of
passenger service, eventually transforming leisure and business travel as well as the
distribution of population, particularly in isolated regions. During the first half of the 20th
century, aviation became infrastructure, a central component of the transportation and
communication systems of modern societies.14 Aeronautical meteorology enabled that
infrastructure to operate, becoming what I will call in this dissertation an “infrastructural
science.”
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David T. Courtwright, “The Routine Stuff: How Flying became a Form of Mass Transportation,” in
Reconsidering a Century of Flight, Roger D. Launius and Janet R. Daly Bednarek, eds. (University of
North Carolina Press, 2003): 209-222.
13
William M. Leary, Aerial Pioneers: The U.S. Airmail Service, 1918-1927 (Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1976).
14
William Leary writes, “For the airline industry in the United States to achieve its position as the prime
mover of intercity passenger traffic, two things had to happen. First, air travel had to be made safe and
reliable; and second, air travel had to be able to compete economically with other forms of intercity
transportation. Safety and reliability came in the years before American entry into World War II … the
economic revolution in airfares occurred after the Second World War.” “Safety in the Air: The Impact of
Instrument Flying and Radio Navigation on U.S. Commercial Air Operations between the Wars,” in From
Airships to Airbus: The History of Civil and Commercial Aviation, Volume 1: Infrastructure and
Environment (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995): 97-113. Quotation on 97.

Theorizing Infrastructural Science
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Infrastructure defines industrial lifeways.15 From water pipes to power grids,
factory farms to forestry, roads to rivers, broadcasting to banking, a carefully constructed
infrastructure underlies nearly everything we do.16 The presence of large technological
systems that reliably bring people water, food, heat, power, and information defines the
developed world.17 These systems are so reliable that we only think about them when
they break down (or pay the utility bills). Yet they all exist in what Aristotle called the
sub-lunar world of change, endangered by floods, storms, surges, earthquakes and fires.18
The living world also threatens—tree roots strangle water pipes and jostle sidewalks,
animals burrow into levees, bacteria grow nearly everywhere. Operating infrastructure
thus requires continuously watching, adjusting, and predicting where the next problem
will occur. Industrial society depends upon monitoring, controlling, and manipulating
nature on a massive scale. This work in turn relies on the knowledge produced by a
diverse group of applied sciences that I call the infrastructural sciences (see Table 1.1).
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Ruth Schwartz Cowan argues “industrialization transformed every American Household sometime
between 1860 and 1960.” Before the Civil war most families did their housework in ways that would have
been familiar in the Middle Ages; a century later, just a few families lived this way. More Work for
Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (Basic Books,
1983): 3-4.
16
For a review of pervasive place of infrastructure in industrial life and its scholarly literature, see Paul N.
Edwards, et al, “Understanding Infrastructure: Dynamics, Tension and Design,” NSF report, available at
http://www.si.umich.edu/cyber-infrastructure/UnderstandingInfrastructure_FinalReport25jan07.pdf
17
The history of development projects in the global south highlights that it is not the presence of these
systems that leads to development, but the maintenance and operation of them reliably over long terms.
Many roads and power plants were constructed, but without building the crucial matrix of expertise,
governance, spare parts, and political economic culture necessary to keep those capital outlays in working
order.
18
Aristotle saw all these phenomena as part of meteorology, the study of change in non-living things below
the heavens. Aristotle, Meteorologica, with a Translation by H.D.P. Lee (Loeb Classical Library, Harvard
University Press, 1952). Liba Taub, Ancient Meteorology (Routledge, 2003).
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Infrastructural
Science
Aeronautical
meteorology

Object of
surveillance
Weather, Upper
Atmosphere

Material
Interventions
Long range, reliable
flight

Ionospheric
physics
Microbiology

ionoshere,
magnetic fields
food supply,
drinking water

Space weather

space
environment, sun

Seismology

earthquakes

Ice Patrol

ice bergs

Aviation
ornithology
Economic
entomology

birds, bats, insects

over the horizon
radio communication
ready availability of
edible food and
potable water
satellite mediated
telecommunication,
transpolar flight
tsunami warnings,
nuclear test detection
great circle ocean
routes, shipping
safety
clearing flight
hazards near airports
productive food and
fiber crops

Fisheries
management
Epidemiology

oceanic animal
populations
public health

Hydrology

river and stream
volumes

Vulcanology

volcanoes

Forestry

forests

Operations
research
Metrology

flows and stocks

Macroeconomics

national/internatio
nal economy

Market Research

Consumers

Astronomy

Heavenly bodies,
Time

agriculturally
important insects

weights and
measures

sustainable
harvesting of seafood
controlling disease,
improving health of
populations
preventing,
controlling and
predicting floods
eruption prediction
for evacuation
Production of
building materials
and fuel
efficient movement
and production
reliable,
interchangeable
commodities and
manufactured goods
maintain/create
patterns of trade and
wealth distribution
Mass consumption

Navigation

Tools of
Surveillance
Satellites, weather
balloons, radars,
aerometeorographrad
iosondes
radio emitters and
receivers
bacteriological tests

Body of theoretical
knowledge
Meteorology,
thermodynamics,
hydrodynamics

solar observing
satellites

electromagnetic physics,
solar physics, nuclear
dynamics
geophysics, plate
tectonics, seismology
physical oceanography,
Glaciology, meteorology

seismographs, water
pressure sensors
patrol ships,
airplanes, satellites

electromagnetic physics
bacteriology, microbiology, epidemiology

binoculars, radar,
pilot reports
traps, damage
surveys, insurance
reports
surveys, inspections,
reports
hospital reports,
standardized
diagnostic criteria
stream gauges, rain
gauges

ornithology, ecology

seismographs, gas
chemistry
Watch towers,
measuring tools

Geology

surveys, reports,
transponders, maps
Inspection agencies,
calibration depots

applied mathematics,
topology, algorithm design
Physics, chemistry

surveys

macroeconomics,
psychology

Surveys, focus
groups, purchase
tracking
Telescopes,
satellites, astrolabes,
sextants

Psychology, Anthropology

Zoology, plant physiology

population biology,
oceanography, economics
Medicine, physiology,
cultural ecology
hydrology,
hydrometeorology

Botany, ecology,
mathematics

Gravitational Dynamics,
trigonometry

Table 1.1: Examples of Infrastructural Science. “Material interventions” describes the types of
activities that depend on the products of infrastructural sciences.

As the examples in Table 1.1 suggest, an infrastructural science is a body of
technical practices that enable material interventions by integrating theory-derived

knowledge with routine observations. Like field science, infrastructural science is a
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cross-disciplinary category—it highlights common practices and problems across
disparate disciplines, showing us similarities between meteorology and macroeconomics,
or entomology and epidemiology, for example.19 Take meteorology and epidemiology.
While most meteorologists have probably never met an epidemiologist, both sciences
integrate theoretical insights derived from numerical modeling and field studies with
continuous monitoring through geographically distributed, standardized surveillance
systems, in order to provide advance warnings to governments in order to save lives.
While infrastructural science is a category created for contemporary analysis, it does have
similarities to past actors’ categories like William Whewell and George Airy’s
“permanent sciences” or 19th century American notions of “science in the service of the
state.” The infrastructural sciences share a set of attributes that make them crucial to
industrial society but simultaneously render them obscure to outside observers. These
attributes describe their work practices, spatial arrangement, temporal orientation,
primary function, key products, and connections to theoretical and academic science.

Formulaic and Routine Work
The work practices of infrastructural science emphasize routine observation.
Large numbers of individuals with a moderate amount of technical training conduct

19

As Robert Kohler and Henrika Kuklick have shown in examining field science, I argue that
infrastructural science pulls together a variety of seemingly disparate disciplines, and reveals that they have
common qualities that are not often discussed. The category does not aim to explain entire sciences, but
rather aspects of various disciplines. Just as not all of biology is dependent upon the production of
knowledge in the field, not all parts of an infrastructural science are involved in supporting infrastructure.
Not all meteorological or microbiological work goes towards the operation of infrastructure, but knowledge
produced by these sciences is crucial. Henrika Kuklick and Robert Kohler, “Science in the Field:
Introduction,” Osiris, 2nd series 11 (1996): 1-14.

established, repetitive observations. These observations often must be made on an
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externally arranged schedule, often in coordination with other observation stations. The
observations are carried out according to carefully standardized procedures, using
instruments or tests that have been calibrated and distributed across a testing network.
The work is literally formulaic, as observers reduce their readings according to
standardized formulae, and then record their observations on pre-printed forms
transmitted up the organization hierarchy for analysis and distribution to users. As
individuals, these technicians rarely measure anything particularly notable. As
components of an extensive, centrally controlled network, they can create vast data sets
to support authoritative statements of average conditions and records of anomalies.
Depending on what is being monitored, routine surveillance work can take many
forms. In sciences like meteorology, oceanography, seismology and hydrology,
technicians generally report instrument readings. While these instruments sometimes are
extremely sophisticated, the most enduring observation networks tend to use relatively
inexpensive instruments. Because the value in these observations lies in their
comparability, continuity and geographical distribution, these instruments often are wellestablished and relatively inexpensive. For instance, thermometers and barometers were
invented in the 17th century, and while they have undergone substantial changes in form,
they remain among the standard instruments used in weather observation.20 In sciences
like microbiology and epidemiology, surveillance begins with standardized laboratory
tests. Drinking water quality and food safety, for instance, rely on routine sample testing
to ensure that established operational procedures are being followed. Epidemiology also
20

W. E. Knowles Middleton, Invention of the meteorological instruments (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press,
1969); W. E. Knowles Middleton, The history of the barometer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964).

uses a third surveillance tool, surveys, which are used by sciences like
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macroeconomics, market research, and economic entomology as well. Survey work
depends upon the cooperation of a network of observers and reporters to submit data.
Maintaining a network of appropriate people willing to complete surveys is a
considerable challenge, undertaken by organizations as diverse as the Centers for Disease
Control, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Nielsen TV ratings company,
and Billboard Magazine, which maintains the Soundscan system for tracking music
popularity.21
The creation of surveillance systems generally requires a staff of inexpensive, and
thus low status, observers and technicians to take observations or test samples. This leads
to hierarchical personnel arrangements ostensibly organized by educational attainment,
though more deeply structured by class and gender. For example, the success of the Pap
Smear as a cancer surveillance tool depended on the invention of a class of low paid,
largely female cytotechnicians to sort through thousands of non-pathological slides and
flag the few abnormal results for further examination by largely male pathologists.22

21

Soundscan tracks music consumption at the point of sale; it superceded surveys of radio broadcasts,
effectively making paying consumers, rather than DJs and station managers the arbiters of popularity.
Introduced in the early 1990s, Soundscan uncovered the enormous appeal of Garth Brooks, whose songs
previously received little air time. Because it cannot track file sharing, Soundscan makes Bob Dylan and
Barbara Streisand appear to be far more relatively popular than they actually are, given that their listeners
are among the few who still buy CDs. “The Future of the Music Industry,” On the Media (WNYC Radio,
October 23rd, 2009).
22
M.J. Casper and A.E. Clark, “Making the Pap smear into the ‘right tool’ for the job: Cervical cancer
screening in the USA, circa 1940-1995,” Social Studies of Science 28 (1998): 255-290. See also Robert
Aronowitz, Unnatural History: Breast Cancer and American Society (Cambridge University Press, 2007),
especially chapter nine, “The Rise of Surveillance.”

Observation Networks
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The spatial arrangement of the infrastructural sciences is usually a network of
observation stations connected to what Bruno Latour has called “centers of calculation.”23
In the case of meteorology, by the middle of the 18th century various natural philosophers
had come to believe that coordinated, geographically distributed observation was crucial
to understanding the weather.24 Some natural philosophers participated in these observing
projects with considerable devotion; Thomas Jefferson famously kept a detailed weather
diary every day for decades (his observations on the weather for the morning of July 4th,
1776 are often quoted). Correspondence networks became the model for the
Smithsonian’s research into American weather in the decades before the civil war, first
using the mails, then telegraphy.25 As a model for organizing and coordinating scientific
observation, the correspondence network has thus depended upon the development of
reliable communications systems, from state postal systems in the 18th century through
telegraphy in 19th century to cyberinfrastructure today.26 Meteorological services thus
exemplify how modern technocratic societies have managed the tightly coupled
infrastructure necessary for industrial life on an increasingly crowded planet.
The contemporary world is layered with environmental surveillance systems like
flood gauges, seismographs, bacteriological tests of drinking water supplies, and satellites
that warn telecommunications system operators of changes in “space weather.” Tsunami
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Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
Andrea Rusnock, Vital Accounts: Quantifying Health and Population in Eighteenth-Century England
and France (Cambridge University Press): Chapter 5.
25
James Rodger Fleming, Meteorology in America, 1800-1870 (Johns Hopkins, 1990).
26
On the history of the mails, a sadly neglected topic, see Laurin Zilliacus, Mail for the world: from the
courier to the Universal Postal Union (New York: J. Day Co., 1953). Perhaps the most fascinating study on
the meanings and importance of postal systems is Richard R. John, Spreading the news: the American
postal system from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
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warning networks offer a particularly clear example of the strengths and weaknesses of
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surveillance in protecting populations. Developed as a result of advances in
oceanographic knowledge, and the disastrous tsunamis that hit Alaska and Hawaii in
1964, these networks use a combination of seismographs, water pressure sensors, and
radio equipment on oceanic buoys to report the passage of massive waves through the
ocean.27 Combined with numerical modeling based on theoretical and empirical studies of
wave dynamics and the ocean floor, substantial systems have been developed to monitor
the progress of tsunamis and warn areas likely to be endangered. These systems are
expensive, however, and only rich countries, particularly vulnerable Pacific nations like
the United States and Japan, had built them during the second half of the 20th century.
While these systems had only limited coverage of the Indian Ocean, they were able to
detect and predict the massive tsunami that affected coastlines along the Indian Ocean on
December 26, 2004. But the effectiveness of centralized detection and warning systems
depends upon delivering credible warnings to affected areas in advance of the hazard. US
and Japanese monitoring could not effectively contact the areas in Indonesia, Myanmar,
India and Sri Lanka most at risk. More than 220,000 people died. In response, new
surveillance of the Indian and Southern Oceans has been established through the Joint
Australian Tsunami Warning Center and the German-Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning
System, funded by the German government. This system will use satellite

27

The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center, operated by the US National Weather Service, is
described in Dennis M. Powers, The Raging Sea: The Powerful Account of the Worst Tsunami in U.S.
History (New York: Citadel Press, 2005): ch. 16.

communications to connect seabed and surface to shore sensors with a warning center,
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aiming to provide warnings within five minutes of an undersea earthquake.28
Environmental surveillance systems can also be used to watch human activities.
As James Fleming has memorably shown, the Army Signal Corps meteorology program
also became a domestic intelligence system, monitoring Native Americans, infiltrating
labor rallies and reporting on major strikes.29 Kai-Henrik Barth has described the
transformation of Cold War seismology when the US government agreed that
seismographs could be useful for detecting nuclear weapons tests. A global
seismographic network, combined with “sniffer” aircraft sampling the stratospheric
winds, became central to enforcing nuclear testing treaties.30
Scientific planners have repeatedly discovered that operating environmental
surveillance networks present unexpected challenges. The environment they seek to
monitor has many uses, which often conflict with scientific plans. In his history of the
ocean buoy networks that became central to understanding El Niño, for example, Greg
Cushman notes: “Buoy tests near Midway Island in 1966 encountered unforeseen
difficulties, most related to human use of the sea: fish bite damage, ship collisions,
entanglement with long-line fishing gear—perhaps even vandalism by other ocean
scientists.” The revised budget had to allocate “the same amount to mooring tests,
service, and buoy replacement as to basic construction, installation, and data analysis.”
The increased logistical requirements required the network to be scaled down to just a
28

“New Tsunami Defenses,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 90 (January, 2009): 17.
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fifth of the original size.31. Meteorologists during the 1920s and 1930s encountered rats
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that chewed holes in weather balloons, insects that damaged radiosonde batteries, and
Gooney birds on Midway Island that disrupted radio communications by perching on the
antennae. The environment of infrastructural science can be crowded in a way
unimaginable in the lab.

Engaged in “Future work”
The infrastructural sciences share a temporal orientation towards the future, what
Gary Alan Fine calls an emphasis on “future work.”32 Their most influential products
tend to be predictions, forecasts, and prognoses. These texts, things like weather
forecasts, flu season outlooks, and predictions of market demand, allow decision makers
to take future conditions into account while making choices about present actions.
Models are a particularly influential tool for producing predictions, often allowing
decision makers and infrastructural scientists to explore their assumptions and the
potential results of decisions by simulating futures using different parameters. While
many of these models are numerical and run on computers (like fishery ecology models,
and global circulation models used for weather or climate prediction) there are
spectacular exceptions.33 The US Army Corps of Engineers, for instance, has constructed

31
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a massive physical analog of the Mississippi river basin, allowing it to test the effects
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of hydrological management choices.34
In an essay on the historical development of prediction in the earth sciences,
Naomi Oreskes distinguishes between two kinds of prediction in the sciences: logical
prediction and temporal prediction. Logical prediction, like Einstein’s prediction that
light would bend in the presence of gravity, is used to test theories by comparing their
predictions to observations. Temporal prediction, such as forecasting the path of a
hurricane or the timing of an earthquake, is a relatively recent development in the history
of the earth sciences (although it was common in physical astronomy, for example). “For
the better part of at least two centuries,” she writes, “most earth scientists eschewed
temporal prediction, viewing it as beyond the scope of their science. Times have changed,
and now earth scientists routinely attempt to predict the future.” Part of this change is
attributable to changes in the philosophy of science in the 20th century, particularly the
development of the hypothetico-deductive method as a model for science beyond
empiricism. Scientists should use hypotheses to guide their observational programs, some
scientists and philosophers argued; making temporal predictions and seeing if they came
to pass could guide scientists in refining their theories and deciding what should be
observed to produce new discoveries. However, a more powerful force elevating the
status of temporal prediction are the needs of public policy in the anthropocene age: “As
more and more people live along America’s coastlines, as the population of Southern
California grows, as humans increasingly become agents affecting the composition of the

Steven. "A Spreadsheet Way of Knowledge." In Tom Forester, ed. Computers in the Human Context.
Information Technology, Productivity, and People, 318-326. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).
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earth’s oceans and atmosphere, earth scientists are increasingly being asked to predict
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hurricanes, earthquakes, and the impact of human activities,” Oreskes writes.35

Aids to Governance and Management
The infrastructural sciences function as tools for managers. 36 As a result, the
infrastructural sciences are conducted in a wide variety of institutions, including some
often overlooked in the history of science. In addition to universities and government
research centers, corporations and private organizations often carry out infrastructural
science work. For businesses like electrical utilities or airlines, this means assisting
managers in running large technical systems efficiently, reliably and safely. For
governments, infrastructural science enables state bureaucracies to manage the people,
resources, and physical geography of polities. Looking for these sites can help us better
map science’s concrete influences on the modern world.
That infrastructural science should be supported largely by governments is no
surprise; outside of the Anglo-American tradition, nearly all science and natural
philosophy has been state supported and managed, with scientists very often employees
of state institutions directly controlled by governments. Infrastructural sciences, however,
are also tools of governance, the daily activities of managing a polity. They tend not to
produce ornamental knowledge to buttress a regime’s claims to legitimacy and wisdom,
in the way that courtly philosophers and artists did in the absolutist courts of the
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Renaissance or human spacecraft did in the space race.37 Rather, they produce
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knowledge useful for the daily and long term management of the state. They contribute to
governance, affecting how a polity is managed, rather than politics, deciding who is in
charge. (While the disastrous response to hurricane Katrina offers a very recent example
of how competent governance affects political legitimacy, as the history of 19th century
France shows, politically turbulent states can experience surprisingly stable governance.)
Because the infrastructural sciences are continual government expenditures for
maintaining a functional state, rather than ostentatious cultural displays, cost is much
more of a concern than for particle physics or manned space exploration. Infrastructural
science contributes to daily governance by creating the knowledge necessary to manage a
polity’s resources, tracking changing situations and suggesting appropriate responses, and
crafting predictions about the future that leaders can use to guide (and legitimate) their
decisions.

Produce Public Goods
The key products of the infrastructural sciences tend to be public or quasi-public
goods, that is, economically beneficial services that are difficult to produce efficiently for
profit because they are hard to sell or it is difficult to exclude non-payers from using
them. These goods are generally distributed in the form of texts. Weather forecasts are an
obvious example of this sort of public good. Economic historian Erik Craft has examined
the effects of weather forecasts on Great Lakes shipping in the 1870s and 1880s, tracking
the costs of ship insurance. Using a natural experiment where storm warnings were
37
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abruptly stopped after Congress discovered major embezzlement within the Army
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Signal Corps meteorology program, Craft calculates that the national weather service
provided a greater than 60% social return on investment just from reduced insurance rates
for the Great Lakes, to say nothing of the lives saved or benefits to agriculture.38
Standards are a second type of public good produced and maintained by various
infrastructural sciences. From the certification of scales at the grocery store to the
standardization of time, government led metrology has played a crucial role in
coordinating economic production and engendering public trust. As Simon Schaffer has
argued, metrology was crucial to Britain’s ability to tax, thus enabling the state to support
tremendous military operations from the 18th century forward.39 Standards produced
through cooperation between government, academia and industry have likewise been
crucial, as historians have best documented in the development of electrical systems and
telecommunications systems.40

Connections to Theoretical Science
While infrastructural science is primarily utilitarian, applied, and conducted in
industrial and government settings, it does have important interactions with theoretical
and academic science. First, academic scientists may develop the tests and methods later
scaled up for use in full observation networks. As a result, existing theory powerfully
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shapes the interpretation of data generated by environmental surveillance. Satellite
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observations of extremely low ozone levels over the Antarctic, for instance, were initially
dismissed as instrument error, given that then accepted theory gave no reason to expect
such low levels.41 Second, infrastructural science is not intended to produce discovery.
Sometimes, as in the case of George Biddell Airy and Neptune, it actively eschews
discovery.42 Nonetheless, academic researchers often make theoretical claims using data
repurposed from industrial use. Third, theoretical research can be inspired by
infrastructural problems, as Peter Galison shows for the work of Henri Poincaré and
Albert Einstein.43 Finally, as Sharon Traweek has pointed out, modern scientific
communities are replenished through education.44 Industry and governments’ steady need
for qualified technicians has been essential to the emergence of science as a career,
justifying academic research and teaching programs.45
A clear example of the interplay between practical and theoretical science can be
found in the development of knowledge about ocean tides. Michael Reidy has described
the central role played by William Whewell, the man who coined the term “scientist,” in
developing a systematic theory of the tides used by the British navy and merchant marine
to rule the world’s littoral regions during the 19th century. As industrialization enabled the
41

Erik Conway, Atmospheric Science at NASA: A History (Johns Hopkins, 2008).
Airy, as head of the Royal Observatory, led the British government’s effort to produce extremely
accurate astronomical observations used to produce the tables of ephemeredes crucial to navigation and
time signals. He had the chance and resources to pursue a very promising lead on looking for an
undiscovered planet. He declined, arguing that institutions like his were engaged in “permanent science,”
and that moving into the realms of “progressive science,” the work of discovery, would harm the efficiency
of the essential work being done in government observatories. When French astronomers discovered
Neptune instead, Airy was exposed to considerable public controversy. Iwan Rhys Morus, When Physics
Became King (University of Chicago Press, 2005): 197-201 provides a useful description of Airy’s work in
“industrial astronomy.”
43
Peter Galison, Einstein’s Clock, Poincaré’s Maps: Empires of Time (W.W. Norton, 2003).
44
Sharon Traweek, Beamtimes and Lifetimes: The World of High Energy Physicists (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1988): Ch. 3.
45
Robert Kohler, “The Ph.D. Machine: Building on the Collegiate Base," Isis 1990: 638-662.
42

production of iron ships with deeper drafts, every port on the East coast of Britain was
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rendered inaccessible except at high tide. Without more precise knowledge of the
environment, Britain’s essential sea-borne trade would run aground. Whewell carefully
coordinated mass observations, a “tidal crusade,” and combined these observations with
mathematically and astronomically rigorous theory to produce tide charts that could be
printed cheaply for distribution to ship captains. This work required producing novel selfregistering tide gauges and other kinds of scientific instruments, as well as recruiting and
maintaining a network of observers to ensure the instruments were functioning properly
and to report the measurements. Government funding was crucial to the establishment of
these expensive and expansive networks, while military discipline was essential to their
continued operation. These were activities that required an aspect of completeness and
continuity that could not regularly be produced by amateur science, by the voluntary
networks of gentlemen characteristic of enlightenment natural philosophy. As Reidy
shows, it is no accident that professional modern science emerged from this increasingly
organized and formalized milieu.46

Culturally Modest
The infrastructural sciences tend to have modest cultural ambitions. They are
quietly pervasive, functional rather than spectacular. They rarely make metaphysical or
cosmological claims; they do not speak to what it is to be human or make explicit
normative assertions about how we should live in the world. To use the categories of
Renaissance knowledge, most infrastructural sciences have contentedly remained forms
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of “mixed mathematics,” avoiding the bold venture from utility to philosophy that
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made Galileo notorious and got him arrested.47 They function in the background, rarely
becoming subjects of major cultural controversy. As a result, while hydrologists never
become as famous as Darwin or even Richard Dawkins, they rarely have to contend with
intransigent fundamentalists seeking to teach creationist theories of flood management.48
Because of their utilitarian aims and low public profile, the infrastructural sciences rarely
are subjects in long-running controversies propagated by political leaders.
One consequence of this cultural modesty is historians of science and STS
scholars have paid them relatively little attention. The history of science has focused on
sciences that have cultural prestige, rather than material impacts. Historians of science
produce Darwin studies on an industrial scale, but far fewer works on economic
entomology, for instance.49 Reviewing a rare history of economic entomology in 1998,
Nicolas Rasmussen argued that historians of science too often
act as if they find only the “great men” of currently ascendant fields of intellectual
high culture worthy of their attention. Thus we find much research on the
founders of molecular genetics, particle physics, and of course cosmology, and
substantially less on economic botany, materials science and chemical
engineering. In the life sciences, scholars of science studies mirror this
overarching bias with great enthusiasm for studies on nobly theoretical, 'basic'
fields of knowledge … while they show strikingly less favour—given the
economic and cultural importance of the products of these sciences—for the fields
related to agriculture.50
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breeding, land use or pest management as iconic representations of the role of biology in
modern society. Similarly, science studies evolved as a field that sought to challenge
claims that science produced disinterested, timeless truths about the world. Scholars
sought to demonstrate that that science was a social activity, and the knowledge that it
produced was full of contestation, politics, and parochial interests. If politics and social
values could be found at the base of those sciences with the strongest claims to
objectivity and disinterestedness, the hardest cases, then scholars could reasonably claim
that their findings applied to all sciences. As such, science studies often focused on the
most culturally prestigious disciplines. These studies emphasized what we might call the
“cultural consequences” of these sciences, rather than their material consequences. They
explored how claims about nature were made and defended, for instance. But even as
science studies scholars scientific knowledge as a cultural construct, their studies helped
propagate the hierarchies that privileged these sciences in the second half of the twentieth
century. Despite their cultural prominence, particle physics, molecular genetics and
cosmology reveal only a small slice of the pervasive presence of science in modern life.
While the pronouncements of Stephen Hawking or newspaper stories about fleeting
hadrons or magazine articles about “the gay gene” attract commentary, it is the quotidian
presence of the TV weatherman, the unseen microbiological assays of the water quality
tester, and the tiny certifications attached to grocery scales by a state metrological
inspector that define the scientific and technological world in which we live.

Structure of the Dissertation
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I describe aeronautical meteorology’s development into an infrastructural science
in five episodes, beginning with the polar exploration in the wake of World War I and
ending with aeronautical meteorology’s role in the invention of the television weather
report in the decade after World War II.
After the end of the Great War, the Arctic was an important place. Geopolitical
thinkers saw the possibility of flying across the Arctic as important to future military and
economic power. The first chapter documents how efforts to make the Arctic flyable
fostered the international spread of the Bergen School. As British, American, Norwegian,
Italian, German and Soviet teams launched pioneering polar flights in the 1920s and
1930s they were assisted by Bergen school meteorologists who could manage the Arctic
atmosphere. Avid skiers from neutral countries who had long lived in the Arctic, these
meteorologists drew on both their experience working in harsh conditions, and theories of
the polar front and air mass analysis to provide meteorological advice crucial to polar
flights. This work brought them international attention, leading to influential careers in
American academic institutions. While Arctic flyways did not become part of the world’s
main transportation routes as quickly as boosters expected in the 1920s, by World War II
they were essential paths for delivering warplanes from American factories to European
battlefields. The Arctic remained a privileged place in meteorological theory, leading the
Allies to attack German meteorological missions to Greenland.
As the emigration of Bergen School acolytes reveal, the United States offered
perhaps the richest place for developing aeronautical meteorology from the mid 1920s

forward. The later chapters therefore move away from a global focus to explore the
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development of aeronautical meteorology in the United States.
Underlying the institutional expansion of meteorology was the development of the
American airline industry. Chapter two describes the central challenge of commercial
flight: keeping to a reliable schedule while flying safely through changing weather
conditions. Aviation historians have described many innovations that contributed to the
solution of this problem, including: instruments that enabled pilots to fly “blind” inside
clouds and fog; radio navigational beacons; lighted airways; and stronger, more powerful
airplanes that could fly around storms or divert to clear airports. I show the important role
played by meteorological experts. Airline meteorologists helped transform aviation form
entertainment into infrastructure; in turn, airline needs shaped the development of
academic meteorology, as illustrated by Horace Byers’s Synoptic and Aeronautical
Meteorology, one of the most important meteorological textbooks of the century.
Within infrastructural science, the interplay between theory and practice often
plays out in the operational patterns of institutions. Chapter Three uses institutional
history to examine the tensions between meteorological theory and weather forecasting
practice. Airline meteorology gave the Bergen School an institutional toehold in the
United States in 1928, when Carl-Gustaf Rossby was appointed professor of meteorology
at MIT. He developed a remarkable research program, but struggled to get air-mass
analysis adopted by the US Weather Bureau, the dominant arbiter in American
meteorology through the 1930s. Bureau observations of the upper air provided material
for Rossby’s theorizing, while theory influenced when and how the air might be
observed. However, practical constraints limited this interplay, as access to an

environment as distant as the upper air was in the 1930s remained expensive and
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circumscribed. While monitoring the upper air was both dangerous and expensive, it led
to Rossby’s discovery of hemispheric waves that could be mathematically calculated to
improve forecasts for upper air conditions.
The coming of World War II brought a tremendous expansion of military
aviation. As officers realized the constraints weather imposed on force projection, they
turned to academic meteorologists. Chapter four focuses on mass meteorological training
for the military. I track the development of two training programs, one for pilots and one
for meteorologists. Where pilots learned their meteorology from manuals that employed
the military’s “thought-picture” method, a style that used comic art, to make technical
information engaging and memorable, military meteorologists went through an intensive
nine-month academic training program equivalent to a master’s degree in meteorology.
This program taught a generation of meteorologists to imagine the atmosphere as a global
entity, best understood in the universal language of physics. By retaining their best
graduates to work as teachers and researchers, organizers of the program helped create a
social hierarchy that privileged theory over operations.
The different training systems experienced by pilots and by meteorologists
created a tension manifested at the most important moment of interface between them,
the pre-flight briefing, when meteorologists would explain to pilots the conditions they
would face in flight. Military fliers complained that academically-trained meteorologists
had trouble communicating with pilots, failing to clearly and efficiently convey the
essential information pilots needed. Meteorologists responded to these concerns by
developing visual aids and a formulaic narrative that more clearly highlighted crucial

information. Some even adopted the visual style that had underlain pilots’
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meteorological education, drawing cartoons to make their pre-flight briefings more
memorable and engaging.
The final chapter explores the invention of the TV weather report in the decades
after World War II, showing how aeronautical meteorology transformed public images of
weather expertise and then was concealed by those public images. Ex-military
meteorologists were among the first to present the weather report on television; they
invented a deeply formulaic genre that combined simplified, hand drawn weather maps
with a narrative largely derived from pre-flight briefings they had developed to
communicate with cartoon educated pilots. This genre became wildly popular, with
unexpected consequences. While meteorologists hoped TV would promote
meteorological education and a better understanding of the challenges of weather
forecasting, they did not anticipate that weathercasters would become celebrities or
primarily entertainers. Although the vast majority of meteorologists do largely invisible
work in support of industrial and military operations, the TV weathercaster has become
the public face of meteorology today. The trivialization of weather forecasting by
television has obscured meteorology’s importance as a support system for industrial life.
The dissertation concludes by reflecting on how infrastructural science can help
historians of science become culturally relevant again. Contemporary industrialized
lifestyles depend upon massive flows of material around the globe. These flows have
released carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases that are transforming the
atmosphere with potentially devastating effects. The discovery of global warming has
revealed that human lifestyle choices can have planet-wide consequences. Perhaps

because industrialization has so comprehensively transformed daily life, history offers
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one of the few perspectives from which to apprehend our utter dependence on the
infrastructure that supports these material movements, and the energy consumption that
makes them possible. While the infrastructural sciences are not currently prestigious in
the way of, say, evolutionary theory, they have an enormous influence on the ways
billions of people in the industrialized world live their daily lives. By drawing our
attention to the interconnections between knowledge, technological systems and the
environment, infrastructural science offers historians of science a perspective from which
to contribute to contemporary discussions of energy and environmental policy.
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Chapter 1
Geopolitics, Aviation and the Bergen School in Arctic Exploration

Aeronautical meteorology’s emergence as an infrastructural science began about
as far from established infrastructure as anyone could get in 1926: high above the North
Pole. It began with a machine that now seems slow, awkward and vulnerable, but then
appeared fast, graceful and well-suited for long-range flight. Captaining the dirigible
Norge were Roald Amundsen and Umberto Nobile, seeking to prove the Arctic could be
flown safely. Standing behind those celebrated explorers in the control car was a vital
expedition member, meteorologist Finn Malmgren. At his fingertips was a radio that
connected him to additional Arctic weather experts at Tromsø, Oslo and Bergen, a
communications machine that could also receive weather observations from the handful
of stations scattered across the Arctic. In his head were physical theories that could
organize those isolated observations into useful descriptions of the present and future
state of the sky. Malmgren had learned to read the polar atmosphere first as a scientific
assistant to Harald Sverdrup on a three year cruise across the Arctic Ocean, and then in
an intensive tutorial at the Geophysical Institute at Bergen, Norway. Upon his trained
judgment (and luck) depended the fate of the first flight across the top of the world.
The development of aviation gave the Arctic a new geopolitical importance in the
1920s and early 1930s. Boosters of Arctic economic development hoped aviation would
make it affordable to extract the rich oil and mineral deposits discovered in Alaska and

Canada’s far north.1 Aviation was expected to make distant places close, and open

36

inaccessible regions to economic and social development. Explorations that once took
months would now take hours, while difficult journeys over rugged terrain would become
common aerial jaunts.2 Geographers and navigators argued that great circle routes
between Europe, Asia and North America would be safer and faster than established
routes across the Atlantic and Pacific. Explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson envisioned the
Arctic as a “northern Mediterranean,” a place where the transports of all nations might
harmoniously share routes and ports as they carried on the world’s commerce.3 Less
idealistically, military strategists like U.S. General William “Billy” Mitchell argued that
control over the Arctic air would hold the key to future wars fought between the
industrialized powers of the northern hemisphere.4
Building infrastructure always requires geographical knowledge. Expanding
transportation infrastructure into the far north required answering questions about the
Arctic environment, and especially about its atmosphere. Was the Arctic a place where
aircraft could fly? What kinds of aircraft were best suited to flying there? When and
where did hazards like fog, clouds, or strong winds prevail? Where could bases be
constructed? To answer these questions, governments and private organizations in many
nations supported Arctic expeditions. To understand if the Arctic was suited for flight,
these expeditions flew planes, dirigibles, kites, and balloons. They trekked through the
Arctic on surface ships, submarines, Icelandic ponies, skis, and propeller-driven motor
1
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sleds. Wealthy private adventurers like Lincoln Ellsworth supported expeditions, like
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Nobile’s, sometimes in concert with geographic societies. The Norwegian Geographical
Society helped fund Amundsen and Nobile’s dirigible flight in 1926, while Mussolini’s
fascist government funded Nobile’s follow-up 1928 expedition in the dirigible Italia.
Plans for intercontinental commercial service led the British air ministry to fund a survey
of Arctic air routes in 1931, while Pan American Airlines retained Stefansson as a
consultant and hired Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh to explore similar
possibilities.
Public interest in polar flight also generated funds. Newspapers like the Detroit
Free Press first sold papers by reporting the drama emerging from the Arctic, and then
attempted to drive circulation by sponsoring flights in exchange for exclusive coverage.
The largely German Aeroarctic expedition, for which Vilhelm Bjerknes was a scientific
advisor, funded their Zeppelin flight by selling stamps, and they were not the only polar
expedition to find a lucrative philatelic market for high latitude cancellations. Charitable
foundations and government weather bureaus chipped in to support the International
Meteorological Organization’s Second International Polar Year.5 All these expeditions
sought to gather meteorological information. They carried weather instruments and
meteorological charts, discussed studies of polar weather, and argued about the influence
of the Arctic on weather around the world. Polar aviation depended on knowing the
weather.
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It was in this context that the Bergen School, a circle of Scandinavian physical
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scientists, centered on Vilhelm Bjerknes and his son Jacob, emerged as a leading force in
meteorology worldwide, for the Bergen School was uniquely placed in the new
geopolitical situation that followed the Great War. Where other meteorologists developed
empirical rules of thumb for forecasting, the Bergen School sought to model the ocean
and atmosphere in thermo- and hydro-dynamic terms. Ideally, they argued,
meteorologists should predict the weather exactly and objectively, by solving a set of
equations that describe real physical relationships in the atmosphere and oceans. This
distant goal would establish meteorology among the physical sciences, “appropriating the
weather” for physics in Robert Marc Friedman’s phrase.6
The Bergen School was essential to polar aviation for several reasons. First, these
scientists had been closely allied with aviation since Vilhelm Bjerknes turned towards
aerology, the study of the upper air, at the start of the 20th century. They studied
atmospheric conditions at heights of interest to fliers. Working from a three-dimensional
model of the atmosphere, they saw aviation as both an ally and a tool—a source of
political and financial support, and a way to get data about the free atmosphere, which
they believed was the driving force and basic cause of surface weather. Second, both the
theories and the lives of the Bergen School were oriented around the Arctic. At the center
of their theory of atmospheric dynamics was the border between polar and mid-latitude
air. This “polar front,” the location of the conflict that drove weather, became a signature
theoretical construct, simultaneously dramatic and easily explained. They theorized the
polar front while forecasting the weather from government institutes covering Norway’s
6
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1,600-mile coastline into the far north. Third, many Bergen scientists grew up under
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and continued to live with Arctic weather. They combined theoretical knowledge and
practical experience of the Arctic. They were athletic, rugged men who could survive and
work in frigid conditions, often reveling in the struggles of Arctic life. They loved to ski.
Finally, the scientists trained at Bergen offered a unique connection between the
scientific communities of the victorious allies and the defeated Germans and Austrians.
As citizens of countries that had been neutral during the war, they had maintained ties
with both sides, and these connections proved important during the difficult postwar
years when the defeated nations were excluded from international scientific and cultural
groups.
This chapter analyzes connections between polar aviation and the Bergen School,
first placing them in a broader geopolitical and technical context, and then following
them more concretely by examining the careers of four Bergen school scientists: Finn
Malmgren, Harald Sverdrup, Jörgen Holmboe, and Sverre Petterssen. These men built
international scientific reputations through their contributions to polar exploration,
helping to bring international attention to the “new Norwegian methods” of meteorology.
The three who survived their polar fieldwork [Malmgren died young] parlayed this
reputation into influential jobs at American research institutions during the mid 1930s.
The early career of another Bergen disciple, Carl-Gustaf Rossby, illuminates the value of
Arctic field experience in establishing international credibility. Though Rossby’s time in
the Arctic amounted to just a brief cruise off the coast of Greenland, he presented footage
of the cruise’s most dramatic events when he first arrived in the United States. To
understand why polar exploration could launch distinguished careers in aeronautical

meteorology, we need first to examine Arctic geopolitics and the meanings of polar
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aviation in the wake of the Great War.
Geopolitics After the Great War
The Great War and the Russian Revolution shattered the balance of powers that
had defined 19th-century geopolitics, leaving an uncertain situation pulled between fear
and hope. Difficult as it is to imagine in the light of World War II, military planners
during the early 1920s envisioned a future war between Great Britain and the United
States.7 One trigger, they argued, might be Pacific expansion. Britain and Japan had a
long-standing military and economic alliance, which had served each during the War.
The Imperial Japanese Navy, trained by British officers and sailing British-built
warships, had protected the Canadian Pacific coast from German commerce raiders, thus
freeing the Royal Navy to focus on defending the Atlantic.8 America’s emergence as a
first-rate world power, though built upon its enormous internal market and domestic
resources, challenged the pre-eminence of the British Empire, especially as the leading
arbiter of global trade. Leadership in global trade had long meant naval power, a point
emphasized by German U-boat operations during the war. The US had already reached
naval parity with Great Britain, a fact ratified by the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. But
wartime advances in aviation suggested that flight might become an equally important
factor.
Countries that first mastered potentially valuable air routes could use that mastery
to conquer markets and exercise control. To prevent the US from developing a powerful
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lead in air transport during the 1930s, the British government sought to stall the
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development of transatlantic flight. It forbade the use of Canadian and English landing
fields for regular commercial flights between the US and Great Britain until both nations
had airplanes and airlines equally capable of flying the routes.9 Efforts to fly the Arctic
thus reflected the powerful influences of nationalism and beliefs in a sequential hierarchy
of nations.
If the suspicious minds of conservative military planners saw the threat of war
looming everywhere, optimistic progressives dreamed of a demilitarized and open future
emerging from the terrible ashes of the Great War. The Washington Treaty struck a
hopeful note for multilateral disarmament, as powerful nations voluntarily agreed to scrap
dozens of warships on the slips while limiting the destructive power of future fleets. The
Washington Treaty also replaced the Anglo-Japanese alliance with a multilateral
agreement not to fortify Pacific islands west of Hawaii, potentially easing tensions
between Japan and the United States. As elaborated in President Woodrow Wilson’s
Fourteen Points, progressives hoped that open agreements openly arrived at, informed by
objective scientific advice, might resolve international disputes without war.10 In this
view, scientific internationalism offered a model for organizing global affairs, where the
cooperation amongst unprejudiced scientists of all nations represented the noblest pattern
of human organization. A hierarchy of merit and accomplishment, guided by objective
9
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facts discovered through natural and social science, could guide sound negotiations
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free from the hysterical nationalisms created by propaganda and the mass press.
Meteorology both displayed and fed on these contradictory tendencies. The
International Meteorological Organization (IMO) reconvened in Paris in 1919, five years
after its last meeting, and set to work re-establishing the international data sharing that
had become crucial to weather forecasting across Europe.11 It excluded representatives of
the Central Powers, however, cutting off many of the best-educated and most
accomplished meteorologists in the world. As in other branches of science, German and
Austrian researchers were shunned for having supported their governments in the run up
to War.12
Like meteorology, polar exploration too was buffeted by the contradictory
impulses shaping interwar geopolitics. While explorers from many nations cooperated in
a wide range of bilateral and international expeditions, support for their expeditions came
from backers on both sides of the geopolitical fence. Progressive internationalists
presented polar exploration as a display of international cooperation, establishing the
Arctic as a crossroads of mankind. But exploring also legitimated national claims to
administer Arctic spaces under international law. As ongoing discoveries revealed the
mineral wealth of the Arctic, discovering (and controlling) new lands could provide
access to crucial resources. The potential economic importance of the Arctic played a key
role in the activities of Canada, the United States, Great Britain, Denmark, and Norway.
To the defeated populations of Germany and Austria, the Arctic offered a space for
11

Hendrik Gerrit Cannegieter, The History of the International Meteorological Organization, 1872-1951
(Selbstverlag des Deutschen Wetterdienstes, 1963).
12
For instance, Matthew Stanley, “An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War: The 1919 Eclipse
Expedition and Eddington as Quaker Adventurer.” Isis 94 (2003): 57–89.

national redemption, a place to prove to themselves and to the world their enduring
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cultural power. For governments of dubious international standing, such as fascist Italy,
polar achievements became a means of asserting ideological legitimacy.
Conquering the Arctic through flight offered a particularly powerful symbol of
modern accomplishment. Flying great circle routes would offer the fastest and most
efficient way to move between Europe, North America, and Japan. The geographical
advantages of great circle routes had long been obvious to anyone with a globe and a
piece of string. Taking advantage of these shorter routes, however, was harder than
stretching string. Travelers first had to control their own locomotion; sailing ships made
faster passages by following routes that conformed to seasonal patterns of reliable winds.
Northerly great circle routes also required new kinds of environmental surveillance.
Steamships encountered icebergs, incurring losses that culminated in the sinking of the
Titanic in 1912, which led to the creation of the international ice patrol, an endeavor that
depended on radio.13 Arctic great circle routes presented problems with persistent fog,
strong winds, ice, and severe cold. With the expectation, voiced loudly by aviators and
commentators, that aviation would transform power-relations and the fighting of wars,
knowing how to fly and live in the Arctic seemed quite important in the wake of the
Great War. Yet meteorologists agreed that navigating the Arctic atmosphere required
coordinated observations across the top of the world. The Arctic atmosphere was thus
alluring to nationalists and internationalists alike.

13

Ron Rainger, “Edward ‘Iceberg’ Smith and American Polar Oceanography,” in Extremes:
Oceanography’s Adventures at the Poles, edited by Keith Benson and Helen Rozwadowski (Sagamore
Beach, MA. Science History Publications, 2007): 133-172.

Interwar Meteorology and Polar Exploration
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Polar exploration was a very different activity after the Great War than before it.
Coinciding with the war, the Shackleton Expedition’s disastrous fate had marked the end
of the “Heroic Age” of exploration. The 1920s would see the emergence of new patterns
for organizing polar expeditions, especially their scientific work.14 The postwar also saw
the emergence of a more practical and utilitarian interest in the Arctic.15 Expeditions
more often sought to prove the viability of operations in the Arctic, rather than the
harshness and challenges of its conditions. For expeditions such as the Navy’s Arctic
flight,16 and the flight of the Norge the goal was to show the feasibility of flight, despite
the harsh conditions. Expedition publications asserted that flying would transcend
distance and environmental conditions. They hoped to show that Arctic flying was a
reasonable, not exceptional, activity that should become commonplace.
At the heart of these utilitarian interests in the Arctic was the expectation that
aviation would open the Arctic to economic exploitation. Before the Great War, interest
in the Arctic was usually related to more symbolic or cultural concerns. After the war,
with nearly the entirety of the world’s land now under the political and economic control
of the industrialized nations, the Polar Regions offered the last chances for discovering
and claiming new land. The Arctic had previously been economically exploited by sea,
primarily for sealing and whaling. Sea travel prevailed, at least during the summer, and
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maritime access organized the pattern of settlement and exploitation. The development
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of aviation might change these patterns, especially by opening the interior of the
Canadian and Soviet Arctic. While overland travel was known to be dangerous and slow,
flying offered the promise of being both safe and quick, taking hours to travel distances
that took months on foot or with dog sleds. Arctic boosters hoped (a hope that was
eventually borne out), that aviation could deliver the tools and personnel necessary to
recover mineral deposits in Alaska, Northern Canada, and Siberia.
Meteorology had long been a central activity of polar exploration. The
Humboldtian scientific expeditions of the 19th century always included meteorological
instruments for recording the weather they encountered as they trudged or sledded across
the Arctic. The International Meteorological Organization put together the first
International Polar Year in 1882-83, just about a decade after the IMO had been
established.17 Polar exploration also provided career credibility in meteorology: three
years after being rescued from Ellesmere Island, where he was leading an ill-fated
American Polar Year expedition, Adolphus Greely of the US Army Signal Corps became
head of the Corps and the national weather observing network it ran.18 The so-called
“Heroic Age” of polar exploration likewise sought to measure and record weather. In
part, these records of extreme conditions served to emphasize the dangers and difficulties
of polar exploring, thus strengthening the argument that such expeditions proved the
masculinity of the explorers. Weather records buttressed the notion that the hardy
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endurance of adventurers served as a public antidote to concerns that industrialization
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had emasculated and enfeebled western men.19
Where meteorology had benefitted from polar exploration, with aviation, polar
exploration became more dependent on meteorology. Successful polar exploration had
long depended upon at least moderately favorable weather conditions,20 but the use of
aviation greatly narrowed the range of weather conditions when successful polar
exploration could occur. Meteorological observations had previously been something
expeditions collected. They now became essential to daily operations as well.
Meteorologists accordingly played crucial parts of the leadership and management of
polar expeditions. The knowledge and advice of meteorologists determined the routes
expeditions took, when they began, and where they chose to stop. Recounting the flight
of the Norge Finn Malmgren noted, “On the 10th of May, in the evening, it was
announced that the airship was now ready. We now merely waited for word from the
meteorologists.”21 Mechanizing polar exploration made explorers more dependent upon
environmental conditions.
Not all explorers embraced the dependencies created by mechanizing
exploration.22 British explorer George Binney bemoaned how flight made the explorer
dependent upon the work of distant craftsmen: “Aeroplanes are mechanical, unreasoning,
and unreasonable things… Because some craftsman at home carelessly mixes the
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components of an alloy in their wrong proportions, we all but lose our lives. … The
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explorer who relies on his dogs and on his own powers of traveling is not subject to the
whims of inaccurate craftsmen. He has the making of his own success or failure.”23
Binney preferred to trust his life to his own character and preparation, rather than the
work of anonymous mechanics. He was not opposed to using aircraft entirely. The proper
place for aviation lay at the expedition’s start; the explorer ought to pack a plane with
sledges, dog teams and rations, rather than tanks of petrol. The expedition should fly as
far as possible, then abandon the plane on the ice and sledge on from the landing site,
never expecting to see the plane again. “Under these circumstances the crew can regard
with equanimity the possibility of a forced landing on the pack-ice, either through
mechanical defect or through blizzard, because they have the necessary food and
equipment for a long polar sledge journey.”24 For Binney, successful explorers eliminated
external dependencies. Rather than rely on flawless machines or suitable weather
conditions, the explorer should be prepared to survive regardless of circumstances.
The belief that aviation would make the Arctic a place of practical utility shaped
the meteorological interests of postwar expeditions. While expeditions continued to
attend to surface conditions, they became increasingly interested in the conditions of the
upper air. They typically included someone specifically concerned with aerology and
often carried things like kites, pilot balloons, and radiosondes to observe the air well
above the surface. In addition to new instruments, expeditions used new forms of
transport in their exploring, such as airplanes, autogyros (a sort of airplane/helicopter
hybrid) and dirigibles.
23
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As arctic explorers focused their attention on aerology to aid practical flight,
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meteorologists focused on the arctic upper air for theoretical reasons. An increasing
number of meteorologists were coming to believe that the general circulation of the
atmosphere was central to understanding local weather prediction.
Meteorology has often been described as a science of interconnections. Rather
than isolating variables or attempting to perform mimetic experiments in laboratories,
meteorologists in the 1920s and 1930s typically sought to find connections, such as those
between ocean and atmosphere or between ice and cyclones.25 The key to understanding
weather lay in a rigorous knowledge of the physics of the atmosphere, a physics that
aspired to use global interconnections to explain local conditions. Understanding the
weather in Des Moines required observations not just of Iowa, but a global, or at least
hemispheric, observing system. As more and more areas of the map were filled in
working northward, and into the oceans, the far north remained a key blank region. The
Arctic became central to understanding the weather of the northern hemisphere.
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The Arctic was not only a meteorologically blank region, but also one that
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occupied a theoretically influential place.28 As one Popular Science headline put it in
1933, “Air Leaks in Polar Waste Hold Secrets of Coming Weather.”29 (Figure 1.2)

Figure 1.2: The Arctic represented an important space in meteorological theory, generating the
reservoir of cold air that animated temperate weather. Note, however, that air masses form in clear,
not cloudy conditions, as depicted above. (From “Air Leaks in Polar Waste Hold Secrets of Coming
Weather.” Popular Science, 1933, p. 13.)

The region included the source region for cold air masses that affected the temperate
latitudes. The new focus on the Poles continued a major development in meteorology, the
construction of meteorology as a global science, one dependent upon widely dispersed,
28

“All the well-known theories of the general circulation of the atmosphere—Maury’s or James Thomson’s
or Ferrel’s and even V. Bjerknes’ and, with a dislocation of the northern pole from 90° to somewhere in
Greenland, W. H. Hobbs’s also—are zonal and have a certain symmetry about the pole. The question
naturally arises, ‘Is there really a meteorological pole around which weather is symmetrical?’” Sir Napier
Shaw, “Arctic Weather of April 15-16, 1928: With Some Observations on Polar Weather in Relation to the
General Circulation,” Geographical Review 18 (October 1928): 556-566.
29
Andrew R. Boone, “Air Leaks in Polar Waste Hold Secrets of Coming Weather.” Popular Science 123
(Oct. 1933): 11-13, 92.

coordinated observing stations, and thus also dependent upon international
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cooperation. As meteorologists developed this vision of meteorology as an international
science, they emphasized working through international institutions like the IMO. But
they also needed people who could bridge the chasms produced by the Great War—the
bitter divides between people caused by nationalism. The Bergen School filled this niche
admirably.

The Bergen School and Aviation
The Bergen School justifiably stands at the center of the historiography of 20th
century meteorology. Robert Marc Friedman’s pioneering study, Appropriating the
Weather, introduced historians to the circle of early 20th century Scandinavian scientists
around Vilhelm Bjerknes and his son Jacob, who sought to understand the ocean and
atmosphere through classical physics. Ideally, the Bergen School argued, meteorologists
should predict the weather exactly and objectively, by solving a set of equations that
describe real physical relationships in the atmosphere and oceans.30 This distant goal
established meteorology among the physical sciences, providing a research direction that
yielded key advances in understanding the atmosphere’s behavior, from the identification
of air masses and the polar front, through numerical weather prediction, to the general
circulation models central to understanding climate change today. Deborah Day has
described how Jacob Bjerknes and Vilhelm’s student Harald Sverdrup moved to the
United States to build research programs in meteorology and physical oceanography,

30

Robert Marc Friedman, Appropriating the Weather: Vilhelm Bjerknes and the Construction of a Modern
Meteorology (Cornell University Press, 1990). See also Arnt Eliassen “Vilhelm Bjerknes and his Students,”
Annual Reviews in Fluid Mechanics 14 (1982): 1-14.

establishing southern California as “Bergen West.”31 Gregory Cushman has extended
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that story southward, showing how Bergen School training programs helped keep Latin
America in the United States’ political and commercial orbit after Franklin Roosevelt
renounced military intervention.32 Kristine Harper documented the crucial role played by
another Bjerknes student, Carl-Gustaf Rossby, and his colleagues in developing
operational numerical weather prediction in the decade after World War II.33 Computer
historians have used Bergen School-style numerical weather prediction to show how
computation and simulation became a novel path to natural knowledge in the 20th century,
from Frederik Nebeker’s study of meteorological calculation technologies, to Paul
Edwards’s argument that “the global atmosphere” as an object of scientific and political
significance emerges from the computing and communications infrastructure that
underlies a planetary network of sensors.34 These studies have revealed the Bergen
School’s pivotal role in developing objective, reliable techniques for predicting the
behavior of the atmosphere and oceans.
While scholars have emphasized the Bergen School’s contributions as theorists
and modelers, they have also attended to the Bergen School’s applied work. Harper and
Friedman have documented how the necessity of developing operational forecasting
services crucially affected the Bergen School’s theoretical contributions. Harper argues
that a “tag team” of Scandinavian meteorologists played a decisive role in making
31
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numerical weather prediction feasible, bringing a combined experience in daily
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forecasting and theoretical modeling that the younger American dynamicists lacked, and
making the first generation of weather simulations behave more realistically.35 This
integrated approach developed in the Swedish and Norwegian national meteorological
services, particularly the Bergen forecast office. As Friedman describes, aviation’s
military uses during World War I and its expected commercial development after the war
had provided key support for Vilhelm Bjerknes’s efforts to create a separate forecasting
office, which was established in Bergen and led by his son Jacob. This office had
considerable autonomy from the central Norwegian weather service in Christiana (Oslo),
enabling it to experiment with new techniques for analyzing weather maps, as well as
incorporate upper air observations into daily forecasting. The daily routines of forecasting
pushed the Bergen School to simplify their efforts to calculate the weather, encouraging
the development of graphical methods, rather than strictly numerical ones. These
methods eventually made it easier to teach the new approaches to operational forecasters
who were not as deeply trained in physics and mathematics. Most importantly, the daily
routines of making and analyzing weather maps, when combined with previous training
in dynamic meteorology, led to theoretical insights that produced the two of the most
significant developments in synoptic meteorology: the concept of the air mass and Jacob
Bjerknes’s theory of cyclogenesis.36 The Bergen Office became a central node in the
network distributing the Bergen School approach to understanding the atmosphere, with
several meteorologists working and learning there prior to serving on polar expeditions.
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The daily work of the forecasting office demonstrated the practical value that the
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Bergen School’s dynamic meteorological techniques could provide, particularly in
understanding the weather at flying altitudes.
The historiography of the Bergen School, however, has paid little attention to the
crucial role of fieldwork. Existing studies depict the Bergen School inside offices and
classrooms, working with maps, equations and computers. Like the contemporary
American weather forecasters Gary Alan Fine has studied, the Bergen School are usually
presented as men who “live in a world of clean hands and indoor work.”37 But the Bergen
School contributed more than just weather forecasts to Arctic aviation expeditions during
the 1920s and 1930s. Several Bergen School scientists joined the expeditions directly,
journeying across the Arctic and Antarctic alongside more famous explorers.
Beyond their theoretical and practical knowledge of the upper air, Bergen School
scientists made ideal polar explorers in the post-war world because of their nationalities,
Arctic experience and their physical hardiness. As Scandinavian scientists, they
participated in the institutions and social networks central to polar exploration, while as
citizens of neutral countries, they could negotiate between national animosities in the
wake of World War I, enabling them to join the national expeditions of other countries,
as well as play a leading role in organizing multinational scientific collaboration. Some
grew up north of the Arctic Circle, learning to read the Arctic environment from their
parents and grandparents. Life in this rugged climate developed physical strength and
personal fortitude, traits reinforced in these fit and athletic young men through strenuous
outdoor activities like military training, skiing and hiking. The lives of several Bergen
37
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School scientists reveal how these traits intertwined to produce successful Arctic
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expeditions that launched internationally prominent careers.

Sverre Petterssen: Growing up in the Arctic
The influence of living and working in the Arctic on the Bergen School is shown
by the career of Sverre Petterssen (1898-1974), one of the leading weather forecasters
and synoptic meteorologists of the twentieth century. Petterssen grew up in a Norwegian
coastal community north of the Arctic Circle. Fishing was central to the economy of his
home in the nordland, though it required braving the dangerous storms of the Barents
Sea. At his grandfather’s knee, Petterssen learned how to read nature, being taught “a
great deal about whales, porpoises, cod and herring; the seasons of the Lofoten and the
Finnmarken fisheries; the calendar of the migrating birds; and the deeds of famous
fishermen.”38 His memoir describes his fondness for the outdoors, recounting rowing
voyages with his older brother, long ski trips, and bird watching afternoons. Summers
spent in the military reserve kept his body fit while studying at gymnasium and then the
University of Oslo, where he first encountered meteorology. An international seminar on
meteorology in 1923 brought him into the Bjerknes orbit. After working in the Bergen
forecast office and on a mountaintop weather observatory, Petterssen was posted to the
Norwegian Geophysical Institute at Tromsø, Norway’s most northerly weather office.
Petterssen’s forecasting work at Tromsø would bring him international
recognition, but his memoir emphasizes the opportunities the north presented for
adventures. As he put it, “Tromsø was a skier’s paradise; I simply lived on skis. In my
38
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daily work I found the rucksack more convenient than the briefcase.” He joined a
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skiing expedition that zigzagged through the rugged mountains between Tromsø and the
Finnish border, crossed the Swedish wilderness, and ended with “nineteen hours of
difficult skiing” to reach “the nearest farmhouses in Norway—at four o’clock Good
Friday Morning.”39 He described how moving back to the Arctic deepened his
appreciation, noting, “In my childhood I had taken life in Nordland for granted. …
Returning to it, I tried to make a deliberate effort to observe and understand what I
saw.”40 Opportunities for observation came on trips into Lapland and to Spitsbergen,
delivering replacement instruments and maintaining the stations that radioed weather
observations. After missing a coal ship that should have borne him back to the mainland,
Petterssen had eighteen days to bird watch, visit the glacial tongues, and witness icebergs
calving from Spitsbergen’s glaciers. Returning to Tromsø, Petterssen combined his
knowledge of the Bergen School techniques with the experience of two older forecasters
to ensure the fishing fleet was not caught at sea by severe storms. “Once in a while,” he
remembered, decades later, “I wished my grandfather had been there to see how things
had changed: better boats and a reasonably reliable storm warning service.”41
Petterssen integrated this storm warning service into polar aviation in connection
with the exploration flights of the late 1920s. Within Petterssen’s forecast area were the
far northern islands of Svalbard, including Spitsbergen. Because Spitsbergen was
inhabited by Norwegian coal miners and accessible by sea, it became a key launching
point for polar flights. These flights tested the new service’s limits. In April 1926,
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crossing from Spitsbergen to Nome, Alaska. “Until then, I had never attempted to
forecast for such a long period.”42 He successfully identified a stretch of suitable weather,
during which time Richard Byrd and Floyd Bennett’s competing expedition took off and
returned to Spitsbergen in a Ford tri-motor, claiming to have flown over the North Pole.
But the Norge needed minor repairs, and was unable to take off until near the end of this
predicted clear stretch. “In the meantime, a disturbance in the form of a low pressure area
had moved eastward into Siberia. Though reports were very sparse I had reason to
believe that the disturbance was heading for Alaska.” 43 Petterssen correctly predicted the
fine flying conditions north of the 80th parallel, and the clouds and strong winds in the
northern approaches to Alaska that eventually required the ship to land in Teller, AK,
somewhat short of its destination at Nome.
In 1927 polar flights ceased for a round of fundraising and planning; they would
resume around Spitsbergen in 1928. The first of these was Sir Hubert Wilkins and Carl
Ben Eielson’s flight from Alaska to Spitsbergen. Petterssen and the forecasting office at
Tromsø knew nothing of this flight until several days after their plane had been forced
down, apparently, it was later revealed, by a storm of the “Bjerknes type.” “About twelve
hours before takeoff a storm began to develop right on the east coast of Greenland, about
71° N. At the time of takeoff intensification set in.” 44 The storm reached peak intensity
near Spitsbergen just as the plane approached the islands, but good fortune and Eielson’s
considerable skills enabled the plane to land in deep snow. Five days later, they hiked
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Wilkins needed a scientific account of the conditions he had experienced. “What he
needed was dignified publicity to assist in raising funds for new enterprises.” Generating
the content for this report became Petterssen’s job, but since he was just a junior
forecaster in a remote Norwegian weather office, “it was understood that my
[Petterssen’s] factual report would be used by Sir Napier Shaw, a prominent and
exceptionally eloquent British meteorologist and physicist, to write an article of the type
Wilkins had in mind.” 45 This article, published in leading British journal Geographical
Review, would help bring attention to the theories of the Bergen School.46
Petterssen parlayed this publicity, and his new connections into a broader career,
putting himself in a position that would allow him to influence the next generation of
meteorologists. After returning to Bergen in 1928, he was recruited to teach forecasting
in Canada, the U.S. Weather Bureau, and then at MIT. While teaching at MIT, Petterssen
remembered, “some of my more venturesome students even joined my Sunday skiing
school in the hills north of Boston.”47 He played a pivotal role in the forecast for D-Day,
and later became the director of scientific services for the US Air Force weather service.
Near the end of his life, he renounced his US citizenship in protest over the corruption of
the American political system reflected by the Nixon Administration.48
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Like Petterssen, Jörgen Holmboe (1902-1979) grew up in a small community
north of the Arctic Circle, where, also like Petterssen, he developed a love of skiing,
hiking and observing nature. With his training in meteorology, these traits would take
Holmboe from nearly the top to nearly the bottom of the world, and around its
circumference as well. He forecast weather on four continents, and taught meteorology in
New Zealand and the United States, where he also instructed a group of leaders of Latin
American weather services during World War II. His warm and enthusiastic personality
and habit of generous hospitality made Holmboe an effective international ambassador
for the Bergen School.
Holmboe’s participation in vigorous winter sports became a key part of his
identity, just as they had with Petterssen. His obituary celebrated him as “an avid out-ofdoor person, hiking, skiing, and gardening throughout his life. (One daring ski run down
the mountains outside Bergen shortly after his return from Antarctica had both disastrous
results--broken bones and hospitalization--and happy consequences, since it introduced
him to his nurse, Kirsten Bendixen, whom he subsequently married.) Colleagues and
students well remember hiking with him in the early years [of his time in California, the
1940s] in the canyons of the Santa Monica Mountains. It was all they could do to keep up
with his long rapid strides; while he eloquently propounded on his current ideas on
science, politics, or the arts, they were too breathless to agree or dissent.”49 Outdoor
sports also shaped his working life and the arc of his career, both by directing him
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towards the study of mountains, and by preparing his body for the rigors of polar
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exploration.
Born on an island near the northernmost point of Norway, Holmboe attended
secondary school in Tromsø before moving south to the University of Oslo. Here, from
1925 to 1930, he served as a research assistant to Vilhelm Bjerknes who had just retired
and handed over leadership of the Geophysical Institute in Bergen to Harald Sverdrup.50
After receiving his advanced degree in 1930, Holmboe joined the Norwegian Weather
Service as a forecaster at Tromsø before being transferred to Bergen in 1932. This put
him in a position to work with polar flights, and in doing so to promote the techniques of
the Bergen School. From 1933 to 1935, Holmboe acted as the meteorologist for the
Lincoln Ellsworth Antarctic expedition, which made pioneering flights around the South
Pole. During a delay before the launch of that expedition, he demonstrated Bergen School
techniques to the New Zealand Weather Service.
Like Petterssen, Holmboe turned the credibility and connections he had gained
through polar exploration into an institutional home at MIT, where he taught from 19361940. In 1940 he joined Jacob Bjerknes in founding UCLA’s meteorology program
where, during the 1950s, he headed a study of mountain meteorology that used
instrument-laden gliders to skim along mountain ridges. Before his retirement from
UCLA in 1970, his home was “the unofficial social center of the department,” as he and
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who visited this leading department.51

Harald Sverdrup, International Arctic Organizer
The “quiet mannerly” Harald Sverdrup was one of the most important institution
builders of the Bergen school.52 The son of a minister and history professor, Sverdrup
was not initially an athlete. But he received serious physical training during his year of
compulsory military service at the Norwegian Military Academy. Sverdrup recognized he
needed physical training and was proud of finishing “as the top man in athletics,”
according to his eulogist and oceanography colleague Walter Nierenberg. “It probably
was essential to his survival and positive performance later during his long Arctic
ordeals.”53
Sverdrup learned dynamic meteorology and oceanography as an assistant to
Vilhelm Bjerknes, funded by the Professor’s long running grant from the Carnegie
Institution of Washington. Sverdrup then left for seven years sailing the Arctic with
Roald Amundsen from 1918 to 1925, returning to take up the chair at the Bergen
Geophysical Institute when Bjerknes retired. In addition to his oceanographic research,
Sverdrup researched the boundary layer between the atmosphere and glaciers on
Spitsbergen. He organized the scientific group for the failed North Polar Submarine
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expedition of 1931 led by Hubert Wilkins and Lincoln Ellsworth.54 He became director
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of the Scripps Institution in 1936, leading the expansion of physical oceanography in the
United States. An article celebrating his installation at Scripps noted, “no doubt from
Professor Bjerknes, Sverdrup received an excellent theoretical background which greatly
facilitated his advance to the enviable position which he now holds among men of
science.”55
Sverdrup’s role in exploration and polar fieldwork helped bring him to
international attention, positioning him to organize the Second International Polar Year.
Sverdrup was one of five people who served on the sub-commission that drew up a
formal proposal for IPY2. After this proposal was approved by the International
Meteorological Conference of Directors in September 1929, Sverdrup became one of the
original seven members of the commission charged with planning the observation
schedule. Sverdrup and British meteorologist George Simpson determined what
instruments were to be used for meteorological observations, while Sverdrup, Simpson,
and the French geophysicist C. Maurain were appointed to arrange for the publication of
the results of the IPY observations. World War II disrupted full publication of the
observations, but Sverdrup was also appointed to the postwar Liquidating Commission
charged with “bringing the manifold activities of the Second International Polar Year to a
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satisfactory conclusion, thereby endeavoring to derive the maximum benefit for the
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science of geophysics from the multitude of data and publications available.”56
The IPY2’s surface weather observations formed the basis for a set of synoptic
charts of the Northern Hemisphere. These were to be prepared by the Deutsche Seewarte
in Hamburg. When the war broke out in 1939, maps covering ten months had been
printed; an additional six weeks of charts were printed after the war, but the material
covering the final two weeks of the IPY was destroyed during the war. As British
meteorologist C.E.P. Brooks noted, “the form of the isobars shows the charts to have
been … analysed on the Norwegian method, but fronts as such are not indicated.”57
Probably Sverdrup’s most enduring contribution to the IPY was administering
grants that paid for the first substantial production of the radiosonde, a new tool for
studying the upper atmosphere in real time. The radiosonde was actually a complex of
instruments for measuring the humidity, barometric pressure and temperature of the air.
Attached to a pilot balloon, these instruments rose through the air at a constant speed,
while the radiosonde broadcast this information to a receiving station on the ground. By
triangulating the signal, upper level winds could also be measured. One early Russian
radiosonde model had been tested on the Aeroarctic’s Graf Zeppelin flight in 1931. With
50,000 francs from the International Meteorological Association and $10,000 from the
Rockefeller Foundation, the IPY2 was the first time radiosonde observations of the upper
atmosphere could be coordinated on a large scale. While “many difficulties arose
because the instrument … [had] only recently been designed and was still in an
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experimental stage,” the Polar Year clearly “expedited the development of the
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radiosonde.”58 As C.E.P. Brooks noted, “preparations for the manufacture of some
hundreds of instruments speeded up its development very considerably.”59 Within a few
years, radiosondes had become standard equipment in weather services across Europe
and North America.60
Sverdrup’s Arctic fieldwork was an essential aspect of his emergence as an
international leader in geophysics. An article announcing his arrival at Scripps touted,
“Dr. Sverdrup has not confined himself to mere study in the library and laboratory, for he
has filled out his researches by carrying out with brilliant success what has probably been
the most ambitious and versatile field program of any modern investigator.”61 His career
made clear that successful polar research built international connections, while
demonstrating that a scientist was capable of integrating theory and fieldwork to produce
accurate and useful knowledge.

Finn Malmgren, Bergen Teamwork
Unlike Petterssen, Holmboe, and Sverdrup, Malmgren was a Swede. Also unlike
them, he began with polar exploration and then moved to meteorology. Yet his career
likewise shows the value of Bergen School meteorology to international Arctic flights.
Malmgren learned how to live and work in the Arctic under the watchful eye of
Norway’s most famous Arctic Explorer, Roald Amundsen, aboard the Maud from 1922
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until 1925. As the expedition’s assistant scientist, he worked with Sverdrup, forging a
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close bond with him. Malmgren was an easy man to like, quick with a joke and happy to
laugh at himself. Amundsen described him as a most popular crew member, writing “If it
is true that a good laugh lengthens life, then, thanks to Malmgren, I shall live to a ripe old
age.”62 Living in the Arctic molded men socially as well as physically. Long expeditions
tested the character of men, and it was here that Malmgren particularly excelled.
Amundsen’s respect for Malmgren brought him an invitation to serve as
meteorologist and chief scientist for the Norge’s flight in 1926. The expedition was
absolutely thick with connections to the Bergen School. Malmgren began his preparations
by studying at the Bergen Geophysical Institute then under Sverdrup’s leadership, where
he became acquainted with “the new weather-report methods which have been in the first
place worked out by the meteorologists [Jacob] Bjerknes, [Halvor] Solberg, and [Tor]
Bergeron.”63 The crew picked up the Norge in Italy where it had been manufactured
under the supervision of Umberto Nobile, who would fly on as Captain. The semi-rigid
airship flew to Spitsbergen with stops in England, southern Scandinavia, Leningrad, and
Vadso. While the ship stopped over at Pulham, England, Malmgren had a chance to
consult with Jacob Bjerknes, who was then temporarily lecturing and researching in
Britain. 64 After departing England, the ship had special weather reports radioed to it,
including many from Petterssen’s office in Tromsø. Malmgren chronicled the essential
role played by Theodor Hesselberg, the head of Norway’s national weather service and
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another former assistant to Vilhelm Bjerknes. Malmgren credited Hesselberg with
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“having arranged the whole of the meteorological precautionary service,” noting that
Hesselberg’s “international connections” enabled him to procure “help for the expedition
from several institutes abroad—from the Italian, French, English, Swedish, Russian and
American.” 65 This international assistance helped ensure the Norge flew in reasonably
clear skies. Malmgren noted the amount of work this apparent good luck required: “The
story of the expedition shows that on the whole the various stages of the journey were
favored with the best of weather. That such was the case was not a matter of mere
chance. With the help of a well-planned organization and a good deal of labor we
succeeded … in making a start at such points of time when the weather was fine.” The
Norwegian weather service also loaned the expedition all the meteorological instruments
the ship carried, and authorized special in flight updates and warnings to be sent from
Tromsø and Oslo. 66
Malmgren described polar aviation in an essay that appeared in Amundsen and
Ellsworth’s book First crossing of the Polar Sea, the kind of serious but accessible
exploration narrative whose publication was crucial to funding and maintaining public
interest in future expeditions. He described the three main meteorological challenges to
the expedition as wind (including eddies around the hanger at launching), ice forming on
the ship, and fog and visibility hazards that hampered navigation. “Almost all the
difficulties encountered by the airship,” he noted, “were connected with unfortunate
conditions of weather.”67 Malmgren explained his work this way:
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66
[the expedition meteorologist’s] duty was to foresee the weather, and, in
conjunction therewith, give the leaders advice in those matters where the weather
more or less plays a part. It was thus his work to point out, by the help of synoptic
charts, the best flying route, and, by the help of the telegraphed pilot balloon
pointers, indicate the best altitude of flight. Besides this he should give the
probable value of a number of meteorological values in landing, as, for instance,
the barometric position of the place, and its temperature in places where not
telegraphed. Finally, he should take the observations of weather that were
collected during the Norge’s voyage. These included, amongst others, barometer,
thermometer, and humidity readings, and also observations of clouds and such
things. During the polar flight itself there were added a number of air-electric
measurements.68
These were heavy responsibilities, and Malmgren had no assistant, other than the help he
might be able to raise on the radio depending on conditions. As the flight lasted over 70
hours, he was collapsing with exhaustion as they approached Alaska, just at the moment
when his expertise was most needed to judge the winds while finding a space to land.
Despite the strain, Malmgren so enjoyed the enterprise that he signed up for the
sequel, Nobile’s 1928 flight in the new dirigible Italia. Again he would serve as flight
meteorologist, though this time he would be the only non-Italian aboard. Nobile and
Amundsen had a falling out in the wake of the Norge flight, and Nobile now sought to
prove his own merit independent of the “Great Man.” Unfortunately, Nobile was a much
better aeronautical engineer than a leader of men. The mission was poorly planned,
ineptly equipped, and chauvinistic. The Italians wanted no international help. Numerous
delays pushed the expedition to the edge of its weather envelope, and the flight ended in
disaster. On the return leg south from the Pole, a weather-related crash left the surviving
crew members stranded on ice floes about 180 miles from Spitsbergen. As one of the
hardiest men in the crew, and the only one with extensive Arctic experience, Malmgren
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set out across the ice with two others to get help. Though his two companions were
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eventually rescued, he died of exposure.69

Carl-Gustaf Rossby: Arctic Fieldwork and International Credibility
Rossby’s polar experience was diametrically opposed to Malmgren’s tragic and
deep involvement. Rossby’s field experiences consisted of a single observational cruise
off the coast of Greenland in the summer. In a clear demonstration of the importance of
Arctic field experience for international credibility, however, this short trip became
central to Rossby’s self-presentation when he introduced himself to the American
meteorological establishment in 1926. Not long after Rossby arrived in the United States
on a fellowship provided by the American-Scandinavian Foundation, he presented a
motion picture he made on his 1923 Greenland cruise aboard the Conrad Holmboe at the
April, 1926 meeting of the AMS in Washington. The film made quite an impression.
According to a summary of the meeting, the film showed: “The ship had been sent to
effect a change of personnel for the meteorological station at Scoresby Sound. Its mission
very nearly ended tragically for those on board, and did so for those who were to have
been relieved. When the Holmboe got within a few miles of the station, ice pressure so
opened her seams that continuous pumping until she reached Iceland alone saved her.
While the ice pressure was at its worst, the personnel of the station were observed setting
out in a boat along leads in the ice, were then lost sight of, and have not since been heard
from.”70 As the film makes clear, arctic meteorology and Arctic dangers heroically
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overcome, modeled by scientists like Greely and Sverdrup, had become a valuable
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component of the meteorologist’s life story.71

Conclusion
The Bergen School was ideally placed to take advantage of a new interest in the
Arctic, expressed by military planners as well as progressive internationalists after the
Great War. As aviation made the Arctic geopolitically important, the Bergen School had
the theoretical and practical knowledge necessary to make the Arctic flyable. Their life
experience in Arctic conditions, as well as their Scandinavian nationalities, put them in
the middle of Arctic flights that generated international attention. Those Bergen School
scientists who survived their Arctic fieldwork parlayed these connections into careers
leading American scientific institutions during the 1930s.
The infrastructure to support Arctic flight eventually became every bit as
important as boosters like Stefansson said it would. During the Second World War, both
the northern Atlantic and Alaska became crucial airways for delivering warplanes from
American factories to European battlefields. The importance of the Arctic for weather
forecasting made Greenland into a minor battlefield itself. The German military
surreptitiously landed weather observing teams on the icecap, leading to Allied missions
to hunt down these teams, some led by pilots who had first cut their teeth on the
exploring flights of the 1920s. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear attack by
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bombers and missiles coming over the pole heavily militarized the Arctic. The US and
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Canada built a line of warning radars across the top of the world, paralleling a Soviet
system of defenses.
Only after the end of the Cold War did the Arctic become a “northern
Mediterranean.” True trans-polar flights today take passengers from Chicago (or
Newark!) to Beijing non-stop, flying at altitudes far above the fog that bedeviled fliers in
the 1920s. Yet the technology that makes these flights safe and reliable has created a
surprising new natural hazard. Flying at 35,000 feet in the highest latitudes, where the
Earth’s magnetic field least shields the planet, planes can encounter higher levels of
radiation, and electromagnetic interference with radio and navigation devices. Flight has
turned the aurora borealis from a natural beauty into a natural hazard. Flights across the
North Pole today are diverted based on forecasts of solar storm activity, which depend
upon observations taken by satellites orbiting the Sun, relayed to Earth and interpreted by
employees of the National Weather Service. These observers of solar storms have
modeled their “space weather” services on the environmental surveillance systems
originally designed to monitor what is now quaintly called “terrestrial weather.”
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Chapter Two
Keeping Schedule: Aeronautical Meteorology
in United States Airline Operations

Airline flights were a gut-wrenching experience in the 1930s. Relatively light
piston-engine airplanes cruising in the lower troposphere exposed their occupants to such
noise, vibration and turbulence that simply sitting as a passenger was physically draining.
Flying was considered so arduous that Franklin Roosevelt challenged the idea that polio
had crippled him by publicly flying to accept the Democratic nomination in 1932. His
flight encountered strong headwinds and considerable turbulence between Albany and
Chicago, arriving two and a half hours late. Nearly everyone vomited. Though Roosevelt
told newspapers he found the trip “delightful,” he did not fly again for nearly ten years.1
Adverse weather posed even more serious discomfort to airline managers.
Weather historian William Meyer has calculated that, largely due to weather conditions,
“nearly 20 percent of scheduled air trips were either canceled or not completed,” in the
early 1930s. This unreliability of service devalued aviation’s chief marketable asset,
speed.2 “The greatest hazard and the greatest obstacle to the regular operation of
airplanes on schedule is the weather,” wrote National Air Transport’s operations manager
Wesley Smith. 3 He spoke from painful experience. As a pilot for the United States
Government’s airmail service between 1919 and 1927, he barely survived the hazards
posed by fog, ice, low clouds and thunderstorms. In one 1920 flight he dodged a fog1
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shrouded steeple only to smack into a mountain crest hidden in the murky skies. He
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crawled from the wreckage as flames erased the day’s Washington to Newark mail
shipment. 4 By rendering flights unsafe and schedules unreliable, weather threatened the
viability of the entire industry.
Learning to manage the weather was essential to transforming civilian aviation
from entertainment to infrastructure during the interwar period. While barnstormers could
make do with informal arrangements and landing in a field whenever flying conditions
deteriorated, commercially viable aviation required firms to deliver safe, reliable service
from terminal to terminal on pre-determined schedules. As David Courtwright has noted,
aviation became infrastructure (that is, a taken-for-granted, widely used part of the
transportation system) in two stages. The first, increasing safety and reliability, largely
took place in the 1930s and 1940s. The second stage, becoming cheap and ubiquitous,
occurred after the introduction of jets and economy-class travel in the 1960s and 1970s.5
Aviation historians have recognized many of the key advances that contributed to reliable
flight, including stronger airframes, navigation systems, new kinds of flight instruments,
and strict government regulation.6 But these accounts pay only fleeting attention to
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meteorology, usually treating weather as a kind of inevitable, unmanageable force.
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Implicit in these accounts is a narrative of escape: as people succeeded in building more
powerful planes and flying higher, flight gradually escaped the weather’s gravity, in both
senses: weather became a less serious threat, and a less powerful restraintTo be sure,
weather causes many fewer crashes today than it did in the 1920s. But this is not just
because of stronger aircraft. This chapter explores how meteorology helped airlines to reimagine weather, not as an inevitability that needed to be battled, but as an ever-changing
set of conditions that sometimes constrained operations and sometimes made them more
efficient.
Meteorological knowledge allowed airlines to become flexible organizations that
could take advantage of tailwinds and cloud breaks, while mitigating the dangers of
headwinds, fogged in airports, and icing. The airlines hired a new kind of weather expert
to provide the advice necessary to make flight safe and reliable. Trained at MIT, Caltech,
or a small number of flight schools, airline meteorologists were never numerous,
numbering only 94 in the United Statesby July, 1940, roughly a quarter of all the
qualified forecasters in the United States.7 Yet they played an indispensable role, judging
the weather, explaining current and possible future conditions to pilots, and advising
dispatchers how to route and manage flights. They also spread advanced meteorological
knowledge by training other personnel to understand adverse weather conditions. Limited
to roles as technical specialists, airline meteorologists did not become corporate leaders.
Internally, the emerging airlines used meteorology primarily to manage daily operations.
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Externally, airlines advertised their meteorological expertise to present flying as a safe,

73

efficient and modern mode of transport.
The meteorological needs of airlines also shaped the research culture of academic
meteorology. Beginning with Carl-Gustaf Rossby’s work with Western Air Express in
1927, airlines helped launch the careers of several leading American researchers. Rossbys
students Horace Byers and Jerome Namias also worked for commercial airlines during
the 1930s, a time when economic conditions made support for academic research
particularly scarce. The porous boundaries between academic and industrial meteorology
made the airlines among the earliest American users of the Bergen School, with its
emphasis on geophysical models and numerical calculation in weather forecasting. The
growth of aviation generally, and airline jobs in particular, supported the establishment of
the first academic meteorology departments in the US. Perhaps the most influential
meteorological textbook of the early 20th century, Horace Byers’s Synoptic and
Aeronautical Meteorology, began as a lecture course for airline personnel, and then
developed into a normative guide that structured how meteorologists-in-training learned
to imagine the atmosphere and its behavior. The financial support and cultural prestige
of the American airline industry thus shaped the 20th century development of American
meteorology into an internationally prominent research discipline built around threedimensional physical models of the atmosphere.
Flying the Mail: The Challenge of Regular Service
The first effort to develop regularly scheduled air service in the United States
came from the Post Office, which began airmail operations in October 1918. While

several small airmail experiments had been made as early as 1910, the assumption that
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urgent dispatches would need to be moved quickly during wartime initially justified a
much larger effort to develop airmail in 1918. The airmail survived the end of the war
thanks to the leadership of second assistant postmaster general Otto Praeger, a
progressive reformer who sought to improve the operations of a government department
notorious as a den of patronage. (Presidents usually appointed their campaign managers
or another influential partisan as postmaster general, because the office controlled the
most pervasive collection of government contracts.) Though Praeger was determined that
the mails should get through regardless of weather (“neither wind, nor rain, nor sleet …”)
his organization struggled with unreliable engines, inadequate maps, an intermittently
supportive Congress, pilots who sometimes refused to fly when weather conditions were
impossible, and who occasionally died when they consented.8
By February 1921, as the Wilson administration came to an end, Praeger planned
a spectacular demonstration of the development and accomplishments of the airmail.
Flying day and night, pilots would seek to carry mail from one coast to the other in less
than 36 hours. Two planes would take off from either end of country, each carrying 350
pounds of mail. However, heavy icing over Pennsylvania required one of the west-bound
planes to make a forced landing that damaged the landing gear. The other plane fought
through bad weather to get to Cleveland, then picked up a new pilot to struggle through
to Chicago, where a combination of rain, snow, and fog to the west ended all hope of
getting through. On the east-bound flight, two pilots left San Francisco at 4:30am,
8
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climbed to 18,000 feet to cross the Sierra Nevadas, and landed at Reno. Pilots Samuel

75

Eaton and William Lewis took over for the flight to Salt Lake City, with a scheduled
refueling stop in Elko, Nevada. Departing Elko, Lewis stalled his plane at 500 feet and
died in the crash. “His mail pouches were gathered up, the broken ones turned over to the
local post office, and the unbroken ones put aboard a standby aircraft.” By 1:10am, the
remaining mail from the two planes had reached Omaha, but it looked like the end of the
demonstration. The only pilot who knew the route to Chicago refused to fly in the
worsening weather. But Jack Knight, sporting a broken nose from an emergency landing
on a mountainside near Laramie the week before, volunteered to fly. Nearing Des
Moines, a descending layer of white cloud forced him down to 100 feet to stay in sight of
the ground. “The air was rough and the valleys were packed with fog. Next I began to get
snow flurries,” he said later. Finding railroad tracks headed in the right direction, he
finally made it to Iowa City for refueling, though finding the airfield required flying “in
and out the town, dodging steeples and looking for that field.” As mechanics refueled his
plane, he called Chicago for the weather report: still bad. Trusting to faith he lingered
over cigarettes and a sandwich before taking off. Managing to negotiate more fog before
catching a fortunate break in the clouds over Illinois, his engine cut out just as he came
overhead the field. He glided to a dead stick landing at 8:30am, exhausted. Two more
pilots braved low clouds, snow and sleet to arrive in New York at 4:50 pm, 33 hours and
20 minutes after take off in San Francisco.9
All told, the transcontinental attempt had killed one pilot, destroyed a plane and
damaged a second, and resulted in two forced landings. Just part of one of the four mail
9
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shipments got through. Astoundingly, however a New York Times editorial hailed the
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achievement, writing “the modern world demands efficiency and speed; aviation is
international and competitive. The United States has distanced all countries in
transportation of mails through the air.” Praeger hailed the event as the “most momentous
step in civil aviation,” saying that Knight’s improvised flight at low altitude, through
snow and fog, over an unfamiliar airway, was a “demonstration of the entire feasibility of
commercial night flying.”10 Though some critics argued the airmail was both unsafe and
uneconomical, nonetheless, Praeger had managed to secure the airmail: it survived and
grew modestly under the Harding and Coolidge administrations.
For the next six years, administrators of the airmail service worked primarily on
improving safety, constructing lighted airways along key parts of the routes, mapping
emergency landing areas, and developing point-to-point radio. In 1922, for instance, field
radios were established at every transcontinental way station except Rawlins, Wyoming,
allowing pilots to receive advance weather reports from observers trained to know what
weather information was relevant and how to report it. This reduced the kinds of stories
that circulated among pilots of exchanges like this, based on the older telephone system:
“Mr. Brown, how’s the weather at your place?”
“Good, for this time of year.”
“No, I mean, is it raining?”
“Well, no, not yet.”
“Then, it looks as if it might rain?”
“We surely could use some.”
“Well, how about this, Mr. Brown—can you see a long way?”
“I can see the barn.”
“Oh, that’s fine. Uh, Mr. Brown, by the way, how far away is the barn?
“It’s across the yard.”11
10
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While this particular story is probably apocryphal, that it was told at all, (and found
funny) reveals the significance pilots gave to disciplined and standardized weather
information. Looking higher and farther than the barn, trained observers produced the
kinds of information that could be incorporated into pilot practice.
The postal system that Praeger had built was dismantled by the Air Commerce
Act of 1926. The government shifted the airmail to a system of contracts to given to
various private airlines to fly the mail on a given intercity route. While these contracts
were open to competitive bids, Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown largely ignored
the prices submitted, instead awarding routes only to firms that in his judgment would
provide reliable service using the most modern equipment. This excluded small and local
airlines and benefited the three large aviation holding companies that combined an
airframe manufacturer, an engine maker, and an operating airline. Brown argued this
policy would most rapidly develop a stable and technologically advanced aviation system
in the United States. Certainly, it provided airlines with a vital subsidy, but it also
presented them with the same meteorological challenges.
A Model Airline Weather Service
The first important private commercial airline weather service was developed by
Carl-Gustaf Rossby in 1927 and 1928.12 In 1927 Rossby worked for the Daniel
Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics, which was busily cultivating the
Western Air Express, a California airline, in order to demonstrate that private commercial
air travel could be safe and profitable without government subsidies. Rossby and the
12
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safer and more efficient.13 Rossby’s success with the Model weather service soon led to a
professorship at MIT for himself, while creating a service emulated by other airlines and
adopted by the Weather Bureau. While organizing the meteorological service, Rossby
also made key connections that would be essential to his scientific research in the decades
to come.
At twenty-seven years old, Rossby was ambitious, confident, and forceful. He had
spent his late teens and early twenties studying meteorology and atmospheric physics
with Vilhelm Bjerknes at the Bergen Institute. After further study and work as a
meteorologist for the Swedish Meteorologic Serivce, Rossby won a fellowship from the
American-Scandinavian Foundation, and settled at the US Weather Bureau where he
studied the application of polar front theory to American Weather. Rossby’s foreign
theories of atmospheric physics—and more particularly his willingness to issue forecasts
without his superiors’ authorization—did not endear him to the Weather Bureau
administration. When the leaders of the Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of
Aeronautics came looking for a bright young meteorologist to assist on various projects,
the Weather Bureau was more than happy to pass Rossby along.
The Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics was the brainchild of
Harry F. Guggenheim, and funded by his father Daniel, the millionaire mining magnate.
Harry Guggenheim had learned to fly during the earliest stages of aeronautics and served
in Naval aviation during the Great War. Believing aviation would be essential to
economic and military power in the future, he and his father were particularly disturbed
13
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to see the US falling behind Europe in the development of aviation during the 1920s.
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Their Fund, established in late 1925, was intended to kick-start American aviation
growth. It disbursed its capital to a wide variety of pioneering projects, aiming to catalyze
the development of aviation at a crucial period, and then disband. The fund ceased
operations in February 1930, after expending 2.6 million dollars on the development of
instrument flying techniques, which enabled pilots to fly safely through fog and cloud
when landmarks were invisible. It supported of Charles Lindbergh’s triumphant national
tour, and promoted a “safe airplane” competition, which aimed to create an airplane as
safe and easy to use as an automobile.14 The fund also endowed schools of aeronautics at
Caltech, MIT, Stanford, Michigan, Georgia Tech, and the University of Washington.
Like many pilots in the 1920s, Harry Guggenheim felt strongly about aviation’s
particular need for reliable weather forecasts. To this end, the Fund established a
committee on Aeronautical Meteorology in August 1927.15 chaired by Rossby, that
included Willis Gregg of the Weather Bureau, Maj. William Blair of the War
Department, Thomas Chapman of the Commerce Department, Lt. Francis Reichelderfer
of the Navy. The committee took its initial task to be the establishment of an
“experimental weather reporting service” to assist the model airline that the Guggenheim
fund was supporting in California. This weather service was to forecast upper air
conditions, cloud cover, head and tailwinds, and landing conditions at airfields between
Los Angeles and Oakland. (San Francisco was still building its first airport.) It would
also establish means of communicating changes in forecasts to aircraft while they were in
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flight. Rossby’s efforts to build a network from the ground up reveal the inner

80

anatomy of meteorological observation.
Rossby spent much of June and July 1928 establishing observing stations and
getting a feel for the airways between Oakland and Los Angeles by traveling them. (His
expense reports from those months include entries for 1000 weather maps, $80.00 for a
pilot to fly him up and down California for ten days, and $19.25 for a leather flying
helmet and goggles.16) He linked observing stations by telephone to centralized collecting
offices in Oakland or Los Angeles. (In 1928, it was expensive to collect weather reports
by telephone. Pacific Telegraph and Telephone agreed to donate their services only after
a high-level negotiation between the company and Harry Guggenheim himself.)
The “Instructions for Observers” issued by the Fund’s meteorological committee
give some indication of the ways that observers were disciplined to interact with the
telephone network:
At 9:35 AM., 11:05 AM., and 12:35 PM., the observer should take place at the
official telephone of the station, keeping the observation sheet before him. As
soon as the collecting station … calls and mentions the key word “Weather report,
please”, he should proceed to read his report off the sheet with a clear, steady
voice, not too fast and not too slow. The Collecting Station marks the end of the
report with the words “Thank you”. … The reading of the weather report should
not be interrupted by any remarks or comments. … These three regular daily
telephone calls are strictly reserved for weather reporting and all other matters
should be taken up with other parties. If the collecting station at the end of report
mentions the word “extra”, then the observer has to make another
observation—30 minutes later, and in regular order wait for a call from the
Collecting Station.17
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the wind direction and velocity (on the Beaufort scale), a one to three word description of
the weather at the ground, the amount of clouds, the cloud forms, the ceiling, the
visibility, the temperature, and the atmospheric pressure. When read in code by a
disciplined observer, this information could be communicated in about 20 seconds. By
the end of the summer of 1928, reports from over 35 stations were being gathered and
plotted in under an hour. All forecasting and analysis of observations was made by
Rossby’s handpicked men at the Oakland and Los Angeles terminals.
While the Weather Bureau had been slow to integrate the polar front theory into
its operations—in part because of questions regarding how continental US weather
differed from the North Atlantic—Rossby trained his observers in practices grounded in
Bergen school methodology. For example the Bergen School had connected atmospheric
physics to cloud forms, using that information for predictive purposes—in the
experimental weather reporting service, observers were given a cloud atlas.18 They were
expected to include cloud formations in their reports, and were explicitly instructed not to
conflate cloud movement with surface winds.19
Another challenge facing Rossby was the need to take increased numbers of upper
air observations on which to base forecasts. He contacted the air corps, hoping they might
be willing to launch regular flights to take upper air data20, and obtained a number of pilot
balloons and related equipment from the Navy. As a foreigner snooping around airfields,
18
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obtaining expensive navy property, Rossby raised the suspicions of a naval intelligence
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officer working within the San Diego chamber of commerce. This officer dashed off a
worried latter to the Guggenheim fund headquarters:
I have been advised that a Dr. Carl Gustaf Rossby, secured a number of valuable
meteorological instruments from the navy department for installation at Vail
Field, Los Angeles. An Investigation disclosed that Dr. Rossby has no connection
with the Western Air Express, which uses a [sic] Vail Field as an air mail and
Passenger base. He is said to have secured the meteorological instruments on the
assumption that he is connected in an official capacity with the Guggenheim
foundation.21
The Guggenheim Fund’s secretary immediately wrote back, vouching for Rossby and
letting the officer know that “the meteorological instruments mentioned by you were
obtained thru Assistant Secretary of the Navy, [Edward P.] Warner, and the Bureau of
Aeronautics, Navy Department, is fully conversant with this situation.”22 No longer a
target of suspicion, Rossby managed to build a denser network of upper air readings into
the Model weather service.
Although initially challenged by a lack of experienced, available meteorologists
in California Rossby soon found a bright, organized young man who would become his
life-long colleague and chief lieutenant. While fishing for weather talent in early 1928,
Rossby was introduced to Horace Byers, than a junior at Berkeley with an interest in
physics and climate. By July, Byers was on the Guggenheim payroll at $175 per month,
and was quickly becoming Rossby’s most trusted lieutenant. According to Rossby’s
letters to the Fund’s headquarters, Byers was doing “splendid work” while teaching the
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Weather Bureau how to run the reporting service, and beginning some empirical
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studies of California weather.23
The Experimental Weather Reporting Service proved successful during its
operations in 1928 and 1929. The Western Air Express suffered no weather-related
crashes or mishaps, and the efficiency and reliability of its schedule increased. As
Edward Bowie, the Weather Bureau’s Meteorologist in charge at San Francisco noted,
the Experimental Service’s forecasts spread beyond the airline, to the members of the
Automobile Club of Southern California who used them in making travel predictions and
the California State forester who used them to help predict forest fires.24
Despite its successes, the model reporting service nearly collapsed in the spring of
1929 when the Guggenheim fund planned to turn the service over to the Weather Bureau.
The Weather Bureau refused to fund the reporting service, which was only saved by a last
minute action by departing President Calvin Coolidge.25 Coolidge’s action was in accord
with the interests of incoming President Hoover, whose son Herbert Jr. was a pioneer in
integrating radio, including weather updates, into aviation communication, and worked
for the airline (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Herbert Hoover, Jr. in March, 1929. As part of his duties as a VicePresident for Western Air Express, Hoover kept pilots informed about changing
weather conditions. This large chalkboard was used at Vail Field in Los Angeles to
organize weather observations from various stations, which appear to have been
erased from the far left hand column in this staged photo. (Author’s personal
collection)
This financial rescue draws attention to the weather service’s political positioning.
Like the airlines and airmail contracts, the meteorological service displayed the
characteristics of Hoover’s “associative state:” negotiating standards, limiting destructive
competition, and using the resources of the state to improve industrial efficiency. This
vision of government depended upon close working relationships amongst the military,
civilian bureaucrats, stable businesses, and wealthy philanthropists. Rossby’s work
managed to add meteorologists to that web of mutually beneficial relationships. The

Guggenheim Fund was organized and supported by one of the richest families in
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America, and operated for the direct benefit of a privately held airline that offered
services well beyond the reach of most citizens. In addition to these lower level officers
working directly with the committee, the Guggenheim Fund for Aeronautics also took
advantage of connections at the highest levels of government. The Guggenheim family,
which continued to make money in mining operations, had an amicable relationship with
Herbert Hoover (who had trained as a mining engineer) dating back to at least 1921.
Hoover’s position as Secretary of Commerce and then as President certainly played a
useful role in the success of the Fund’s activities, perhaps making possible the Fund’s
frequent access to assistant secretaries for aeronautics of the War, Navy and Commerce
departments. Airlines’ close identification with the governing methods of the associative
state made them vulnerable after the economic crisis brought a sea change in American
politics.

The Army Flies the Mail
Franklin Roosevelt’s sweeping victory in 1932 led to an enormous but short-lived
upheaval in the airline industry. Early in 1934 Roosevelt’s Postmaster General, James
Farley, announced that the airmail contracts had been awarded corruptly and canceled
nearly all of them. He planned to re-open the bidding, but only to firms that had not been
tainted by the previous back-room deals, effectively ruling out all the major firms with
experience and adequate equipment for scheduled operations. Just in advance of this
announcement, Army Air Corps General Benjamin Foulois was asked if the Army could

fly the mail while new bids were arranged. Caught off guard, Foulois said the Army
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could.26
The Air Corps flew the mail for 78 days, beginning in February 1934, but winter
weather, inadequate airplanes and poor navigational skills led to chaos, including 66
crashes and 12 deaths. Air Corps planes were not equipped with the latest navigational
aids, and worse, “most pilots had not trained in blind flying, were unfamiliar with the
expensive new radio equipment, and had flown only during the daytime and in decent
weather.” 27 Clearly, airmail demanded new expertise and new technical systems.
Despite its brevity, the air mail fiasco compelled the Air Corps to alter its
practices, paying more attention to navigation and instrument flying. Army leaders
established rush programs to teach instrument landing, and a year later, in March 1935,
new Army regulations prescribed instrument and navigational standards for all Regular
Army and Reserve pilots.28 As Randolph Field, the Army’s school for primary flight
training, received the latest navigational equipment coming into the Air Corps in 1936,
officers experimented with teaching blind flying, using a canopy drawn over the head of
a student pilot flying a BT-2. (Completing the training earned the trainee a diploma from
the “Institute of the Blind.”) Ground-based Link trainers, a kind of closed cockpit miniplane attached to analog recorders and the first true flight simulator, became a crucial tool
for teaching pilots to trust their instruments while navigating in zero visibility. While the
Navy had ordered a Link as early as 1931, it was only “after the disastrous experience of
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flying the air mail in 1934 and the concomitant push to improve instrument training,
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the Army, too, ordered the trainer.” But Army pilots were still taught to fly more by feel,
sound and sight than by instruments. While training in instrument flying became more
widespread, a continued lack of equipment and funds for additional flights ensured that it
remained superficial.29

Airline Meteorology on Display
With the restoration of airmail contracts, the airlines had regained the subsidy
essential to their commercial survival.30 Profitability, however, would require making
operations more efficient, as well as boosting passenger traffic. Meteorologists played
important but overlooked roles in these challenges. This section explores the emergence
of airline meteorology as an industrial occupation, and examines how airlines used
meteorology in public relations.
The Work and Persona of Airline Meteorologists
Just who was an airline meteorologist in the interwar years? The US airline
meteorologist of the 1930s was white and male, and young, probably in his 20s or early
30s. He might or might not have a pilot’s license, but he was strongly interested in the
development of aviation. Airline meteorologists worked eight-hour shifts in the
administration building at an airport and earned good money: $200 to $300 per month.31
In 1938, an airline operations office might employ “one chief meteorologist and three or
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maximum of about a dozen meteorologists for a domestic airline.32 Pan Am employed
more, as it required forecasters as well as observers for every spot its planes regularly put
down along its far-flung international routes.
The Boeing School of Aeronautics, involved in training airline meteorologists,
described meteorology as a field that appealed to people who like “technical” work, while
noting that “the duties of the airline meteorologist entail a great deal of responsibility,
since his decisions carry great weight with the pilots and dispatchers in determining
whether or not a scheduled trip can be made safely in existing weather.” Meteorologists
usually worked a 48 hour work week, consulting with pilots and dispatchers, making trip
forecasts for each out bound flight, preparing eight-hour local forecasts for the terminal
and a twenty-four hour operational forecast covering all routes flown by the airline. The
school estimated that airline meteorology would continue to “provide positions each year
for a certain number of well-trained men.” 33 Unlike academic or military scientists, an
airline meteorologist could work his way through a corporate hierarchy, from
Meteorology Clerk to Junior Meteorologist, Assistant Meteorologist, Meteorologist in
charge of station, Division Meteorologist, culminating in Chief Meteorologist for the
airline. He would experience a variety of working conditions, both indoor and outdoor,
with “considerable responsibility.” His job duties were: “Interprets and amplifies
Government weather reports for aeronautical application, prepares and analyzes weather
maps, and makes forecasts for various sections of the airways and airline terminals.” 34
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produce a synoptic map showing the current conditions in his area of responsibility. This
involved translating a long string of coded weather observations delivered by Weather
Bureau teletype circuit and plotting them on a map, four times a day. According to one
career guide, this routine work made him look like “probably the most dissatisfied worker
in the air line. He does a good job in making a map, and yet within six hours he decides
the old one is no good and draws a new one.”35 The second part of the job involved
analyzing the map and predicting the atmospheric conditions each flight would
experience. He then briefed the pilots and dispatchers on these conditions. In cases
where flying conditions were marginal and potentially dangerous, the dispatcher, pilot
and meteorologist would cooperatively decide whether a plane could take off and what
altitudes it ought to fly at. Although these decisions were taken cooperatively, ultimate
responsibility for flight safety lay with the pilot.
The pre-flight briefing was the key moment of intersection between weather
knowledge and the act of flight; the meteorologist translated his technical knowledge into
a personal communication with the pilot who would experience the conditions the
meteorologist was struggling to understand. This moment produced both an emotional
bond between the two men, each an accomplished expert in his field, as well as barriers
imposed by their necessarily different encounters with the weather. Pilot Bob Buck, who
flew TWA DC-3s in the late 1930s at the start of long career in commercial aviation and
weather research, described the relationship:
The bond between pilot and meteorologist is like that between patient and doctor
… one looks to the meteorologist to explain the often unexplainable, and to tell
35
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you honestly about what he doesn’t and can’t know, and why, and what to
expect if the unknown appears as you fly toward or through it. This bond started
with my earliest flights, and has been the same with the meteorologists I’ve dealt
with since.36
A good aeronautical meteorologist needed to be someone who pilots felt they could trust
to give them an honest read of the weather. At the same time, they also needed to be
strong enough not to simply tell pilots what pilots wanted to hear. Though the weather
forged a bond between pilot and meteorologist during in the pre-flight briefing, their very
different experience of that weather left a divide between the two. Buck described a
moment late in his career when he was flying 747 jets, and a meteorologist told him
about the rough air likely to be found near a kink in the jet stream:
I wonder how he visualizes this, if his mind makes a picture of the turbulence, or
if he just thinks in principles and formulae. He isn’t thinking of it the way I do,
picturing the airplane jouncing, seeing myself reaching to get the seatbelt sign on,
reducing power so as to slow to turbulence penetration speed, being a little
apprehensive in the dark night, hoping it doesn’t get real nasty. 37
Because of this complicated relationship, Boeing asserted that airline meteorologists:
“Must be sound physically, mentally alert, industrious, cooperative, have teaching skill,
and sound judgment and principles.”38

Meteorology in Advertising
The moment of expert consultation became a very public part of the airline’s
strategy to make flying look safe. Pictures of the pre-flight weather briefing between
pilot, dispatcher and meteorologist, often with a caption describing the meteorologist’s
36
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advanced training and the pilot’s years of experience, became a favorite trope of airline
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advertising, appearing also in Popular Aviation articles and airline timetables. A 1950 ad
for American Airlines explicitly highlighted the connection between meteorological
expertise and safety. “Here begins your Flagship’s flight… Here in conference between
pilot, dispatcher and meteorologist. Their accurate decisions, reflecting years of
specialized study and practical experience, have played no small part in making air
transportation such a safe, comfortable way to travel.”39 Ford Motor Company (which
made a not very successful foray in commercial airplane manufacturing) promoted air
travel by invoking the government’s growing commitment to aeronautical meteorology.
“Whose guiding hand kept the flier safe from fog?” asked a Ford advertisement. It was
“The Weather Man at Washington who watches the pathways of ships at sea … who
warns the traveler on his way … who tells the farmer clearly when danger to his crops is
rolling towards his horizon … the weather man is now lifting his eyes to the pathways of
the sky!”40 In a related strategy, airlines highlighted the climatological advantages of their
routes. Standard Airlines touted the “Fair Weather Route” in its ads, suggesting
smoother flights in the warm sun of the US southwest.
In advertising the role of meteorology in safety Pan Am mingled impressive
figures with a streak of nativism. Highlighting the integral role played by weather
observations among forms of navigational safety devices making long distance flight
reliable, a Pan Am marketing brochure from 1934 described the airway to Nassau,
Bahamas, Havana, Cuba, and on to South America this way:
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Today, great aerial highways link the continents… one hundred and forty-seven
airports have been developed, often in the face of incredible difficulties…
seventy-two ground radio stations maintain constant communication with all
airliners en route… as many private weather bureaux at strategic points along the
airways advise the pilots continuously of all weather conditions… directional
radio stations have been perfected to guide the airliners faithfully over the longest
routes… and a staff of American experts has been carefully trained to man these
important observational posts.41
As an airline whose operations extended beyond the network of the US Weather Bureau,
Pan Am often had to create its own systems for producing the meteorological information
on which its flights depended. Station managers launched weather balloons at Wake
Island, while engineers pioneered radio systems for receiving updated forecasts en
route.42 On its tropical routes to Latin American and the South Pacific, Pan Am faced an
additional challenge. Most meteorological research examined mid-latitude weather
conditions that affected Europe and the United States. The world’s premier
meteorologists assumed their theories of atmospheric physics were universally
applicable; dispatchers and pilots working in the tropics quickly discovered they were
not.43 Pan Am personnel became experts on the effects of tropical weather upon flight
operations. When World War II expanded into the South Pacific early in 1942, the Navy
and Army Air Force relied upon Pan Am employees to provide meteorological and
operational advice.44
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After leaving Guggenheim’s Weather Service, Rossby played a crucial role in
creating this class of aeronautical meteorologists. Of the handful of institutions that
offered training in aeronautical meteorology during the interwar period, Rossby’s
program at MIT offered the most rigorous training in theory and research. After 1933,
Irving Krick also led a less successful meteorology program at Caltech that focused on
commerce and the Army Air Corps and was less oriented towards research and theory.
Graduates of this program included Peter Kraght and Mort Rubin. Two private flight
schools, Parks Air College and the Boeing School of Aeronautics, also offered courses in
airline meteorology.
The Boeing School offers particular insight into commercial airline operations; it
was part of United Aircraft and Transport Corporation, a vertically integrated holding
company that brought together Pratt and Whitney engines, Boeing airplanes, and the
operational activities of Boeing Air Transport, which was soon renamed United Airlines.
Beginning operations in September of 1929, and managed by transport pilot Theophilus
Lee Jr, the school offered to help its students find jobs in aviation, but fed its best
graduates into jobs with United. 45 As the school made clear in a 1941 promotional
brochure, its role in the operations of a commercial airline was central to its claims to
expertise: “As an integral division of the United Air Lines Transport Corporation, it has
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transport flying and thirteen years of airline operation.”46
The School was well positioned to become a model flight school. Located at the
Oakland Municipal Airport, one of just a handful of the most advanced airports rated A1-A by the Department of Commerce, the School adjoined offices of the Civil
Aeronautics Authority, the Postal Service, and the Weather Bureau. Because the school
shared hangers with United Airlines, students could observe passenger and air mail
operations firsthand. In 1941, the school maintained a fleet of fourteen training planes,
ranging from open-cockpit Boeing 203-Bs and Stearman biplanes for basic flight
training, up through an airline standard twin-engine Boeing 247D, complete with an
enclosed hood for instrument training and radio navigation equipment necessary for flight
in heavy weather. Other school equipment included a construction and repair shop; an
“avigation” laboratory with sextants, drift indicators and dead reckoning computers; a
communications shop for building and repairing radio equipment; a 48 seat drafting
room; an engine laboratory with viscometers and Orsat Gas Analyzers for testing fuels
and components; an engine shop with 16 types of engines used in Boeing aircraft; an
instrument laboratory and repair shop, featuring cut-away models of aircraft instruments
like artificial horizons and directional gyros; a five hundred volume aeronautical library;
specialized shops for propellers, parachutes, dope and fabric, wood, metal, and welding;
plus classrooms and a science laboratory equipped for instruction in kinetics and
kinematics, as well as general physics.47
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Boeing offered two training courses to become an airline meteorologist.
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Students who had graduated high school could take a twenty-four month course in
“Airline Operations and Engineering,” with a major in meteorology. For the first four
quarters, meteorology majors joined with flight engineers and maintenance engineering
students to study subjects like “airplanes and theory of flight,” “blue print reading and
shop sketching,” air law, and shop practices. In the second year, meteorology majors
apprenticed part-time in the United meteorology office while taking specialized courses
in synoptic and dynamic meteorology, forecasting analysis, avigation, and the practical
aeronautical applications of meteorology. Tuition for this course was $1440, payable in
24 equal monthly installments. 48 The second option, for students who had graduated from
an accredited four-year engineering college, was a nine-month course in “Airline
Meteorology.” Built around 408 hours of lectures and 828 hours of laboratory work, the
course included most of the same classes as the second year of the meteorology major,
including “Principles of Meteorology,” “Synoptic and Dynamic Meteorology,” and
“Meteorology, Forecasting Analysis.” In the classroom, students in Principles of
Meteorology covered these topics:
Theory of physical laws governing weather. Relation of weather phenomena in
the upper air to surface observations such as winds, fogs, and ice-forming
conditions. Analysis of flying routes and prediction of weather interferences.49
The more advanced classes integrated physics with some of the key concepts developed
by the Bergen School:
The detail of hydrodynamics and thermodynamics, with special application to
atmosphere phenomena. The statics and kinematics of the atmosphere. The study
of the upper air sounding for use in forecasting fog, clouds, thunderstorms, ice
48
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forming conditions, etc. Air mass analysis and the study of fronts, frontogenesis
and frontolysis. Study of the structure of the extratropical cyclone and the general
circulation of the atmosphere. Local effects of topography upon frontal
movements and upon air mass properties.50
Laboratory sections focused on the practical work of supporting flight operations,
disciplining students in the tasks they would face as workers.
The Boeing School’s laboratory was built to simulate the routine work of airline
meteorology, the interpretation of the meteorologist’s central tool: the synoptic map.
Each student sat at a drafting table, plotting and analyzing their own copy of the current
map, facing previous maps clipped to a board mounted at the edge of the desk. The lab
received updated weather information 24 hours a day through a dedicated teletype line, as
well as constant access to United’s meteorological office and “one of the most advanced
and best equipped Airport Weather Bureau stations.”51 An airy space with both natural
light and overhead electric lamps, the meteorology lab overlooked the flying field, and
was equipped with an anemometer, an external wind vane with an indicator inside the
laboratory, mercury barometer, barograph, and “apparatus for determining relative
humidity, temperature, and dew point,” probably a hair hygrometer, a sling psychrometer,
and a slide rule.52 A photo showed an instructor teaching air mass and frontal analysis
comparing a table top, three dimension model of an occluded front with the two
dimensional representation of the same on a synoptic map.
At Boeing, students learned to function in a rapidly bureaucratizing industry.
They decoded weather reports and drew weather maps, used meteorological instruments,
and made airways forecasts for selected routes as well as preparing flight orders like
50
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like Boeing, the role of the airline meteorologist was enshrined in standardized routine.
The Effect of Commercial Airlines on Academic Meteorology
Although there were fewer than 100 airline meteorologists at the start of World
War II, aviation exerted a strong influence on the development of the discipline,
employing meteorologists like including Jerome Namias, Irving Krick, Mort Rubin, and
Horace Byers, who would go on to become leaders in academic and government
meteorology.
The early career of Horace Byers is a good example of how aviation’s cultural
authority affected the disciplinary development of meteorology. Byers was one of the
most important 20th century American meteorologists; a member of the National
Academy of Science, he founded the graduate program at the University of Chicago in
1940 and helped manage the expansion of meteorological education and research
institutions in the wake of Sputnik. Though he’s best known for having lead the
Thunderstorm Project after World War II, for his research on cloud physics, as well as for
his extensive work as a teacher, organizer and administrator, his few years as an airline
meteorologist powerfully shaped his future career path. 53
Between his introduction to meteorology in 1928 and his move to the University
of Chicago in 1940, Byers was in regular contact with the airlines. Byers was an
undergraduate geography major at the University of California at Berkeley when he
began taking observations as a volunteer “cooperative observer” for the U.S. Weather
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Bureau in 1928. After the summer working with Rossby on the model airway service,
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Byers returned to Berkeley, completing his A.B. degree in geography in 1929 and
gathering data for his first research paper, “Summer Sea Fogs of the Central California
Coast,” which addressed a key problem for the airline flights between Los Angeles and
Oakland. After receiving his bachelor’s degree, Byers secured a fellowship from the
Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics to become Rossby’s first graduate
student, and earned his M.S. from MIT in 1932 for a study of the characteristic weather
phenomena of California. Byers then returned to California to work as a research
assistant at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography under the direction of Harald
Sverdrup. After a semester, however Byers returned to the airline weather service he and
Rossby had created. Western Air Express had been purchased and expanded, and was
now called Transcontinental and Western Airways and owned by the General Motors
Corporation. Byers developed an extensive series of lectures and notes for teaching the
Bergen techniques to TWA’s personnel. After a year with as an employee of a GM
subsidiary, Byers became eligible for an Alfred Sloan fellowship, which supported his
continued studies at MIT. Byers completed his doctorate degree in 1935, writing a
dissertation on “The Changes in Air Masses during Lifting.”
The general expansion of aviation during the 1920s and 1930s had pushed the
Weather Bureau to expand its upper air observations and incorporate the methods of the
Bergen School. Byers’ expertise, developed with Rossby at the Weather Service here
came into play. In June of 1935, the bureau appointed Byers to head a new Air Mass
Analysis Section. For the next five years, Byers taught small groups of Weather Bureau
forecasters about fronts, air mass analysis, and how to incorporate upper air data into

their forecasts. In 1940, Byers was detailed to Chicago to establish a new forecasting

99

center. He left the Weather Bureau soon after, to become the founding faculty member at
a new Institute of Meteorology at the University of Chicago; Rossby followed him and
became director of the Institute.
Byers’s greatest influence on the disciplinary culture of American meteorology54
can be seen by analyzing his textbook Synoptic and Aeronautical Meteorology.55 Byers’s
book is one of the key textbooks in the history of American meteorology. It went through
four editions between 1937 and 1974, and is still widely held in research libraries.
Expanded and retitled General Meteorology in 1944, it was the primary text used for
instructing the roughly 6,000 weather officers trained for military service during WWII, a
generation of men who dominated meteorology for the next 30 years. Even today, any
roomful of senior or recently retired American meteorologists is likely to find several or
many who used the last edition of the book.
Synoptic and Aeronautical Meteorology emerged from the work practices of
airline meteorology. As Byers noted in the preface, the “preparation of this book was
carried out at the suggestion, and under the auspices, of Transcontinental and Western
Air, Inc., and is based on a course given to the personnel of that company by the author
during the year 1933-1934.” The book began as Byers’s notes for teaching the new
methods in meteorology to TWA personnel, and the airline actually owned the copyright
to the 1937 edition. Byers prefaced his 1937 edition by noting that it was for “pilots and
54
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students of meteorology who wish to begin a study based on the newer methods of
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synoptic meteorology, called, in general, the air-mass analysis system.” He noted that this
book was intended to build upon a previous introduction to meteorology, “such as that
given in aviation ground school.”56
At the heart of the book are the key Bergen themes, using air masses and fronts to
model the three-dimensional physics of the atmosphere. Byers wrote that, “the modern
application of the principles of physical hydrodynamics to the weather has given
conclusive evidence that the vertical components of air motions are the principle factors
in the producing the more important meteorological phenomena.” Air masses “profoundly
influenc[ed] weather conditions as they migrate.” The book included a careful description
of the conditions pilots would experience in the upper air as they flew through warm and
cold fronts. Physical models of the atmosphere also suggested that it was possible to
predict the weather through calculation, with the same kind of impersonal objectivity
(though much less precision) that astronomers had in predicting the location of planets.
Byers’s chapter on weather forecasting included formulae for calculating the
displacement of fronts, for instance. Other chapters in the book explain atmospheric
phenomena of key interest to aviators, such as fog and the formation of ice, in terms of
air masses and fronts. 57 Since TWA flew the central transcontinental route, taking its
planes over the heart of the Dust Bowl, the text also includes a chapter on the causes and
aerological effects of dust storms.58
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The 1944 edition of the textbook shows the extent to which aviation had
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become the central concern of the American meteorological community. Now titled
General Meteorology, the book included plenty of new material, including a chapter on
hurricanes, as well as several introductory chapters examining the effect of solar radiation
in driving the behavior of the Earth’s atmosphere. Yet it was notable for not focusing on
topics like frost forecasts for orchards, the relationship between weather and human
behavior, or atmospheric acoustics, subjects that were included in earlier American
general meteorology texts.62 It did include a chapter dealing with cold waves, another
common and important topic in American general meteorology texts, but it sought to
explain these events in terms of the free atmosphere. Chapter XVI, “Highs, Lows and the
Upper Air,” framed middle latitude heat waves and cold waves as secondary effects of
American Meteorological Society, Parkinson made a detailed study of dust storms on the Great Plains,
analyzing them in terms of air masses and incorporating observations made by pilots as they flew through
and around the brown clouds. The paper begins by exploring the sources of the Dust, noting that
precipitation records showed drought conditions throughout the Western Plains states for several years
prior to May 1935. He noted that the majority of storms occurred in late winter and spring, when strong
winds blew over barren soil, following farmers’ plowing, disking, and harrowing the earth to prepare it for
spring planting. Parkinson had been stationed in Amarillo, Texas during 1930 and early 1931, and then
transferred to Kansas City for the rest of the 1930s. After Byers moved from TWA to the Weather Bureau,
he wrote a short article that used soil analysis by the Soil Conservation Service to track the continental
movement of the dust storm of February 1936. Byers used Parkinson’s paper as the basis for the final
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the behavior of air masses and fronts. Dust storms almost disappeared from the 1944
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edition, receiving only a short mention in the context of a chapter on “atmospheric
turbulence and the wind structure near the surface of the Earth.” More revealing is the
change that took place in the discussion of air masses. In 1937, one chapter was titled
“Air-Mass analysis of the synoptic chart,” while in the 1944 edition, practically the same
text had become more general—air mass analysis had become the basics of the whole
field, so that the same text was now titled “Technique of synoptic-chart analysis.”
In support of aviation, the Bergen School had changed the epistemic hierarchy of
atmosphere. The weather that people experienced at the surface became a secondary
phenomenon, while the primary cause of weather (and thus the key object of
meteorological explanation) was the general circulation of the atmosphere.

Conclusion
During the interwar period, aviation became an essential part of the American
transportation system, carrying urgent mail and a modest number of passengers across the
country. Troubled by fog, squall lines, and turbulence, the airlines turned to aeronautical
meteorology to help make flight reliable and safe. The operational needs of the airline
industry enabled Rossby, initially to plant the Bergen School in the United States. Rossby
and his students could then use airline support to show the effectiveness of Bergen
School concepts, and to produce textbooks and operational procedures. But while the
airlines could afford to hire experts to analyze the weather for their operations, gathering
the data on which that analysis depended required a large expenditure and huge
organization. Running the environmental surveillance system essential to airline safety

was the job of the US Weather Bureau, and it remained the dominant institution in
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American meteorology. And it was hesitant to displace the attention to local and surface
conditions for a headlong rush into calculating the weather. Only by converting the
Weather Bureau could the apostles of the Bergen School make the upper air the center of
American meteorology. It is to that institutional struggle that we turn next.
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Chapter Three
Institutionalizing Aeronautical Meteorology:
Connecting Research and Operations

Airline meteorologists’ efforts to find the friendly skies during the 1930s relied on
two innovations: widespread observations of the upper air, and practices of knowledge
making that could translate those observations into meaningful statements about the
atmosphere’s behavior, connecting research with operations. The first of these tasks,
monitoring the upper air, became a core task of the Weather Bureau, a central part of the
Bureau’s burgeoning role in aviation support. The development of this observation
network was guided by advances in meteorological theory. At the same time, the
expanding observation system provided data useful for further theorizing and forecasting.
Because the Weather Bureau was by far the most significant meteorological
institution in America from the 1870s through the 1920s, Carl-Gustaf Rossby and his
students desperately wanted the Bureau to utilize their theories and methods in crafting
forecasts. However, as theorizing about the upper air became increasingly important to
researchers, it exposed significant social, epistemological and educational gaps between
the small but growing group of academic researchersand the practical forecasters who
populated the Weather Bureau. The result was a campaign by the theorists, to remake the
Weather Bureau as a “modern” scientific organization. Theorists pushed the Bureau to
hire men with graduate training in meteorological theory, and preferably to give those
trained men leading roles in improving the Bureau’s services. Yet once inside the

Bureau, young dynamic meteorologists found few rewards. They were asked to teach
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the complicated new methods to senior forecasters with decades of experience and no
institutional incentive to change their work practices. The Bureau had a well-established
institutional culture quite different from the privileging of research and abstract theory
that characterized the group of academic meteorologists that grew around Bergen School
emigrants.
The group of theoretically-trained American meteorologists who sought to
appropriate the Weather Bureau had emerged from a group of new institutions, in
particular the meteorology program established in the aeronautical engineering
department at MIT in 1928, and the American Meteorology Society. Rossby played a
major role in steering both these institutions towards theoretical research. As the MIT
program’s first professor, Rossby oversaw its elevation from a program to a stable
department engaged in an extensive research program. The American Meteorological
Society, founded in 1919 in part to offer a forum for the men who had been trained
during the Great War, became an increasingly professional organization beginning in the
mid-1920s, and offered an institutional form parallel to but independent of the Weather
Bureau, though many of its members and officers were Bureau men. Encouraged by
Rossby, AMS meetings provided a forum for discussing advances in meteorological
theory, while its Bulletin provided a new journal for publishing research, one independent
of the primary American meteorological publication, the Weather Bureau’s Monthly

Weather Review. At Rossby’s urging, the AMS established an award to recognize
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promising young researchers.1
Institutional history is crucial to understanding infrastructural science. To
understand the rise of the Bergen school, to see how aeronautical meteorology in
particular emerged as an infrastructural science, we need to explore the institutions in
which it flourished, and the institutional cultures that made atmospheric physics a fruitful
pursuit. To understand the processes central to infrastructural science more generally, we
have to study the physiology of the organizations that coordinate observation networks
and manage forecast production. Finally, to understand how infrastructural science
enables powerful material interventions, we need to reassess the various kinds of work
that scientists perform. We need to see institution building itself as a crucial kind of
scientific labor. This chapter examines how the development of an influential group of
academic theorists reshaped the way that weather was observed, predicted, and
conceptualized in the United States during the 1930s.

Seeing the Weather: The US Weather Bureau in the 1920s
In the five decades following the establishment of a national weather service in
1871, the US Weather Bureau grew into the dominant American meteorological
institution.2 While a few independent observatories collected weather data, University
graduate programs in meteorology were basically non-existent, and few other institutions
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played a role in meteorology.3 As late as 1940, the Weather Bureau employed over
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two-thirds of all the trained or experienced meteorologists in America. As the agency that
controlled the observational network and the nation’s climatology records, the Weather
Bureau played the key role in organizing and administering American meteorology,
linking nearly all Americans paid to theorize about and forecast the weather.
In part this dominance came from money. Within American meteorology, only
the Weather Bureau had a significant and reliable source of funds. While congressional
appropriations were never adequate to meet the demands placed on the Bureau, and
became particularly inadequate as aviators required more extensive upper air
observations during the 1930s, the Bureau’s budget towered above all the other sources
of funding for meteorology in the interwar period. In 1923, the Bureau’s appropriation
was a bit over $1.9 million, while by 1932, it had swelled to just under $4.5 million. In
comparison, the new meteorology graduate program at MIT in 1928 depended upon a
$34,000 grant from the Guggenheim Fund.4 On the public stage, the Weather Bureau was
nearly synonymous with orthodox meteorology. The Bureau issued the forecasts that
appeared in newspapers and it was the first authority journalists consulted when judging
the validity of meteorological claims.5 The title of a 1920 children’s book suggests how
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inseparable weather science was from the organization that controlled it: “Gilbert
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Weather Bureau (Meteorology) For Boys.”6
The Bureau upheld orthodox meteorology through a culture of conservatism. A
domain as important--and public--as the weather attracted many people who claimed
revolutionary techniques for improving forecasts or controlling the weather. In terms of
social standing, these claimants ranged from fast-talking, itinerant rain-makers like
Charles M. Hatfield to Dr. Charles Greely Abbott, a student of astrophysical connections
to weather—and the assistant secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. These techniques
almost never proved effective or repeatable, but neither did they die. By attracting the
attention of a powerful official or two, nearly any idea about the weather might gain
celebrity. In 1934, the Secretary of Agriculture appointed a statistician to investigate
astrometeorological connections for long-range forecasting, an idea long rejected by the
Bureau.7 The Bureau maintained its intellectual and political authority by generally
refusing to support meteorological claims made by people outside of the organization.
Bureau officials expected that new techniques would gain only brief, though bright and
annoying, prominence, and then fade into the regular background of extravagant stories
invented by kooks.

Strikes and Surveillance: The US Army Signal Office, 1861-1891," Historical Studies in the Physical and
Biological Sciences 30, no. 2 (2000): 315-32.
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The Bureau’s daily forecasting practice depended upon visual techniques for
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analyzing synoptic weather maps. These techniques had developed alongside the
telegraph-based observing network in the years after the establishment of the Signal
Corps weather service in 1871, and had changed little over the decades. According to
historian Donald Whitnah, “the general forecasts of 1933 did not vary basically from
those of 1871. The movements and relationships among areas of high and low barometric
pressure formed the primary source of Weather Bureau prognostications.”8
Synoptic weather maps revealed pressure area movements and the daily
production and interpretation of synoptic maps formed the base of a Bureau man’s
knowledge of weather. The map was constructed twice a day, based on morning and
evening observations. As a torrent of weather observations flooded over the telegraph
lines from remote observing stations each morning, map plotters or junior meteorologists
at the forecasting stations wrote the data on pre-printed blanks. Then the station’s
“meteorologist-in-charge” (usually the most senior forecaster) would analyze the chart
and dictate a forecast. Observing stations were widely dispersed, however, and a useful
weather map depended upon the continuities of barometric pressure areas, of isothermal
lines and bands of precipitation. In creating and interpreting weather maps, forecasters
routinely used interpolation and educated intuition. This practical knowledge slowly
developed from the daily routine of watching the play of weather observations across a
map of America.9
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In 1916, the Bureau’s leading forecasters attempted to codify their practical
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knowledge. Initiated at the request of new chief Charles F. Marvin, their text, Weather
Forecasting in the United States attempted to “explain, more or less fully and in detail,
the processes by which forecasts can be made,” intended for the “guidance and
instruction of beginners.”10 The book made clear, however, that forecasting was an
activity learned by doing and watching, not reading. “The consensus of opinion seems to
be that the only road to successful forecasting lies in the patient and consistent study of
daily weather maps.”11 Emphasizing that point, more than one hundred weather maps
illustrated 370 pages. The book was a supplement to apprenticeship, and made sense
primarily in that context.12
The Weather Bureau’s recruitment and training practices reinforced the
development of forecasting through practice. Lead forecasters typically worked their way
up from Junior Observer after entering the Weather Bureau with a high school
education.13 New weather forecasters were promoted from the ranks, “by choosing the
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winners of contests in making daily practice forecasts.”14 With little formal education
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or opportunities in meteorology available outside the Weather Bureau, seniority—rather
than education or research attainments—largely determined status. Keeping one’s
intellectual and social distance from unorthodox theories of forecasting demonstrated the
sobriety that distinguished a reliable weatherman. Successful careers were made by
observing instruments carefully, plotting maps accurately, and forecasting responsibly.
Despite its conservatism, the Bureau hoped to see the expansion of meteorological
education in the United States. But the real driving force behind creating new places for
meteorological education in the 1920s came from the Navy, particularly Francis
Reichelderfer, the Navy’s head aerologist.

Meteorology at MIT
Francis Reichelderfer’s knowledge of meteorology came from the Navy’s need to
support flight. He had joined the Navy during World War I, after completing a chemistry
degree at Northwestern, and learned meteorology through the Navy’s emergency training
program under Alexander McAdie at Harvard, before being posted to the Canadian
Atlantic coast to support coastal patrol flights. Even as nearly all of his colleagues
returned to civilian life as the military demobilized, Reichelderfer chose to stay on in the
Navy after the war to expand on the potential he saw in the future of aviation and
meteorology. He began by learning to fly himself. Reichelderfer became an important
part of the Navy competitive ballooning teams that entered into national and international
races. During the early 1920s, he became head of the Navy aerology office, working out
14
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of the Bureau of Aeronautics in Washington, and supervising a handful of lieutenants
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and about fifty enlisted men who took weather observations and supported flying
observations at Naval Air Stations, as well as the Navy’s expanding lighter-than-air
operations.15
As part of his duties in the aerology office, Reichelderfer was also responsible for
meteorological training. He began by establishing some temporary courses through the
Navy Postgraduate School. However, feeling the program needed to be more strongly
institutionalized, that the Navy’s needs could better served through a proper academic
and scientific education in meteorology, and that the US needed a research program in
meteorology, Reichelderfer developed a plan and began shopping for a school. He
initially approached Harvard, which had traditionally been allied with the Navy, and
which hosted the Blue Hill meteorological observatory. Harvard’s Robert DeCourcy
Ward only felt himself qualified to teach climatology, however, and the University did
not embrace the opportunity. Keeping his focus on Cambridge, Reichelderfer turned to
MIT. While MIT had no meteorologists on faculty, Reichelderfer knew one who was
available: Rossby, whom he had met while visiting the Weather Bureau to obtain the
daily weather map.
Using his connections through the Naval Postgraduate School, the Weather
Bureau and the Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics, Reichelderfer began
lobbying for the creation of a meteorology course at MIT with Rossby as its leader.
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At the end of May 1926, the head of the US Navy Postgraduate School sent
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the MIT administration a copy of the proposal for a meteorology program originally sent
to Harvard.16 During the spring of 1927, leading men in the Weather Bureau prepared
letters recommending Rossby to MIT. William Humphreys, one of the few researchoriented senior figures in the Weather Bureau (his title was “professor of meteorological
physics”), asked his friend G.K. Burgess, of the Bureau of Standards, to pass along a
recommendation to MIT president S.W. Stratton. Rossby was “much better prepared to
teach advanced meteorology than any other man now available in this country,”
Humphreys said, because of his “knowledge of meteorological phenomena, and
exceptional training in mathematical physics.” Rossby also had initiative, “and yet
admirably adapts himself to cooperation, or teamwork. Furthermore he is companionable
and in every way a gentleman.”17 Weather Bureau chief Charles Marvin echoed these
sentiments, saying “I know of no young man, whether in this country or abroad, better
equipped to teach meteorology as it should be taught, than Mr. Rossby. Furthermore, he
is thoroughly gentlemanly in his behaviour, mixes well, and has an excellent command of
English. This is a most exceptional opportunity to obtain a teacher of scientific
meteorology.” He also emphasized the Bureau’s interest in exploring a different approach
to teaching meteorology: “the Weather Bureau has long endeavored to have meteorology
taught in American universities as a branch of physics and mathematics rather than as a
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part of the sections devoted to geology and geography, as is the usual custom.”18
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Marvin even went so far as to sound out Rossby regarding his salary expectations.
Then MIT institutional politics intervened. By July, as Rossby’s fellowship from
American-Scandinavian Foundation ran out, he felt confident enough to write to
President Stratton with an ultimatum. Rossby said he had received an offer from another
institution (“without any solicitation on my part”) and asked if MIT was still interested in
hiring him. But Charles Norton, head of the MIT Physics department, did not see
meteorology as a departmental priority. While acknowledging that Rossby was a good
man and the physics department would be glad to have him, Norton saw meteorology as
an unaffordable luxury.19 Rossby became a full-time employee of the Guggenheim Fund
instead, leaving for California to establish the model airway weather service.
Reichelderfer switched tactics. To sidestep financial constraints, he began
lobbying for a meteorology program within MIT’s aeronautical engineering program, to
be funded by a grant from the Guggenheim Fund. Late in 1927 Edward Warner, formerly
Guggenheim professor of aeronautics at MIT, now assistant secretary of the Navy for
Aeronautics and an advisor to the Guggenheim Fund, let Harry Guggenheim know that
the Navy needed a good training course for its weather forecasters. Fishing for financial
support from “some public-spirited citizen or organization like your own,” Warner sought
a “fully rounded course to prepare men for meteorological work either in the services or
in civil life.”20 Warner sent a copy of the program description to President Stratton as
well. Stratton endorsed the proposal, telegraphing “Will proceed at once, preferably in
18
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connection with aeronautics as physics has not shown much interest heretofore when
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this work was proposed.”21 The MIT executive committee then approved hiring a
meteorology professor, and Stratton asked Warner to recommend someone to fill the job.
Warner’s lobbying of the Guggenheim Fund succeeded. On June 18, 1928, the Fund
approved a grant to establish a meteorology program. MIT received $34,000 total, to pay
for three years worth of: salary for one professor ($4,000/year), three graduate
fellowships ($2,000/year), $2,000 per year of research funds, and one time expenses of
$10,000 to buy equipment.22
Reichelderfer’s efforts had been successful at last. Rossby reported for work on
September 7th, bringing with him the vigor and overwhelming enthusiasm that marked his
entire career. The classes he taught were small, usually three or four Navy officers and
one or two graduate students. Horace Byers became the program’s first graduate student,
while Jerome Namias, Harry Wexler, and Athelstan Spilhaus all studied at MIT during
the 1930s. Their distinguished careers in geophysics are a testament to Rossby’s
considerable skills in mentorship. 23 Rossby’s charm and generosity marked his teaching.
Horace Byers recalled that Rossby’s “informal discussions over luncheon or a cup of
coffee … were nothing less than an inspiration.”24
Rossby’s most important research occurred during the ten years he spent at MIT.
This work focused on exploring the influence of upper air conditions upon the
movements of air masses. Working from the increasing number of upper air observations
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being taken around the northern hemisphere (and some of which he arranged in the
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Boston area), Rossby developed techniques for identifying and tracking air masses. By
charting constant potential temperature (isentropy), the boundaries of air masses could be
identified and followed over time. To understand what caused the movement of air
masses, Rossby returned to the rotation of the earth, and its effect on the general
circulation of the atmosphere. From upper air observations, he teased out a pattern of
enormous tongues of low pressure, reaching downward from the pole. These large-scale
atmospheric disturbances, he realized, were waves that had periods of a few days, the
same order as many substantial changes in weather. Following a line of mathematical
reasoning that stretched back to Laplace’s theory of ocean tides and through a theorem of
Hermann Helmholtz, Rossby developed an equation that could be used to calculate the
movement of these waves, later known as “Rossby Waves.” The equation, published in
1939, accounted for shifts in the upper-level westerlies, the steering winds which guided
air masses. The result made Rossby world-famous amongst physicists studying the
atmosphere.25
Rossby’s research program was defined by expansion and continual new plans for
the “modernization of American meteorology.”26 As early as his second semester, Rossby
managed to add an assistant professor in Hurd C. Willet, a former Weather Bureau
observer and one of the few American meteorologists with a Ph.D. (Physics, George
Washington University), as well as secure additional university funds to pay for a
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radioman to receive and plot upper air observations taken by the Weather Bureau. He
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also hired an assistant to work at MIT’s Round Hill Observatory and spent $2,000 on new
equipment. 27
The Guggenheim committee’s interests strongly shaped meteorological research
at MIT, though given Rossby’s force of character, he tended to be the dominant
personality on the Guggenheim committee. For example, Warner encouraged Rossby to
address a new issue of considerable commercial and military importance: “Hope you will
also give consideration to development of instrument for analyzing atmospheric structure
and movements at various altitudes this is a problem of enormous importance for airship
development and hardly a beginning has as yet been made.”28 Addressing another interest
of the Guggenheim committee on aeronautical meteorology, the characteristics of fog,
Rossby asked President Stratton to assign a professor from electrical engineering and
another from chemistry to assist him and Willett. This study sought to understand fog, in
the hoes of eventually developing an effective means of artificial fog dissipation.29 Fog
would remain an important subject of research at MIT through the early 1930s.
In his first year, Rossby made clear the elements of his institution building
strategy. During his ten years at MIT, he recruited additional faculty attracted private
graduate students, established a burgeoning line of research projects, and trained the
Navy aerology officers who were the program’s original raison d’etre. Rossby’s research
program included a dedicated airplane used to make upper air observations over Boston,
collaboration with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution on the boundary layer
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between the ocean and atmosphere, and investigation into long-range forecasting,
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ostensibly in response to drought in the Dust Bowl region. He also developed a theory of
atmospheric motion that enabled hemispheric scale changes to be calculated, a discovery
that made him one of the most celebrated atmospheric physicists since Vilhelm Bjerknes.
Though the Great Depression limited his ambitions, Rossby managed a complex agenda
as he built MIT into a world-leading center for meteorological research and education.

Institutional Exchanges
One of Rossby’s key strategies for promoting intellectual change was one that he
had inherited from Vilhelm Bjerknes: institutional exchanges. Rossby himself toured
Europe in the summer of 1930, spending ten days with his colleagues in Bergen,
attending the International Geophysical Union meeting in Stockholm, studying
techniques of upper air observation at Lindenberg and Templehof Airport in Berlin, and
catching up on developments in dynamic meteorology and turbulence in Vienna, among
other stops across central Europe.30 As early as March 1929, Rossby suggested that a
Navy aerology student should be sent to study European methods. Rossby suggested one
of his first students, asserting that
This year’s graduates in aerology from M.I.T. form the first group which has ever
been given the thorough course in the theoretical aspects of meteorology. They
are therefore capable of conducting independent research work, keeping the
fundamental problems of meteorology in mind, whereas the practical aerologists
taken direct from the naval service may well be acquainted with instruments and
the daily routine work but hardly have an eye open for the fundamental problems
of meteorology.31
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The head of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Admiral William Moffett, disagreed. Moffett
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demanded an officer with “a thorough education in meteorological and aeronautical
subjects who has also had considerable practical experience.” Moffett sent Reichelderfer.
It was on this tour that Reichelderfer directly encountered the Bergen school.
Reichelderfer spent six months in Bergen in 1931–1932, working with Jacob
Bjerknes, Tor Bergeron, and Sverre Petterssen to analyze both American and European
weather maps. Promptly, Reichelderfer became a conduit for Bergen methods. His
summary, Report of Norwegian Methods of Weather Analysis, became an informal bible.
Though marked “Restricted,” mimeographed copies circulated among Army and Weather
Bureau forecasters in addition to Navy officers.32
Rossby also brought the Bergen School to MIT in person. He asked President
Stratton for permission to invite Harald Sverdrup to MIT for a series of lectures in late
May, 1930, describing Sverdrup as “Director of the Geophysical Institute, Bergen,
Norway, for seven years leader of the scientific work of Amundsen’s Maud Expedition to
the Arctic, and one of the outstanding meteorologists and oceanographers of our time.”33
Rossby also arranged for Jacob Bjerknes to lecture at MIT in 1933 and 1939, and secured
both Sverre Petterssen and Jörgen Holmboe to join the faculty. Petterssen took over for
Rossby as chair when Rossby took a leave of absence to work in the Weather Bureau in
1938. In fact, the presence of so much of the Bergen School at MIT gave Jacob Bjerknes
an excuse to avoid a large commitment to the institute during his 1939-40 tour of North
32
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“since he feels that the Department then would become practically a Norwegian
institution, both Petterssen and Holmboe being Norwegian citizens.”34
Not all Rossby’s exchanges were so dramatically successful. Indeed one of
Rossby’s most interesting attempts at institutional exchanges failed completely, with
important consequences for the future of American atmospheric science. C. Warren
Thornthwaite (1899-1963) had trained in geography Ph.D. under Carl Sauer at the
University of California, Berkeley. During a peripatetic career that took him to the
Universities of Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, the Soil Conservation Service in the
Department of Agriculture, and finally a major commercial farm in New Jersey,
Thornthwaite developed a vision of climatology that connected human behavior, plant
physiology and climatic variation across many scales. He consistently took an integrative,
interdisciplinary approach as he sought to measure climate from the point of view of
individual plants or discuss the role of drought in human migration from the Great
Plains.35 In addition to climatology, Thornthwaite was quite familiar with advances in
meteorology (his first scientific paper was “The Polar Front in the Interpretation and
Prediction of Oklahoma Weather,” in 1929), and Rossby attempted to recruit him to teach
at MIT in 1939. Rossby had been hoping to expand MIT’s meteorology program by
adding Oliver Wulf to address atmospheric chemistry, and Thornthwaite for agricultural
meteorology. Thornthwaite wanted too high a salary, according to Rossby’s initial
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sounding, so Rossby turned his attention to Thornthwaite’s colleague John Leighly.
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Rossby proposed a one-year exchange with Berkeley. However, Carl Sauer, the head of
the Berkeley Geography department, vetoed this plan saying students needed more time
to plan their course of study, and so he could not let Leighly leave without at least a
year’s notice. 36 MIT never developed analytical climatology, and Thornthwaite’s vision
of an integrative applied climatology remained unfulfilled. His decline to move to MIT at
this crucial juncture meant that he spent the rest of his career outside of the emerging
networks that controlled American atmospheric science.

Upper Air Observations: By Plane and Balloon
Directly monitoring the upper air would begin to provide Rossby with the data he
needed to understand the physics behind the atmosphere’s hemispheric circulation. To
produce the knowledge that would help make possible technological system of flight
required a technological system of its own. Beginning in November 1931, he organized a
program of upper air observations, and adjusted his program through the 1930s in
response to changing technologies for accessing this remote environment.
Rossby began with a light airplane, a Warner Cessna, purchased for $5,000 using
the Guggenheim Funds, and based at the East Boston Airport. “The primary object of the
daily flights,” he wrote, “is to collect in routine fashion information regarding the vertical
temperature and humidity distribution over Boston. These data will be studied from day
to day in connection with our daily weather map colloquium.” His plane would also be
equipped with a camera to take pictures of the distribution of fog over Boston and the
36
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was piloted by MIT professor Daniel C. Sayre. Charles Stark Draper built the initial
instruments, early in a long and influential career aerospace instrument design.37 All were
subject to Rossby’s overall supervision.38 The Boston observations would fill a gap in
Weather Bureau upper air observations, the nearest of which were at Royal Center,
Indiana and Anacostia in the District of Columbia. The department would combine these
observations with about 1300 kite records, in order to study “the structure and in
particular the conservative properties of different American air masses.” Like the work in
Bergen during the Great War that had led to the discovery of the Polar Front, Rossby
sought to connect daily observations with theoretical insights into atmospheric dynamics.
As the plane had a large capacity, it attracted the interest of other researchers at
MIT anxious to get instruments into the air. By June of 1932, in addition to an
aerometeorograph strapped to the wing, the plane was also carrying: gas samplers to
study the chemical composition of upper air; dust collectors for Harlow Shapley’s studies
of cosmic radiation at the Harvard Observatory; insect traps for the Bureau of
Entomology; and bacteria plates for MIT’s Department of Biology and Public Health. In
applying for grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, Rossby and Karl Compton touted
the multiple lines of research the plane supported.39 Like oceanographic vessels or space
satellites, the plane thus initiated interdisciplinary interactions by offering access to an
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otherwise inaccessible environment.40 These interdisciplinary connections, in turn,
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stabilized and strengthened Rossby’s own institution.

Collaboration with Woods Hole
As Rossby organized coalitions of institutions around specific technologies, he
was also organizing coalitions around specific questions. In the late 1920s, Rossby
became interested in physical oceanography, since the oceans, like the atmosphere, had
large-scale waves. By 1931, Rossby had reached out to Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution, initiating contact between the MIT and the research center 75 miles to the
south. Rossby was appointed “associate in dynamic oceanography,” and by December
1931 Woods Hole was paying him $1,250 per year (in addition to the $6,000 he was than
making from MIT).41 He began a joint publication program for research papers on
dynamic meteorology and oceanography, with the two institutions chipping in cover
publishing costs. The collaboration supported the doctoral studies of Raymond
Montgomery in dynamic oceanography. One of the key outgrowths was the development
of the bathythermograph by Rossby’s student Athelstan Spilhaus. Spilhaus was a bold
South African who parachuted behind enemy lines to make weather observations during
World War II, drew a widely syndicated science education comic strip from 1957-1973,
led Institute of Technology at the University of Minnesota, presided over the Franklin
Institute, and Served on a wide variety of government advisory panels. The
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bathythermograph became a crucial tool in anti-submarine operations during the war,
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detecting the sonar-distorting thermoclines that could obscure U-boats. The second key
outgrowth was Rossby’s work on understanding the Gulf Stream. His work trying to
understand the physics driving the stream, and to develop methods to calculate it,
developed in parallel, and addressed many of the same questions and principles, that
underlay his more famous work on Rossby waves (discussed below).42

Finding Support
Supporting this expanding research enterprise presented a challenge. Rossby
initially looked to a series of familiar private foundations. However, by the late 1930s,
when foundation funding began to dry up in the face of the depression, the climatic
catastrophe of the Dustbowl presented him with new opportunities. Rossby turned to the
federal government, receiving funding from Congress earmarked to support scientific
research relevant to the Dust Bowl.
When the initial Guggenheim grant expired in the midst of the economic crisis,
Rossby sought several sources of new funds. His first foray was to his old employers. In
March, he dashed off a letter to Chief Marvin asking the Weather Bureau to offer a
contract that would pay between $7 and $10 for each weather observation flight that
reached 3,000 meters above Boston, noting that MIT’s flight data had always been freely
shared with the Bureau. Chief Marvin declined the suggestion that he should create such
a contract to subsidize MIT, though he did note that the observations were soon going to
be sent by teletype to the Central Office in Washington for use in general forecasting, and
42
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that “the information has been of considerable value, particularly in connection with
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determining the likelihood of ice formation.”43
Rossby then turned to private industry. On Rossby’s behalf, MIT’s new President
Carl Compton wrote to aviation dynamo Jerome Hunsaker, then developing a passenger
dirigible partnership between Goodyear and Zeppelin, to pay for Rossby to continue a
study of “a meteorological project of interest to aircraft operators.” Hunsaker replied that
appreciated the study’s value, but needed to “conserve resources for the lean years
ahead.” Referencing a recent accident where the Akron was dramatically spun on her
nose (fortunately causing only minor damage) he offered to try to persuade the Navy to
pay for a technical “report” from general funds.44
Rossby next tried to persuade his old patron Harry Guggenheim, now serving as
Ambassador to Cuba, to fund a new airplane for MIT. Guggenheim apologized, saying
that he had stopped funding aviation work since he became ambassador, but encouraged
Rossby to keep up the good work. Rossby next turned to the Rockefeller and Carnegie
foundations. Warren Weaver at Rockefeller eventually granted $8,400 to support upper
air flights in 1934, describing the project as an ”interesting and valuable demonstration,”
but warning that the Foundation would not further support the work.45
Desperate for funds, Rossby turned to a new source, the Federal Government, and
found that the environmental aspects of the economic crisis would prove of enduring
value. As the dust storms swept topsoil from the plains and deposited it as far away as
Washington D.C., as images of the drought and walls of blowing dust became national
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icons, the plight of farmers and Dust Bowl refugees rapidly became a subject of
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considerable political importance.
In response to this devastation in the Dust Bowl region, Congress passed the
Bankhead-Jones Act, which appropriated funds specifically for research intended to
address the region’s problems. The Bankhead-Jones funds supported Rossby’s long-range
forecasting group at MIT, which began work in 1937, and moved into the Weather
Bureau in 1941.46 According to Rossby’s assistant and student Jerome Namias, who
would take over the project when it moved from MIT into the Weather Bureau, “the
government’s interest in the field of long-range forecasting was stimulated during the
dust-bowl days.”47
Rossby argued that advances in long-range weather forecasting (i.e., more than 23 days in advance) would benefit agriculture. Rossby’s group sought to extend forecasts
by developing a better physical understanding of the atmosphere’s general circulation,
including:
anticyclogenesis… particularly as related to the influence of lateral mixing; a
study of how systems become dynamically unstable; and the development of a
theory of flow patterns in the atmosphere as shown on isentropic charts.49
By developing theoretical tools to understand the atmosphere’s general circulation,
Rossby also hoped to learn to interpret past climate fluctuations. Although his research
was funded as a response to the Dust Bowl, in performing it, Rossby was not concerned
46
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with the Dust Bowl’s actual conditions. Improvements in five-day weather
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forecasting would likely have been of little use to farmers suffering drought on seasonal
to interannual timescales. Predictions of the climate were not part of the project.
Rather than as a practical response to the Dust Bowl, the project should be viewed
as an institutional strategy. Rossby used Dust Bowl money to broaden the reach of the
Bergen school, by funding his continuing efforts to theorize and model the general
circulation. The project’s primary impact, other than sustaining Rossby’s research group
during the last years of the Great Depression, was to help launch Namias’s outstanding
career in atmospheric dynamics, long range forecasting, and eventually climate
research.51 However, during WWII the considerable military interest in longer range
forecasts would bring this knowledge to the fore.
While Rossby was building a research program, aviation continued to grow,
despite the global economic collapse. Between 1928 and 1940, five American
universities established graduate programs in meteorology. Following MIT in 1928, the
California Institute of Technology established a program in 1933,53 and Rossby’s student
Athelstan Spilhaus led a department at New York University from 1937. These programs
were each connected to Guggenheim-funded schools of aeronautics. In 1940 the
University of Chicago and the University of California, Los Angeles introduced
51
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professional meteorological instruction. All five programs focused upon preparing
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students for careers in aviation, and began to send graduates into the Weather Bureau
following reforms in the 1930s.

Reforming the Weather Bureau
For the emergence of aeronautical meteorology as an infrastructural science, the
most important aspect of Rossby’s institutional agenda was his effort to change the
practices of the Weather Bureau. Defining modern meteorology as dynamical studies and
the methods of the Bergen School, Rossby sought to “modernize” the Bureau.
Aviation helped him with this goal. While Rossby worked at MIT, flying interests
called for improvements in the Weather Bureau’s aviation forecasting services. The
resulting reforms embraced the values of the Bergen School. By the time Rossby rejoined
the Weather Bureau in 1939 as assistant director for research, directives from outside the
Bureau had set it on a course towards full adoption of Norwegian methods. University
education of young men was the primarily mechanism for spreading the Bergen School.
Though the Air Commerce Act of 1926 directed the Weather Bureau to provide
forecasts and warnings useful for aviation, flying grew far faster than appropriations. In
the late 1920s, the Bureau struggled to provide adequate observations and forecasts for
the nation’s airways. The economic collapse of 1929 also hindered appropriations,
though it was not until the first Roosevelt budget that government spending was
drastically curtailed. The Weather Bureau lost nearly $2 million, about 45% of its budget,

between the 1932 and 1933 appropriations. Chief Marvin dismissed nearly 500
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employees, about 20% of the Bureau’s workforce.54
Even before these cutbacks took effect, the Bureau faced a new and humiliating
catastrophe. On April 4th, 1933, the Navy dirigible USS Akroncrashed in an unpredicted
squall, killing 73, including the head of the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics, Adm. William
Moffett. Resulting Congressional hearings explored the inadequacies of the Weather
Bureau, while highlighting the credibility problems faced by such a public science. In one
hearing, Charles Mitchell, the Bureau’s most respected forecaster, battled a Senator who
claimed expertise based upon many years of study of Weather Bureau reports, while the
committee chairman spoke of meteorology as “this so-called ‘science’.” Later in the
hearings, air power advocate General Billy Mitchell argued that the weather service
should be rearranged, removed from the government department responsible for “raising
onions, potatoes and such things,” and run by the military.55
President Roosevelt took a moderate response, calling upon a new institution: the
Science Advisory Board, an institution linked to Rossby through its chair, MIT president
Karl Compton.56 The Board appointed a subcommittee to recommend improvements to
the Weather Bureau: one Weather Bureau meteorologist, Charles D. Reed, and three
university presidents: Compton, Johns Hopkins’s Isaiah Bowman, and Cal Tech’s Robert
Millikan. In addition to being America’s most distinguished physicist, Millikan had
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headed the Army’s meteorology program during the Great War. Bowman was an avid
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supporter of polar exploration and president of the American Geographical Society.
The subcommittee’s report called for the immediate adoption of “air-mass
analysis methods.” With air-mass analysis, the committee wrote, “there is the practical
certainty that our whole forecasting service can be improved both as to accuracy and
reliability.”57 Since air mass analysis required upper air data, the report suggested the
Army and Navy provide daily aerological measurements during their regular training
flights. The report called for the Bureau to keep up with new developments in air-mass
analysis. In addition, the Committee recommended that a system of postgraduate training
for Weather Bureau meteorologists be initiated. All forecasters should receive “thorough
instruction in the more modern methods,” while those “who already have a good basic
training in meteorology, physics and mathematics and have shown some proficiency in
the actual art of forecasting” should be detailed “to an institution of recognized leadership
in this field” for six months or a year of advanced instruction.58 Superior meteorological
knowledge now came from universities, this group of college presidents implied.
The Weather Bureau’s adaptation to air mass analysis, however, “proved to be a
painfully slow process.”59 The Akron crash ended Chief Marvin’s tenure in January 1934;
he officially retired eight months later after fifty years with the weather service. The new
chief was Willis Gregg, head of Bureau’s aerology division. Gregg’s promotion made
clear the centrality of aviation interests. But while Gregg had been a member of the
Guggenheim committee on meteorology alongside Rossby, he remained an insider who
57
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had spent his career with the Bureau. Between 1935 and 1938 the Bureau appointed
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roughly “a dozen young university men with air mass training.”60 Among these men were
Rossby’s students Horace Byers, Harry Wexler, and Stephen Lichtblau.61 Gregg’s choices
about how to pay for the new technique may have caused some of the conversion pains.
Money intended for salary increases in 1935 was diverted to the new air mass section
instead.
A novel by America’s greatest novelist of infrastructure best captured the tension
between young university men and senior, experienced forecasters. Based on
ethnographic research, George R. Stewart’s best-seller Storm featured a universitytrained meteorologist struggling to understand a major winter storm and its effects on
California.62 This passage described the Junior Meteorologist’s difficult adjustment to the
culture of the Weather Bureau:
He admitted that he had been unhappy in the Weather Bureau; his mathematical
training did not seem to help him, and sometimes he thought that it even was a
handicap. Sometimes it seemed as if the Chief were only using the same methods
that any shepherd might have used back in the time of the Patriarchs; he just
60
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looked at the sky, and decided from the appearance of things what weather
would come along after a while. The Shepherd, of course, never saw farther than
the actual horizon. By the weather map the Chief extended his view for several
thousands of miles. There was a tremendous pyramiding of information, but not
much change in method.63
To the young men trained in the methods of the Bergen School, the empirical methods of
senior forecasters simply looked obsolete—the methods of stubborn old-timers resisting
the progress of modern meteorology. Reminiscing in 1981, Jerome Namias took the
resistance to Bergen methods as evidence of the Bureau’s “provincial and narrow
view.”64
To the experienced forecasters responsible for issuing reliable forecasts on tight
schedules, however, the intuitive processes refined through years of practice represented
a skilled judgment that couldn’t be learned in a classroom. Running a weather service
was different from talking about one. The Bergen School learned this difference when
Chief Gregg died from a heart attack in 1938. At the suggestion of the Science Advisory
Board, President Roosevelt appointed Francis Reichelderfer to replace him.
Reichelderfer learned of the offer as he entered port aboard the USS Utah.65 Not only was
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chiefs had been, he hired Rossby as Assistant Director for research and education.
Reichelderfer proved a conscientious administrator, and he avoided making
wholesale changes to his new organization. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gave him
a useful tool for gradual change: education. The act directed the Weather Bureau to send
men each year to universities for “training at Government expense… in advanced
methods of meteorological science.” Such men also retained their seniority as they
learned.66 Reichelderfer further reformed the Bureau by addition. Senior forecasters could
continue to forecast as they had, while new methods and new men were added to the
process.
The Department of Agriculture’s 1941 Yearbook of Agriculture: Climate and Man
illustrates these processes of reform. In an early chapter, Reichelderfer laid out the new
goals that marked modern meteorology. In its current stage, expert forecasting remained
“a combination of training, experience and native ability. However, as progress is made
in three-dimensional analysis of the weather and …knowledge of its physical processes…
the science will become more systematic and exact.” Progress would come through
research. Meteorology’s goal was not only better forecasting, but also to diminish the
importance of “personal factors” in the process.67
Rossby’s contribution reiterated the commitment to research as the engine of
progress. In “The Scientific Basis of Modern Meteorology,” Rossby laid out a “semipractice bombs dropped by Army Air Corps B-17s, and in September 1938 she was attacked by an early
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technical” presentation of the physics of Northern hemisphere atmospheric
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circulation. “Genetics, soil science and nutrition have all made great strides based upon
important fundamental discoveries,” he argued. “Latest to join this group is
meteorology.”68 Arguing for the primacy of theory, he wrote, “it is safe to say that until
the proper theoretical tools are available, no adequate progress will be made either with
the problem of long-range forecasting or with the interpretation of past climatic
fluctuations.”69 While much of his article seems far too “semi-technical” for the average
reader, he ended his piece with a short demonstration of “amateur forecasting from cloud
formations.”
Though a product of institutions developed for aviation, this 1248 page book was
a public response to a different challenge: the Dust Bowl. It included relatively accessible
essays on a wide range of topics, including “Climatic Change through the Ages,” Climate
and Settlement in Puerto Rico and the Hawaiian Islands,” “Health in Tropical Climates,”
eleven essays on the relation between climate and different crops, “Flood Hazard and
Flood Control,” and “World Extremes of Weather.” A state-by-state climate summary
occupies nearly 500 pages, thick with data tables compiled by Works Progress
Administration relief workers from Weather Bureau records. The book represents a
provocative effort to provide the public with an accessible survey that integrates
knowledge about atmospheric dynamics, agricultural practices, and government policy.
The boldest essay is Thornthwaite’s primary contribution, “Climate and
Settlement in the Great Plains,” which integrated grain prices, climatic data, and the
68

Carl-Gustaf Rossby, "The Scientific Basis of Modern Meteorology," in Climate and Man: Yearbook of
Agriculture 1941, ed. F. W. Reichelderfer (Washington, D.C.: Department of Agriculture, Government
Printing Office, 1941): 599.
69
Ibid.: 600

history of human settlement to argue that the Great Plains are not suitable for the
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consistent production of grain for export. Both periods of adequate rainfall and periods of
extended drought are to be expected in this region. Thornthwaite concluded by
advocating constraining agricultural development to fit this climatic reality. Yet from his
minor office at Soil Conservation Service in the USDA, away from the influential flood
of students soon to be training at MIT, Thornthwaite remained far from the emerging
main stream of meteorology. He pointed towards a path that meteorology did not travel, a
path bricked up by the exigencies of World War II.

Conclusion
During the 1930s, Carl Rossby developed institutions and a disciplinary culture
that would eventually raise the academic status of meteorology. Working at MIT, Woods
Hole and the Weather Bureau, and, through his students and colleagues, at NYU, UCLA,
and Chicago, Rossby established meteorology as an academic and research discipline in
the United States. Rossby used this system of universities as his primary tool for pursuing
theoretical research and training colleagues. At the same time however, he recognized
the key role of the military and airlines in creating careers for students, and in providing a
justification for theoretical research. His academic program grew because they addressed
the needs of aviation organizations for specialized technical experts. As American
meteorology developed into a research field focused on the realm of flight, it became a
respectable science whose practitioners could achieve the presidencies of the National
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Academies, and even Nobel prizes, albeit only for interdisciplinary work like Ozone
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chemistry.71 Through these institutional gains Rossby’s work both guided how the upper
air would be observed, and used those observations for further theorizing. His work
shows the interplay between theory and observation, and between research and
operations, characteristic of infrastructural science.
However, this expansion of aeronautical meteorology also led to the rejection of
other meteorological subjects and methods. Before aviation, American meteorology’s
central topics of inquiry included the relationships between weather and health,
agriculture, or human behavior as readily as studies of the structure of the atmosphere.
The ineffectual response of American science to the catastrophe of the Dust Bowl
suggests some of the dangers inherent in connecting atmospheric science too tightly to
the needs of a single technological interest. Aviation captured the American
meteorological researchers, focusing them on a narrow set of problems essential to flight,
but kept them from the attending to the human dependencies on climate and weather
pressing down on refugees from the Great Plains. The abstracting of weather knowledge
from personal experience would only be intensified by the coming of another global war.
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Chapter Four
Mass Meteorology: World War II, the Weather Cadets,
and the expansion of the Bergen School

“You and your instructors have helped solve one of the Navy’s most important wartime
problems—the training of men to carry out the specialized tasks demanded by modern
warfare. The importance of your field—meteorology—cannot be over estimated.”
–Admiral John McCain to UCLA professor Joseph Kaplan, celebrating the graduation of
a class of military meteorologists in 1942.1

Enormous numbers characterize every aspect of World War II. The Soviet Union
manufactured 36,200 shturmovik attack planes to defend against the German Army,
which invested 7,146 division-months (something like 2.6 billion man-days) in combat
on the eastern front alone. Japan imported 6,460,000 tons of coal and 2,110,000 tons of
rice in 1941, dwindling to just 548 and 201 tons in 1945, as the Allies sank 2,345
Japanese merchant ships. Many were torpedoed by US submarines, of which 53 were
destroyed, a number that pales beside the 785 German U-boats sunk, which does not
include the 221 more submarines scuttled after Germany’s surrender. The Allies
produced over a billion metric tons of crude oil, more than 15 times as much as the Axis.
Much of it was shipped across the Atlantic, where between 62 and 131 merchant ships
were sunk every month during 1942, totaling 1,170 ships lost that year. The United States
produced 4,123,200 metric tons of aluminum between 1942 and 1945, fashioned into
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more than 35,000 four-engine strategic bombers. Those bombers helped kill perhaps
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600,000 European and 1.2 million Japanese civilians, staggering numbers that
nevertheless represent less than 4% of the estimated 50 million people who died as result
of the war.2
We know some of these numbers with surprising precision because fighting a
global, total war required mobilizing technical expertise. Physicists famously contributed
to military hardware like radar, the proximity fuse, rocket motors and the atomic bomb,
proclaiming the conflict “the physicists war.”3 Many other kinds of technical experts
were needed to manage the massive flows of material, money, and people; they
mobilized with less notoriety. Applied mathematicians constructed the field of operations
research out of their efforts to calculate efficient ways destroy enemy industrial
production and convoy war materials across submarine-infested oceans.4 Economists
worked to devise policies that would control prices and maximize production.5
Nutritionists devised systems for rationing civilian food and feeding soldiers efficiently. 6
Organic chemists investigated the synthetic rubber and enriched fuels crucial to global
mobility. 7 The military and universities negotiated new kinds of contracts for managing
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the relationship between science and the government.8 To house the bureaucracy that
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managed these managers, buildings mushroomed in Washington D.C., while across the
Potomac the US military constructed the world’s largest office building, with 3.7 million
square feet of office space. President Roosevelt insisted the new building’s façade
contain no marble, but the Pentagon’s concrete edifice nevertheless became a monument
to military management. 9
Meteorologists too mobilized to help the military control the atmosphere and
oceans. The crucial role of meteorology in the success of the D-Day invasion is, of
course, its most famous contribution. Thanks to two skilled and lucky forecasts (that
nearly went the other way) Allied troops invaded Europe during a tiny window of
favorable conditions, catching the defenders off guard since the German meteorologists
had predicted the weather would not clear. The Allies’ forecast team included senior
meteorologists like the Norwegian Sverre Petterssen, who had cut his teeth forecasting
for polar dirigible flights in the 1920s, and Irving Krick, a former airline meteorologist
for TWA, and British forecasters with comparable experiences.10
Less dramatic, but perhaps even more essential to the war effort in the aggregate
were the routine observations, forecasts and weather briefings carried out by junior
weather officers in support of the thousands of American planes around the globe. By
8
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1944, pilots carried the daily synoptic chart with them, using it to find cover from
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anti-aircraft fire in predicted clouds, or clear landing fields in case of diversion or
emergency.11 However it was immediately apparent that the pre-war United States had far
too few meteorologists to support military operations. A professional census in July 1940
counted just 377 qualified weather forecasters in the United States: 150 in the Weather
Bureau, 94 in the civil airlines, 62 in the Army, 46 in the Navy, and only 25 in
educational and other institutions.12 (Germany was believed to have mobilized 2,700
forecasters into military service.13)
While maintaining its domestic weather service, the US would have to create new
observation networks and forecasting stations where the fighting occurred. To meet this
need, the nation’s few academic meteorologists led by Carl-Gustaf Rossby worked with
the military to produce a large training program based at the five universities with
graduate meteorology programs and at Chanute Field. An official history of the Army
Air Force’s weather training program wrote that the curriculum “was in essence a
modification of the meteorological course developed at MIT over a period of 15 years,”
providing military cadets with nine months of intensive training in dynamic meteorology
and weather forecasting.14 By the end of 1944, this program had turned out approximately
6,200 male weather officers and 100 women.15 Some of the women were civilians trained
to fill temporary vacancies in the Weather Bureau, while others were military volunteers
11
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deployed in the United States to support airways and pilot training bases. The men

141

forecast weather in every theater of the war, providing knowledge necessary for effective
strategic bombing, amphibious invasions, ferrying aircraft and supplies from factory to
battlefield, and other vital military operations. Almost none had had any prior technical
training in how to monitor and predict weather.
The training program created a large new cadre of meteorological experts trained
to understand the weather in the geophysical terms of Bergen School models. A subset of
the men of this “weather cadet generation” would dominate American (and thus to a large
extent international) meteorology, from the 1950s into the 1980s.16 The vast group of
meteorologists created for the war, would, in the peace, become the basis for both
meteorology’s public face, on television, and for its hidden, much larger, networks of
industrial, military and government scientific workers. Its scale made possible its later
ubiquity, and its place as national infrastructure.
Fighting a global war also demanded many new pilots.17 Aircraft had become far
more complicated since World War I, and the training necessary to fly and fight in an
advanced machine had similarly increased. Learning to read the weather was just a
fraction of the extensive training pilots required. To meet these imperatives, the flying
services, like other branches of the US military, employed a variety of media to teach
servicemen about the technical tasks they would have to complete. Visual materials
played a particularly important role. In addition to films, models and posters, the military
16

John F. Fuller, Thor’s Legions: Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army, 1937–1987 (Boston:
American Meteorological Society, 1990); Charles C. Bates and John F. Fuller, America’s weather
warriors, 1814-1985 (Texas A&M Press, 1986); J.M. Lewis, “WAVES Forecasters in World War II (with
a Brief Survey of Other Women Meteorologists in World War II)” Bulletin of the American Meteorological
Society 76, 11 (November 1995): 2187-2202.
17
On wartime training of pilots in the US, see Dominick A. Pisano, To fill the skies with pilots: the Civilian
Pilot Training Program, 1939-46 (University of Illinois Press, 1993).

extensively used comic art, an aspect of print culture intimately familiar to trainees
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from pre-war comic strips, advertising, and comic books. Using the “thought-picture
method,” weather manuals in particular deployed comic art to make an arcane,
complicated subject memorable and comprehensible to trainees. Artists, some drafted
from the comic book industry, others discovered in meteorological units, drew comics to
teach weather flying. Cartoons exhorted pilots to heed the advice of their weather officers
and to learn to read the clouds, often through satirical characters who screwed up with
tragicomic results.
Wartime operations, however, revealed that these parallel training systems did not
inevitably produce weather officers and pilots who could work together effectively. The
training shortcomings were particularly evident at the key moment of interface between
meteorologists and pilots, the preflight weather briefing. In their day-to-day operations,
most aeronautical meteorologists briefed pilots on the day’s weather, explaining forecasts
and helping pilots to understand the conditions they would encounter in flight. This was a
moment essential to the safety of flights and the success of operations. Military officers
evaluating the university meteorological training programs found that meteorologists
came out with too much training in meteorological theory, and not enough knowledge
about the tasks they would need to perform in military service, particularly talking to
pilots. While academic meteorologists added lessons in communications skills and
practical work, it fell to the meteorological officers serving at airbases to invent a
communications style that effectively reached pilots. Some of these meteorologists
deployed the techniques of comic art deeply familiar to pilots, sketching cartoons to hold
pilots’ attention and make forecasts memorable. These airfield interactions created the

rudiments of the visual style and narrative structure of the television weather report
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that members of the weather cadet generation invented after the War.

Part I: Mass Producing Meteorologists
Even before the United States declared war, the military dramatically increased its
training program for meteorologists. In 1940, the few dozen existing military weather
officers had largely learned their meteorology at MIT or Cal Tech during the 1930s—as
they attempted to expand their ranks they looked to the research universities, and found a
group of academic meteorologists eager to work with the military. As of October, 1940,
there were 150 new cadets studying meteorology at MIT, Cal Tech, NYU, UCLA, and
the University of Chicago.18 Managing this training program was the University
Meteorological Committee (UMC), led by Carl-Gustaf Rossby and academic
meteorologists representing each of the schools involved. Describing itself as “a clearing
house for the exchange of ideas between the [AAF] Directorate of Weather and the
individual universities,” the committee was “at the disposal of the Army Air Forces
whenever technical problems arise.”19 The UMC coordinated the training program,
exchanging research, curricula and even instructors. Above the UMC stood the Joint
Meteorological Committee composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Weather
Bureau, and the “Big Five” University programs, divided into subcommittees charged
with handling specific tasks. In late 1942, for instance, UCLA’s Joseph Kaplan chaired
the “Personnel and Recruiting” sub-committee, the Weather Bureau’s William Thickstun
18
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chaired the group on “World Weather, Climatology and Forecasting.” From his post at
the University of Chicago, Rossby chaired two groups, the Curriculum sub-committee
and the Civilian Advisory Committee on Meteorology.20
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the mass production of meteorologists
ramped up substantially; the five schools went to year-round programs and began taking
in two classes of meteorological cadets per year in 1942. Col. Donald Zimmerman, the
head of AAF Weather Service, estimated that the AAF would need 10,000 weather
officers by the start of 1945.21 In December 1943, Americans could read in National
Geographic that “Army and Navy Turn out Needed Weather Experts by Mass
Production.” According to the caption accompanying a photo of nine tiers of uniformed
men, close packed into a classroom and studiously taking notes, “More than 100 students
from both services, only a part of one class, compose this picture at the University of
California at Los Angeles. So important is weather in planning and fighting the war that
thousands of officers and enlisted personnel are being trained as weather forecasters and
observers.”22 These “weather cadets” understood they were being mass-produced and
trained in an abstract understanding of weather. “The days of our years took on a more
universal aspect and almost unconsciously we came to measure time by new and different
standards,” wrote one reflective cadet. “The doldrums moved South despite the fact that
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150 neophytes had been strapped to the NYU assembly belt and were being
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processed into weathermen.”23
The “assembly belt” of this industrial process was a university-centered, graduatelevel education in atmospheric physics, primarily concerned with conditions that
impacted air operations: upper air winds, fog, visibility distances, and cloud ceilings. The
weather cadets learned mathematical and graphical techniques that applied physical
theory to weather prediction. In doing so, they learned to understand weather in ways that
were abstract, objective, and impersonal. Training thousands of men to share this
understanding of weather, and using that understanding to operate an integrated, global
weather monitoring system, enabled Army Air Force pilots to reach targets, even after a
flight of 1500 miles from the Mariana Islands to Japan.
The weather cadets were taught a way of knowing weather that aspired to render
place irrelevant. Ideally, given an adequate observation network, accurate knowledge of
the immediate future conditions of any place could be produced anywhere—the
forecaster need not be in a particular location to know what the weather would be at that
place. Global military power depended upon disciplining personal environmental
perception.

Questions of supply
Creating a mass of disciplined weather officers began with recruiting intelligent
and well-educated young people, mainly men. Initially, the program required recruits to
have a bachelor’s degree, one year of college physics, and differential and integral
23
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college, but with no change to the math and physics requirements. The program did not
seek out individuals interested in weather or trained in geography, and actually recruited
a particularly large number of chemistry majors. The key qualification was the math and
physics education. “As a result of some remarkable foresight in setting high standards for
admission to these training programs,” wrote members of a commission on
meteorological education in 1958, “a large number of young people with excellent
backgrounds in mathematics and the physical sciences was brought into the field.”24 The
influx of students helped reorient meteorology as geophysical rather than a geographical
science.25
Rather than being randomly assigned by the Army, students were recruited to the
program and announced their intention to become weather cadets when they enlisted. The
program promised pay during training at cadet levels, as well as a commission as a 2nd
Lieutenant upon graduation. Given that forecasters were unlikely to fight on the front
lines, it is likely that some young men joined the weather program to avoid combat.
Enlisting to join a particular technical training program also offered young men more
control over what they did and learned in the military, while being drafted offered almost
none. The UMC recruited through advertising as well as through informal university
networks. The University of Chicago, for example, helped produce a half-hour radio
program titled “The Invisible Allies! A Thrilling Chapter from the Notebooks of
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Science—and War!” that featured an appeal for meteorology recruits from Nobel
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laureate physicist Arthur Compton.26
Because of the stiff educational pre-requisites and the need for scientists and
engineers throughout the war effort, the UMC established a second and third series of
preparation programs.27 The existing 9-month long graduate programs became Advanced
Meteorology (the “A” courses), while a second-tier feeder program (a six month
Premeteorology course, the “B” courses) was established to teach calculus and physics to
students who had only a year of college. A third program, Basic Premeteorology (the “C”
courses) prepared high school graduates for the A course in 12 months, with instruction
in college mathematics, calculus, physics, cartography, history, and military drill. The B
courses were conducted primarily at twelve major universities scattered across the
country, while a majority of the C course sites were liberal arts colleges.
As a result of misjudgments in planning requirements, the UMC “A” Courses
trained many more weather officers than the Army Air Force (AAF) ultimately needed.
At the end of 1942, the AAF expected to field 10,000 weather officers by the start of
1945, and structured training and recruitment programs accordingly. Where AAF
administrators initially believed that every squadron would need its own set of weather
officers, for instance, experience during the war revealed more efficient forms of labor
organization. Ultimately over 1,800 of the 6,200 meteorologists trained were assigned to
26
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other duties. Sverre Petterssen, who oversaw the beginning of the training program at

148

MIT, noted, “everyone agreed we needed more, but no one tried to decide how many. The
program continued to snowball long after a balance between supply and demand had
been reached.”28 This planning mistake caused considerable consternation in the AAF
office of Operations, Commitments and Requirements (a tone of exculpation runs
through participants’ accounts), but it seems to have caused no great harm. As an Air
Force official history notes, “a weather officer … could insist, quite seriously and with
some impunity, that wars were lost through shortages, not overages.”29

“To bridle the mighty air masses with weird and unholy formulae”: Physics and
Placelessness
At the core of the training program’s curriculum were the ideas of the Bergen
School.33 Most of the textbooks were written by Vilhelm Bjerknes’s students, like Sverre
Petterssen, Harald Sverdrup and Bernhard Haurwitz, or by students of Bjerknes’s
students, like Rossby’s early students Horace Byers, Jerome Namias, and Victor Starr.
(Table 4.1) In contrast to Rossby and Byers’s pre-war efforts to teach dynamic
meteorology to experienced Weather Bureau forecasters, the course put dynamics and
calculational approaches to understanding the weather at the beginning of a
28
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meteorological education. As one student yearbook put it, “For the information of our
descendants Basic Meteorology is a noble attempt of Messrs. Bjerknes, J. and V. and
others of their ilk to bridle the mighty air masses with weird and unholy formulae.”34
Remembering his training many years later, Robert Fleagle noted, “we got a heavy dose
of air mass and frontal analysis and of Petterssen’s forecasting methods.” Sometimes the
emphasis on fronts went overboard, as “We were indoctrinated with the belief that a good
analyst should be able to find a front to account for any area of nonconvective cloud or
precipitation.”35 Formerly an “advanced subject,” the atmospheric physics of the Bergen
School had become the basis of modern meteorology.
Table 4.1: Books Issued to Meteorology Cadets, UCLA A-level Class, March 194336
Horace R. Byers
Synoptic and Aeronautical Meteorology
McGraw-Hill, 1937
Bernhard Haurwitz
Dynamic Meteorology
McGraw-Hill, 1941
Bernhard Haurwitz
The Physical State of the Upper
Royal Astronomical Society of
Atmosphere37
Canada, 1941
Wilfred Kendrew
The Climates of the Continents, 3rd edition
Oxford University Press, 1937
W. E. K. Middleton
Meteorological Instruments
University of Toronto Press, 1942
Jerome Namias
Air Mass and Isentropic Analysis
American Meteorological
Society, date?
Sverre Petterssen
Weather Forecasting and Analysis
McGraw-Hill, 1940
Athelstan Spilhaus and
Workbook in Meteorology
McGraw-Hill, 1942
James Miller
Victor Starr
Basic Principles of Weather Forecasting
Harper, 1942
Harald Sverdrup
Oceanography for Meteorologists
Prentice-Hall, 1942
G. E. F. Sherwood and
Calculus
Prentice-Hall, 1942
Angus Taylor
Weather Bureau
Circular N: Instructions for Airway
Government Printing Office
Meteorological Service
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weather in physical and mathematical terms, and exhorted them to try to quantify and
calculate its changes. Victor Starr’s Basic Principles of Weather Forecasting described
calculating the weather as the ultimate goal, while admitting that it remained distant.
“Since we know the fundamental laws” of fluid mechanics and thermodynamics, “it
might appear that a forecast of future motions could be made completely by analytical
means. Unfortunately, although we do know the elementary principles of atmospheric
motions, the problem of integrating them and obtaining a forecast by purely analytical
procedures is too complex to be treated by a direct frontal attack.” Starr then footnoted
Lewis Fry Richardson’s “effort in this direction.”38
Textbooks presented weather as a secondary phenomenon, the local consequences
of the general circulation of the atmosphere. “The general problem of forecasting weather
conditions may be subdivided conveniently into two parts,” wrote Starr. “In the first
place, it is necessary to predict the state of motion of the atmosphere in the future.” As a
second step, only after predicting the atmosphere’s general motion, “it is necessary to
interpret this expected state of motion in terms of the actual weather which it will
produce at various localities. The first of these problems is essentially of a dynamic
nature, inasmuch as it concerns itself with the mechanics of the motion of a fluid.”
Successful forecasting, textbooks made clear, would result from first understanding the
physical principles that governed the atmosphere, then applying them to the local
situation.39
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The texts produced for the wartime training program also made some
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influential choices in presenting climatology and dust storms. For example, when Horace
Byers released a new edition of the textbook he had written for the airlines, he made
expanded claims for relevance (instead of Synoptic and Aeronautical Meteorology, the
title of the 1937 edition, the book had become General Meteorology) but dropped the
chapter on dust storms, despite the recent memory of the Dust Bowl. Similarly, Bernhard
Haurwitz and James Austin’s 1944 textbook Climatology, developed from material used
in teaching a thirty-hour course to aviation cadets at MIT, chose to ignore not only dust
storms but also, “the many applications of climatology in agriculture, industry,
merchandising, transportation, medicine and other fields,” instead stressing “the physical
causes of the climates and of the variations of the climatic elements in space and time.” 40
Justified by the needs of wartime aviation, such omissions would have major
consequences. By shaping the attitudes of a generation of atmospheric scientists, these
books contributed to the reinvention of climatology as a physical science built around
radiation and dynamics, replacing earlier visions of climatology that had integrated
vegetation, agriculture, and human relations.41
Beyond the textbooks, students experienced extensive lectures, demonstrations,
forecasting practicums, and instrument laboratories, much like airline students had at the
Boeing school before the war. (Table 4.2) According to a report summarizing the

40

Bernhard Haurwitz and James M. Austin, Climatology (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1944): v.
For the long view on different meanings of climate, see James Rodger Fleming, Historical Perspectives
on Climate Change (Oxford University Press, 1998). C. Warren Thornthwaite offered a rather different
understanding of what a “modern” climatology should include during the 1930s-1950s. The Genius of C.
Warren Thornthwaite, Climatologist-Geographer by John Mather and Marie Sanderson (University of
Oklahoma Press, 1996), and Sepideh Yalda, “Charles Warren Thornthwaite,” in New Dictionary of
Scientific Biography, v. 7 (Thomson Gale, 2008): 38-41.
41

University of Chicago program, the curriculum mixed a heavy dose of physical
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theory with hundreds of hours of synoptic map analysis:
The program offered by the Institute for the training of cadets as meteorologists
for the Army Air Corps, and of Navy officers as aerologists, has been planned to
provide each student with the utmost practical experience in the analysis of
weather charts and forecasting, and at the same time to endow him with a broad
theoretical background in modern meteorological physics. To accomplish this, the
academic week at the Institute comprises approximately 20 to 24 hours of
practical weather analysis and forecasting in the synoptic laboratories and 12
hours of formal lectures. From two to four hours of the weekly laboratory time are
devoted to discussions, … A two-hour examination covering all subjects is held
weekly, and final examinations are given in each course.42
Examinations and quizzes ensured that students stayed engaged with the material. Along
with frequent quizzes, students were rated on all the work they turned in, including
worksheets, their efforts at constructing synoptic maps, and upper air observations.43
Students achieving consistently low marks were failed out, and usually reassigned to
other training programs in the Army Air Force Technical Training Command. While
coursework and laboratories followed the academic mold, cadets also learned to march,
shoot, salute, and defend themselves against poison gas attack when they were not
calculating radiative cooling.44
Table 4.2: Curriculum for Wartime Training Classes
Institute of Meteorology, University of Chicago
Subject
Total # of hours
Synoptic laboratory
672
Dynamic meteorology
116
Synoptic and aeronautical meteorology
72
42
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Introductory meteorology
Hydrodynamics
Field course
Radiosonde
Climatology
Geography
Physics of the High Atmosphere
Oceanography
Fieldwork with mobile weather unit
Examinations

43
42
24
53
32
22
32
20
18
95

Crucially for the development of meteorology as an academic and research
discipline after the War, Rossby and the academic members of the UMC won the right to
retain the best students from each class as instructors for future classes. In contrast to
pilot training, where top cadets went on to the most challenging types of combat flying,
top meteorologists would stay at the universities to become teachers and researchers.
Among the dozens of cadets retained as officer instructors were: Edward Lorenz (MIT),
later an atmospheric computer modeling pioneer and leading chaos researcher; Robert M.
White (MIT), who became Chief of the Weather Bureau in 1963 after the retirement of
Francis Reichelderfer and later served as first head of the Environmental Science and
Service Administration, and its successor, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration; Robert Fleagle (NYU), a noted dynamic meteorologist and AMS
president in 1981; Loren W. Crow (Caltech), a commercial consulting meteorologist and
weather modification expert after the war; and George E. Forsythe (UCLA) later a
pioneering computer scientist who founded the Stanford computer science department.
Rather than forecasting and communicating with pilots, America’s top young
meteorologists thus spent the war working with theory: earning advanced degrees,

generating new knowledge about atmospheric dynamics, and learning how to teach
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meteorology in the style of the Bergen School.
While reforming meteorology around a quantitative and physical understanding of
the atmosphere was central to Rossby and the Bergen School’s long-term agenda, the
military needed to be convinced why it should pay for (and wait for) its cadets to learn so
much theory. To do so, Rossby drew upon physics’ claims to universality:
Earlier methods of training meteorologists, particularly in the United States
Weather Bureau, were based entirely on the accumulation of experience. A man
trained over a number of years in, say, San Francisco, would in that fashion
become a good forecaster for our West Coast but would have to start all over
again if he were transferred to another part of the country.
We do not have the time to give our students adequate basic training and also
a large amount of experience within the short period of time at our disposal.
Hence, we must concentrate on the application of fundamental principles of
analysis and forecasting which can be used in any part of the world.45
Rossby argued that physicist forecasters were not only superior, but also the only
effective kind that could be produced quickly. His vision of dynamic meteorology
promised portable, placeless knowledge. Knowing the weather through physics meant
forecasters could become another interchangeable part of the war machine, ready to be
shipped wherever they might be needed.
To summarize, the transformation of the social and epistemic hierarchy of
American meteorology depended upon military-sponsored education. Before World War
II, the iconic weather expert was a figure like the Chief in George Stewart’s 1941 novel
Storm: an old Weather Bureau hand, deeply experienced in watching and predicting the
weather, with an intuitive sense for how conditions would change.46 During the war,
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thousands of students were taught to understand weather as the local manifestation of
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the general circulation of the atmosphere. They learned to quantify the atmosphere’s
properties and calculate the equations that governed its motions. Through the disciplining
effects of lectures, examinations, graded assignments and tutorials with instruments,
trainees came to accept the hierarchy that placed dynamical equations as the ultimate,
fundamental description of weather. Only by mastering the general mathematical
relationships that described the behavior of particular weather phenomena was the
highest, most valued form of meteorological knowledge produced. Meteorological truth,
the weather cadets learned, was to be sought at the level of abstractions, not particulars;
theoretical laws, not empirical rules. The men who could deduce those rules, who could
mathematize the skies, were the new ideal meteorologists. In 1960, the American
Meteorological Society commemorated this changed focus by renaming its highest
award. It is now called the Carl-Gustaf Rossby Research Medal.47

“A GI life of calculus, physics, and meteorology”: The Weather Cadet Experience48
Although the students were military officers in training, the meteorology training
program retained a collegiate atmosphere. College professors led lectures and labs, while
students took exams and lived together in dormitories or apartments. Like many college
classes, the weather cadets often produced commemorative yearbooks to construct and

Press of Kansas, 2008): 235-237.
47
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48
Ibid.: 8

solidify the meanings of their experiences (Figure 4.1). These books suggest how
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meteorologists-in-training understood their education.

Figure 4.1: A weather cadet’s representation of the meteorological training
program. The series of panels circling the page beginning at top left
illustrates the daily routine, including falling asleep five minutes after the
second morning lesson, and struggling to complete the push-ups at
1750hrs. The four images in the middle narrate the transition from civilian
leisure to military discipline, culminating in a pre-flight briefing conducted
by the newly commissioned lieutenant. This set of comic images was
probably drawn by Robert C. Petterson, one of the cadets in class 1A, 1944,
at New York University. (Source: Endpaper from Synopsis 1-A-44, NYU,
author’s personal collection).
The yearbooks narrated a stylized story of growth and learning, progressing from
naiveté through challenge to triumph and graduation, deploying the genre conventions of

other memorial yearbooks.49 Full of inside jokes, the student authors drew upon
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military and weather metaphors to recreate shared experiences. For example, “the big
guns—Bjerknes and Kaplan and Holmboe—bombarded us without quarter,” and “the
worst maps turned up as test maps, which is what is meant by periodicity in weather.”50
Describing their transformation, reflective writers in the meteorology classes
revealed how training instilled a new way to know and understand weather. Entering the
military, the cadets understood weather as something experienced bodily and discussed in
commonplace terms. Learning to see their surrounding environment in more abstract
ways de-centered their individual experiences. Personal feelings, bodies, and the
particulars of place became increasingly extraneous to the description of events:
The world around us changed quickly; a cloudy sky became a nimbostratus
overcast, the wind that tugged at our overcoats became a Beaufort 6 and we all
looked for 00 Wx [clear skies] on our weekends.52
The students experienced a tension between the vernacular weather culture they entered
with and the scientific way of seeing they were being taught. While they felt a chilly
wind tugging at an overcoat, they learned to abstract that gust into a number on the
Beaufort scale that could be compared to other wind measurements anywhere in the
world.
Instruments transformed the subjective, personal experience of weather into
objective quantitative descriptions of atmospheric conditions. The yearbooks captured the
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triumph students felt as they learned to master various instruments, as well as their
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ambivalence:
As our final act of subservience to the Demanding Instrument, we followed the
Instrument’s faithful disciple, Lt. [Fred] Decker, in a night and day orgy known as
radiosonde lab. We calibrated, released and recorded until those little lines on the
thermodynamic diagrams symbolized for us hours of blood, sweat and tears.
Despite the urgings of their academic teachers towards theory, abstraction, the rejection
of subjective experience and those little lines on the thermodynamic diagrams, the
irreducible world of embodied experience remained a fundamental category for fully
understanding the meanings of their new role. Now, however, the relevant physical
experience was that of flight:
In reward for beavering well done, we were given an opportunity during that last
quarter to fulfill our manifest destiny—that of becoming “flying fighting
meteorologists.” A convalescent B-18 was assigned to our detachment for
weather reconnaissance, and group by group we groundlings took to the air
verifying our own forecasts. Frozen limbs and upset stomachs made lapse rates
and turbulence less academic, and we returned sadder but wiser weathermen.53
To be a true fighting meteorologist, a man had to both understand the physics of weather,
as well as the physical experience of what those map symbols meant to the men flying
bombers through limb-freezing, turbulent air against murderous enemies.

Part II: Mass Producing Pilots: Comic Art in Training Manuals
If the emblematic objects of training for meteorologists were the synoptic map
and the radiosonde, the emblems of weather training for pilots were pugilistic cartoon
clouds and satirical comic characters like Aviation Cadet Knucklehead (Figure 4.2).
Seemingly simplistic, comic art was a sophisticated educational tool used by the military
53
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across many fields, and one that, like physical theory, enabled technical training to be
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scaled up rapidly.

Figure 4.2: Clouds were routinely depicted as enormous boxers ready to
punch out an unwary pilot, as in this picture from “Thunderstorms,” a
pamphlet produced by the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics in 1943. (Author’s
personal collection).
World War II could be as accurately called “the technicians’ war” as it could “the
physicists’ war.”54 The ability to operate, supply, maintain and repair complicated
machines, often thousands of miles from factories, played a decisive role. 55 This was
particularly noticeable in aviation, where small faults could easily result in the
destruction of the entire aircraft. Lauding the ground crews who maintained strategic
bombers, a US propaganda film reminded the home front that
54
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The normal work of keeping an airplane fit for operation is enormous, even in
peacetime. When you add to this already great job the element of battle damage,
the problem becomes gigantic. Engines, wings, propellers, controls, wiring, fuel
system, oxygen system, the thousand and one elements that go to make up the
mechanics of a heavy bombardment plane, all must be kept in perfect shape. The
failure of any one of them on a mission can easily mean the loss of a plane and its
personnel, or at best, such a failure will cause a plane to abort.
Entering the war, the Army Air Force only expected about 37% of its planes to be
available for fighting at any particular moment. Thanks to the heroic work of the ground
crew, the film announced, the readiness rate for bombers was nearly fifty percent.56 By
the middle of the twentieth century, training masses of technicians who could keep
extremely complicated machines functional just half the time had become essential to
fighting wars.57
Making the challenge harder was that many, probably most, perspective
technicians were draftees whose diverse employment experiences had not prepared them
to perform the novel technical tasks that supported modern warfare. Some skills
translated easily. Civilian and military organizations alike required bureaucratic abilities
like typing, filing, tracking and reporting.58 Skilled metal workers found the same kinds
of machine tools in maintenance depots and on the lower decks of battleships that used in
domestic factories. But farmers, laborers, assembly line workers and men from hundreds
of other occupations had to be trained in gunnery, ordnance, radio operations, oxygen
56
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systems and hundreds of other skills, not to mention skills never required before the
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war. The war pulled the national economy from more than 20% unemployment to beyond
full employment, as people—particularly women—who had not expected to work
replaced men drafted into the service.
To train technicians quickly, the US military developed curricula that relied
heavily on visual materials. For teaching skills as diverse as defense against chemical
attack, marksmanship, and aircraft identification, the military developed films, maps,
pictures, and three-dimensional models.59 Since many of the technical tasks that draftees
would have to carry out were “extra-textual,” that is, they involved manipulating objects
and images, not just words and numbers, visual materials allowed the first stages of
training (and of weeding out the non-adept) to be done in classrooms, without giving up
the visual stimulus that would eventually be essential to doing the required tasks
effectively. As aviation historian Donald Nijboer notes, posters and illustrations in
manuals were “designed to be easily deciphered by the thousands of new recruits.”
Technical drawings made for training aircrew were three-dimensional perspective
drawings, in contrast to the two-dimension drawings made for engineers. These materials
dramatically improved the efficiency of technical education. Good graphic design and
clear illustrations could save weeks of training. “In 1944, U.S. designer Will Burtin
produced a series of instruction books to help air gunners in their training. His manuals
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shortened the gunnery course from six months to six weeks.”60 Most surprisingly,
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many training materials used cartoons and other elements of comic art.
Comics made effective training materials for several reasons. First, comics
integrated text and image, allowing each aspect to reinforce the other’s message.
Avoiding photo-realism, cartoon images could emphasize the most salient parts of a
technical image. Second, comic manuals could be cheaply printed in great quantity.
Third, readers associated comics with leisure and pleasure. Military manuals often used
humor to make their messages both memorable and more likely to be read. Fourth,
comics featured a familiar repertoire of satirical techniques for gently correcting readers
without offending them. The emotional distance created by caricature meant that cartoon
characters could do all the dumb things that other novices did, often with fatal results, but
without quite implying that the trainee himself would be so stupid as to make that
mistake. Finally and most importantly, comic art was a visual language pervasively
familiar to the American men drafted into the military. As George Gallup discovered in
1930, super-majorities in every social class, education level and demographic group
eagerly read newspaper comic strips. Young men (and women) voraciously consumed
comic books beginning in the mid-1930s, and continued throughout the war to
overwhelm military Post-Exchanges with requests for the latest exploits of Superman.61
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In short, comic art was both the best-loved and the lowest common denominator of
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American visual culture. While this section focuses on the use of cartoons to teach
meteorology to pilots, elements of comic art can be found throughout military training
materials developed throughout World War II and beyond.

The Evolution of Comic Art in American Culture
Understanding how comics work suggests why they were such a useful training
tool. Describing the comics as “a medium in their own right,” cultural historian Roger
Sabin notes that the comics “are a language, with their own grammar, syntax, and
punctuation.” Comic strip communication does not “‘happen’ in the words, or the
pictures, but somewhere in-between, in what is sometimes known as ‘the marriage of text
and image’.” The basic building block of a comic is the strip, a “narrative in the form of
pictures,” often supplemented with text. Like any communications medium, comics have
conventions. Conventions like speech- and thought-balloons allow linguistic input, while
artistic conventions like speed-lines bring motion into the still images. Exaggerated sweat
beads show anxiety, one of many conventions used to depict emotion. The most basic
graphic convention are bordered panels, “which serve to break down the action into 9 [or]
10 readily-understandable segments,” on a typical page of a comic book. “Taken
together, these conventions constitute an abbreviated style … that allows the reader to fill
in the gaps using his or her imagination.” But reading the comics is not automatic; it
requires a complex pattern of eye movements as readers focus on image, then text, then

them occasionally.” Comic Strips and Consumer Culture, 1890-1945 (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998):
88, 89, 139, 140.

dialogue, then image again before moving to the next panel. As Sabin puts it,
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“reading a comic is an acquired skill.”62
Americans had acquired this skill through advertising and nationally syndicated
strips printed in local newspapers. Efforts to duplicate the success of British comic
weeklies like Punch had introduced comic art into mass circulation in the US during the
late 1870s and early 1880s, but it was the adoption of the comic strip in newspapers
during the 1890s that made comic art commercially valuable and nationally recognizable
in the United States. The comic pages were the most read section of the paper—88% of
subscribers complained when it was not included in a delivery. (Only 4.5% complained if
they didn’t get the news section.) Laborers and doctors, factory workers and engineers
alike enjoyed reading the comics, incorporating them into their leisure patterns. Alerted
to the broad-based popularity of the comic pages by a George Gallup survey in 1930,
advertisers made extensive use of this combination of familiarity and pleasure during the
1930s.63 This constant exposure made comic art perhaps the most widely shared aspect of
American visual culture.
Although the comics were widely loved, they were not widely respected.64
Criticism of comic books was especially strong amongst educators and religious
authorities.65 Educators felt comic books distracted students from better reading
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and celebrated lewd, lascivious, and rule-breaking behavior.66 Comics were low culture,
vulgar and cheap, their readers dim and poorly educated; as one 1908 critic put it, the
comic supplement appealed to people “who don’t care for fine shades of humor, because
they can’t appreciate them.”67
While critics chastised comics for degrading the reading abilities and moral sense
of children, some publishers sought to make comics educationally and morally
constructive. As one reviewer wrote, “Increasingly, teachers and educators, aware of
children’s universal interest in comics, are becoming interested in the possibility of using
comics as instructional material.”68 One such figure was M. C. Gaines, a former school
superintendent, who sold his major entertainment comic books publishing business in
1945 to organize Educational Comics, Incorporated. A 1945 review showed Gaines
planned to publish a series “frankly educational materials in comic form,” which would
address the Bible, America history, science, natural history, and mythology.69
Before World War II, educational comics were most widely used in aviation.
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and then Charles Lindbergh’s transatlantic solo, aviation had become a central
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subject in mass culture. Aircraft and fliers featured prominently in movies, radio plays,
illustrated magazines and newspapers.70 Hundreds of books were published to explain
how planes worked. Among the most successful were a series of richly illustrated books
by Assen Jordanoff, a Bulgarian immigrant who became a commercial pilot for American
Airlines.71 (Figure 4.3) Several comic artists illustrated Jordanoff’s many books. Perhaps
the most important for this story was Eric Sloane, a complicated personality who
invented a style of cartoon instructional guides that found wide use during World War II.

Figure 4.3: Cloudy Joe, a cartoon foil for Assen Jordanoff’s flying advice,
prepares to challenge the air masses, here identified by their type and
origins. TG meant tropical gulf, PC polar continental, PA polar Atlantic, and
TC tropical continental. His plane is worried. (Source: Assen Jordanoff,
Through the Overcast (Funk and Wagnall’s, 1938, p. 4). Illustration by Fred
Meagher.)
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One Strategy for Comic Technical Manuals: Eric Sloane’s “Thought-Picture”
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Method
Today Eric Sloane is best known as a nostalgia artist who memorialized the cool
stone barns of a New England that never was. However, his less well remembered work
celebrated the sleekest modernity, in both comic art and fine oils, from a massive mural
at the entrance to the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum to illustrations for
science texts like Jordanoff’s and military instructional guides.72
For his pedagogical manuals, Sloane developed an illustration technique he called
the “Thought-Picture” method. Sloane began one manual explaining his strategy. (Figure
4.4) “Pictures are easier to remember than words!” he asserted. “Military training has
accepted the ‘Thought-Picture’ method: it is just as scientific to present these facts in
cartoon as it is to do them by diagram and chart.”73 At the bottom of the page, a
mortarboard-topped professor with a long white beard and an arm armful of books
chides, “Tsk! Tsk! It’s all very unscientific!” while a smiling fighter plane answers, “This
flyer understands what he’s reading!” The fighter plane and its pilot recurred throughout
the manual, while the professor was a stock Sloane character.
Sloane first explored his “thought-picture” method in his 1941 book Clouds, Air
and Wind, which combined advanced meteorological concepts, elegant pen-and-ink
cloudscapes, and comic art to produce a memorable and approachable text on the flyable
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atmosphere.74 The book began with a preface by Sverre Petterssen, one of the leading
synoptic weather forecasters of the 20th century, and Sloane’s teacher at MIT.75

Figure 4.4: Eric Sloane articulates his “thought-picture” method. (Your
Body in Flight, page 3.)
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Petterssen praised both Sloane’s more formal pictures of clouds (recognizable according
to standard methods of classification) and his ability to write “a truly popular presentation
of the vagaries of Nature.” Analyzing a typical comic illustration shows what Petterssen
meant. In the illustration “Dangers of Clouds, Air and Wind,” Sloane shows why pilots
need not fear lightning, but should worry about fog and ice. (Figure 4.5) He explains the
different kinds of ice that threatens planes, how they form, and the mechanical devices
used to combat ice. He shows where dangerous turbulence can be found and how to avoid
it. Finally, he throws in a tip for gaining an advantageous tailwind by dodging bad
weather conditions properly. The page uses various conventions of comic art, including
dialog balloons, motion lines, a sequence of frames, expressive lettering to suggest sound,
personification of inanimate objects, visual cues for depicting emotion, and one character
recreated several times in different situations. In an economical single page, Sloane
conveys a wealth of flight safety information, much more memorably than the similar
information communicated by the column of prose on the facing page.
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Figure 5: Some of the dangers of weather to flight. Several illustrations like
this were reproduced on small cards and distributed as reminders to
experienced aircrew. (Eric Sloane, Clouds, Air and Wind, 1941: 64).

Sloane’s work was widely used in training fliers during World War II. The
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publisher’s preface to the revised edition of Clouds, Air and Wind, published after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor, emphasized how the book’s pictorial approach made it useful
for training across linguistic lines. The Army Air Force used a Spanish edition of the
book to teach Argentine pilots, while Chinese pilots training at American flight schools
also were said to find the book helpful. Pages of the book were also reprinted on small
cards that could fit in a shirt pocket and given to pilots.76 The cards reminded pilots of the
dangers of thunderstorms, the hazards of winter flying, and so forth. These small cards,
with their almost unreadable text and shrunken cartoon images, were not intended to be
read. Rather, they were a memory aid, an image and textual arrangement seen previously
during an earlier phase of preparation. They played on the ways that early trainees used
graphics differently from experienced crewmen. “For new and inexperienced aircrew,
these illustrations were tools upon which their very survival depended, to be closely
studied; for battle-weary crews, these images were merely glanced at.”77
Sloane’s comic style also played a key role in the AAF’s efforts to help aircrew
manage their bodies. The Army Air Force’s Aero Medical Laboratory at Wright Field
worked with Eric Sloane to produce Your Body in Flight. Touted as “an illustrated ‘book
of knowledge’ for the flyer,” the 83 page, 8.5” x 11” black-and-white booklet mixed
printed text, hand drawn pictures, and hand drawn text. (Figure 4.6) The book taught
pilots how to manage their bodies as they flew at different altitudes. Physiologists,
psychologists, and flight surgeons had developed extensive knowledge about the effects
of high altitude flight; the book sought to translate that knowledge into a form that pilots
76
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would use and remember. It was the pilot’s job to put this scientific knowledge to
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use, because using such knowledge would “help you get more planes over the target,
bring more planes back, and increase your own chances for survival.”78 The manual
addressed how pilots were supposed to operate their machines to protect their bodies,
including when they should don oxygen masks, how high they should fly, and what sorts
of food they should eat to lessen painful gas and avoid nausea. But, it warned, even when
aircrews avoided soda, beans and weanies, diminishing air pressures would make them
belch and fart as they climbed through 20,000 feet.
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Figure 4.6: Comic manuals often mixed images, hand drawn text and type
set text. (Eric Sloane, Your Body in Flight, p. 4).

Comic Strategy II: Will Eisner and the Caricature Counter-Example
A second common strategy in comic-illustrated manuals was pioneered by Will
Eisner. A successful comic book artist who had created The Spirit, Eisner was drafted in
to the Army’s Ordnance Command. Early in his service, Eisner encountered a unit
largely composed of illiterate soldiers. He later recounted how that experience
highlighted the importance of reaching readers at the most basic level. In 1942, he

became the artistic director for a minor publication, Army Motors, charged with
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promoting preventative maintenance. He created a lovable loser, Private Joe Dope, who
always did things wrong, showing his readers what not to do. (Figure 4.7)

Figure 4.7: Will Eisner’s Joe Dope offered textbook examples of what not to
do. Eisner’s posters, magazine illustrations, and cartoons appeared
throughout the US Army. (Source: http://www.comicartville.com/
eisnerdopeposter.jpg, accessed April 21, 2010.
To understand why characters like Joe Dope were effective teachers, we need to
understand the mechanics and limits of identifying with caricature. In his work on comic
strips and consumer culture, historian Ian Gordon argues characters are “re-created in
each instance of a strip in a never-ending construction of identity.” Readers were
supposed to understand characters through repetition, and through that familiarity they
would come to identify with them. But “the caricature techniques of comic art, and the
often satirical nature” of the action, “sets readers apart from the strips. In the distance
between the eye and the page, readers come to look on comic humor as a satire on the

foibles of a strip’s characters and not on the reader’s own idiosyncrasies.”79 This
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tension between identifying with the situation of the cartoon pilot and laughing at his
mistakes was to help pilots learn to fly safely.80
As the Army expanded, so did its need for training materials. Eisner became
responsible for instructional comic strips in the Army’s Technical Manual series. His
strips translated the technical language of the manuals text into more familiar language,
while his artwork illuminated the technical discussion from a different perspective. While
photographs produced exact reproductions, comic drawings could exaggerate the
important elements, showing the action from the point of view of the personal reading the
manual and expected to perform the technical task. Because the comics memorably
integrated image and text, comics led to easily portable publications that could be printed
cheaply. Manuals often used the humorous elements familiar to comic art to reinforce
particularly important aspects of equipment operation.
No cartoon character carried out this mission with more devotion than Aviation
Cadet Knucklehead. (Figure 4.8) Willfully ignorant of the weather, he died six times
before earning his (angel) wings near the end of Technical Manual 1-232, “Basic
Weather for Pilot Trainees.” Drawings regularly included an X to mark the spot where
Knucklehead came to grief. The manual begins by describing the AAF’s weather service
and the role it plays in supporting flying operations, then explains why pilots must
maintain close contact with weather officers before each flight. Knucklehead’s first death
begins by skipping a stop at the weather office before taking off, else he would have
known about the need to plan an alternate field. (Figure 4.9) Later mishaps result from
79
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failing to adjust his altimeter for changes in the pressure field during a long distance
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flight, getting caught in the most dangerous parts of thunderstorms as a result of three
different mistakes, and flying into the occluded portion of a front rather than around it.81

Figure 4.8: Aviation Cadet Knucklehead. Characters who committed
common mistakes frequently showed up in cartoon-illustrated manuals.
Throughout “Basic Weather for Pilot Trainees,” X marked the spot where
Knucklehead perished as a result of not understanding how to navigate
dangerous weather. (Source: Technical Manual 1-232. Author’s Personal
Collection)
81
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Figure 4.9: A knuckleheaded pilot thinks he doesn’t need expert advice on
the weather forecast. (Source: Technical Manual 1-232, p. 4. Author’s
Personal Collection)

Despite comics’ ubiquity, not everyone within the military felt comic art an
appropriate medium for technical instruction. According to Eisner’s authorized
biography, to counter continued skepticism he persuaded the Adjutant General’s
department (in charge of producing technical manuals) to put his publications up to a test
against more traditional manuals. Administered by the University of Chicago, the test
showed that “the readability and retention level” of Eisner’s material “was greater than

that of the precise but dry and pedantic technical manuals.”82 Perhaps similar
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struggles played out differently in other nations; comic art was a distinctly American and
British strategy, and was not found in German manuals.83
Probably the most avid user of comic illustrated manuals was the Training
Division of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics. It produced a series of 30 to 40 page
booklets, 6” x 4”, stapled and double hole punched, covering subjects like “Ice Formation
on Aircraft,” “Thunderstorms,” “Fog,” or “Air Masses and Fronts.” The inside cover
bade students, “Keep This Booklet. This is the first of a series of booklets on aerological
subjects,” which when bound together would produce “a complete text on Aerology. …
[This pamphlet] is the starting point of a text that will be of value to you throughout your
entire flying career.”84 The first twenty-five pages describe the kinds of ice that form on
aircraft, where it forms, and ways to prevent it. The takeaway message comes on pages
26 and 27. On the top half of the pages, a cartoon grandfather standing under a calendar
labeled 1980, wearing a parachute and flying gear, holding a model plane, balances on a
footstool in mid-swoop, regaling his grandchildren with war stories. One of the kids
clutches his father’s leg in terror, a sailor hat shooting up from his head. “If you ever
expect to tell your grandchildren about your flying career,” the caption says, “remember
these 15 rules.” The most important is “Maintain your flying speed!” listed as number
one, and then again as number fifteen, in bold and a larger font. The second pamphlet in
the series echoed this formula, building to a series of 16 rules for safely navigating
thunderstorms, illustrated by eleven cartoons of a pilot and his tuna-like plane. They find
82
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a saddleback above a horse-shaped cloud, fly around a thunderstorm while looking
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down at the island maiden with her grass skirt and ukulele, and he stares at the picture of
his girl (signed “to my ace”), pinned-up on the instrument panel, so the bright flashes of
lightning don’t blind him temporarily.85 (Figure 4.10) These pamphlets also mixed in
more serious drawings to illustrate different phenomena, sometimes using stylized clouds
and airscapes, sometimes using familiar objects like bicycle pumps to explain heating by
compression.

Figure 4.10: The Navy produced a series of small booklets with cartoonillustrated rules for flying in different kinds of weather. Ordinary American
women, as well as movie stars, commonly posed for pin-up style photos to
send to their husbands and boyfriends serving away from home. (Source:
“Thunderstorms,” US Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, 1943. Author’s Personal
Collection.)
How to Speak to Pilots: The Tone and Style of Pilot Meteorological Manuals
Manuals used colloquial language and usually addressed readers as “you.” The
tone suggested that military service was an extension of democratic life, implying the
85
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American military was assembled through education and persuasion, rather than
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coercion.86 The texts implied that authors had already “been there,” and might have lost
some buddies along the way; trainees were being given the chance to learn from the
examples and advice of peers. The tone aimed to evoke the informal “hanger talk”
conversation between an experienced pilot and a newbie.87 Some manuals quoted older
pilots explicitly, usually identifying them only with titles like, “a former Randolph Field
navigation instructor now on duty in Newfoundland.”88
A representative Navy manual that was used widely enough to be printed in
several editions was Aerology For Pilots. (Figure 4.11) It combined a conversational
tone with technical education, humorous instructive cartoons, meticulously detailed
scenes reminiscent of dramatic comic books, and strong elements of patriotic
encouragement and lectures on Navy duty. The manual used meteorology to mobilize the
atmosphere for American military service, asserting “Weather fights on the side of the
airmen who understand and use it!” It emphasized the global nature of air power; among
the things a Navy pilot had to know about aerology was the “general world distribution of
types of weather” because “United States naval aviators may fly anywhere!” 89
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Figure 4.11: A typical page from Aerology for Pilots (McGraw-Hill, 1943: 86).
The comic size disparity reminded pilots that thunderstorms were too
powerful to fight. Note the tone in the Editor’s Note at bottom: “I have lost
two good friends in them… I’ve been through a couple—that’s why I’m gray
and somewhat bald.”

Like the struggle air mail and commercial pilots faced to maintain schedules
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in the face of threatening weather, military pilots often experienced a tension between
completing important missions and avoiding dangerous atmospheric conditions. In
expressing this tension, Aerology for Pilots lapsed into contradictory advice. A lengthy
section first explained why pilots should not fly through thunderstorms. A plane in a
violent thunderstorm
can be tossed, rolled, carried rapidly upward in a great thermal updraft, dropped in
a down current with a rushing downpour of rain, pitched helplessly sideways and
sucked upward again, structurally twisted and broken, pelted with hailstones,
struck by lightning, thoroughly iced, possibly dropped and tossed a few more
times and emitted from the great cumulo-nimbus cloud at any unpredictable point
between earth’s surface and the stratosphere—possibly in pieces.
The manual detailed how to recognize and avoid different types of thunderstorms. The
distinctive anvil shape atop a towering cumulo-nimbus signified a thunderstorm in full
progress. “Don’t fly through it,” a stunt that might provide tall tales for future
grandchildren, but also “scare the virility out of a man.” Nor should pilots fly near it,
since turbulence within 1,000 feet of a thunderhead might knock a plane out of control. If
a pilot faced a line of closely spaced thunderstorms, the Navy advised, “and your mission
is not immediately urgent, retreat. You are not fully equipped to fight nature.” Yet in the
very next sentence, pilots were told to “Live to whip the Axis. When whipping the Axis
means going through a thunderstorm, Navy fliers go through.” While the Navy taught its
pilots to understand the threats posed by weather, it ultimately demanded men to put war
objectives first while bearing the risk of hazardous storms. 90 Trainee pilots, like their
weather cadet colleagues, returned from flights sadder but wiser to the dangers posed by
the churning atmosphere.
90
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Finally, the manuals make clear that instilling a respect for meteorologists
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was a crucial aspect of pilot meteorological training. Aerology for Pilots, like other
meteorological manuals, drilled home the importance of talking to meteorologists before
every flight, of learning how to ask them questions and confirm understandings, and of
treating meteorological advice as essential to a pilot’s life. Developing a shared language
for communicating the weather was a crucial part of the training of both pilots and
aviation forecasters:
The aerologists’ forecasts may be received in written form or may be obtained in
conferences with the aerologists. Most of the forecasts or reports contain special
aerological “jargon” (the aerologists contain the same), and this “jargon” must be
understood by the pilots. (The aerologists cooperate; when explaining their
forecasts, they use much pilot “jargon.”)91
A reliable and effective fighting force required these two very different sorts of
technicians to work together effectively, although they were trained separately.

From Training to Operations: The Interface between Pilots and Meteorologists
One of the few weather briefings recorded (or staged) for posterity comes from
the propaganda film Target for Today.92 In the middle of this documentary about the
bombing of Germany, a mustachioed weather officer with close cropped hair, a slight
southern drawl, and a pointing stick briefs a large room packed with B-17 pilots. Looking
mainly at a massive topographical map of Western Europe, rather than the assembled
pilots, he begins:
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The synoptic situation today is this: we have a high pressure system centered
over northwest Europe, up here near Finland, extending down southwestward
across the British Isles, causing an influx of south and southwesterly air going up
in this direction, hence causing little or no cloud in the area towards your target.
A fine day for a thousand-plane bombing raid. “There are no fronts to affect your route
today except a frontal system off to the west which will cause an increase of medium and
high clouds as you come back across the North Sea.” He continues personalizing the
situation with “you” and “yours,” an acknowledgement of the pilots’ upcoming direct
experience of the weather.
Calling for the lights to be turned off, a stratified route chart is projected via
lantern slide. Marked at 5,000 foot intervals from the ground to 30,000 feet, the chart
follows a line from base to target, depicting a patch of fog below 5,000 feet near the
bases in England, stratus clouds drawn in at 10,000 feet over the North Sea, and a note
warning of light rime icing near 10,000 feet. Temperatures range from +11°C at the
ground to -41°C at 30,000 feet. A line is drawn at 13,000 feet, the altitude at which the
bomb run is to be made. “At take off time there will be nil with three tenths clouds, also
there will be a layer of high clouds 23,000 feet, 4 to 6 10ths in amount, also a little layer
of clouds in there between 10 and 12 thousand feet, these medium and high clouds
decreasing out over the north sea to 3 to 5/10ths each in amount,” and so on, describing
cloud cover at different heights and locations, patches of fog, the freezing points and
temperatures at various key altitudes, and a visibility of 4 to 6 miles.
The camera occasionally pans to the pilots, shown looking attentive and taking
notes, glancing at each other to make sure they have it right. In the film, the weather
briefing takes about two minutes and forty seconds, though this was likely edited down.

The whole presentation has a very serious tone, no jokes, not even a smile from the
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weather officer. The pilots do not ask questions, though they would have received a copy
of the latest weather chart before they took off.
When it reached the screen, this act of communication had gone through a double
processing. Obviously, it had been cleaned up by the director of the film, and by the men
who knew they were being recorded. More obscurely, though certainly more
significantly, the pilot briefing was the result of a long struggle to standardize and render
functional a form of communication on which human lives depended.
Inspection reports from the field revealed a less cooperative scene. Many
university trainees, they admitted, lacked the “qualities necessary for a technical officer,”
a failing that particularly showed in weather briefings. Working in an American military
culture that intensely valued oral communication skills, particularly brevity and clarity,
many officers “lacked the ability to give their forecasts orally—to ‘talk’ weather to a pilot
so that he could understand it.” 93 Officers also had trouble fitting into Army bureaucratic
culture, failing to correctly fill out weather service forms and aircraft clearance records.
Moreover, meteorologists trained at different universities had trouble agreeing on what
information should be communicated. “A deputy commander, two years out of MIT,
would raise hell when maps were drawn in UCLA style,” remembered one weather
cadet.94
Hearing complaints about the lack of operational knowledge, universities
responded in several ways. First, they established functioning weather stations at each
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university. Due to wartime secrecy and the value of weather information to the
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enemy, all data on current conditions had been kept out of public circulation. As a result,
where the Boeing students had had regular access to weather reports, military students
did not experience the emotional engagement provided by watching the behavior of the
atmosphere in near-real time.95 The university meteorologists noted how current
observations stimulated student interest far better than the “canned data” they were
otherwise given in exercises. University weather stations were initially rejected in late
1942 by Lt. Col. Oscar Sentor, the chief of the Operations Division, who argued that
staffing five additional weather stations would tax the manpower of the weather service
and risk the security of weather information. These objections were overcome by staffing
the stations with a rotating pool of cadets, and charging the military officers detailed to
the universities as instructors with keeping weather observations secure. 96
Second, the universities developed ways of communicating with their former
graduates, by now officers in the field, giving them access to new methods developed
through research. By the middle of 1943, the first graduates of the weather cadet
generation, the class of 1941, had been running weather stations and briefing pilots for
close to two years, with little exposure to the insights developed through research since
then. In June, the commander of the Weather Wing suggested officers who had been in
the field for 18 months or more might need refresher courses to familiarize them with the
advances in meteorology the war had brought. Rossby, ever eager to create future
95

Since weather generally travels from west to east, access to North American and Atlantic weather
observations were of particular value to the Germans. They used U-boats and long range flights from
France for Atlantic observations, and repeatedly tried to establish secret meteorological outposts in
Greenland. Wilhelm Dege, War north of 80: the last German Arctic weather station of World War II,
translated from the German and edited by William Barr (University of Calgary Press, 2004).
96
Raymond Walters, “Weather Training in the AAF, 1937-1945.” US Air Force Historical Study no. 56
(USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952): 80-87.

colleagues in dynamic meteorology, seized on the idea. In December he proposed a
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curriculum for an “Advanced Meteorology” course at Chicago. AAF headquarters
rejected Rossby’s proposal, saying it was “‘excellent’ for a second-year graduate course
in meteorology, but far ‘too academic for the purposes of the Weather Service in
Wartime.’” 97
Despite these measures, inspectors continued to report that weather officers
needed a broader and more practical education than provided by the universities. An AAF
captain spent 17 days touring air bases in the Pacific Northwest in the fall of 1943,
investigating how the meteorological training schools might improve their training. Some
of the feedback reflected local circumstances that challenged the universal applicability
of meteorological training. Base weather officers in this mountainous region hoped the
schools would spend more time on orographic effects, finding that valleys, plateaus and
mountains had more effect on the synoptic situation than was commonly thought by
meteorologists who had never been to the area. Nor did operational realities match the
training program’s assumptions. Officers felt that the schools should emphasize short
range forecasting rather than 24 hour spot forecasts, asserting that “most forecasts are for
routes and for time intervals of 2 to 4 hours.”98
The biggest problem remained getting new meteorologists to work well with
others. Operational forecasters had more time to analyze the daily map than the schools
thought, but they needed better training in how to cooperate with other officers to
maintain the continuity of weather maps and observations. (Drawing synoptic maps from
97
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teletype data was a partially subjective process, but storms that jumped illogically at
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shift changes confused pilots and discredited meteorology as a science.) Students needed
to learn more about teamwork and how to maintain cordial, working relationships with
officers and enlisted men, the inspector reported. The relationship between
meteorologists and flight crews represented a particular problem. Meteorologists were
having trouble communicating weather data clearly, leading to “a gap between the
weather service (personnel, equipment, and knowledge) and flying personnel, which can
be bridged by better and unique presentation of weather data.”99
Even in early 1944, the nine-month curriculum for the aviation meteorological
cadet courses spent relatively little time on the crucial task of weather briefings. While
511 hours of instruction went to Surface Weather Charts and Forecasting, 132 hours to
Air Mass Analysis, and 99 to Dynamic Meteorology, only 24 were spent on Weather
Station Operation. This subject was expected to cover a wide range of topics, including
the AAF Weather Service’s history and organization, as well as the administration and
daily operation of a weather station. Buried in this course was instruction in “display and
dissemination of weather information” and “preparation of weather forecasts for the
AAF.”100
Consequently, continuing education programs run by the AAF’s Air Weather
Service emphasized communicating forecasts clearly. For instance, the 1944 Advanced
and Refresher Course at Chanute Field spent nearly half of its 396 hours of instruction in
“Weather Forecasting and Briefing Laboratory,” where officers developed “station and
route forecasts,” giving “simulated briefing presentations” with “special attention to
99
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Weather Officers similarly built public presentation skills, with seven of the nineteen
days covering briefing related topics, like “Principles of weather briefing and mission
briefing,” “Weather briefing to commanding officers of air forces and commands,” and
“Special briefing on contrails.” 101
One of the strategies developed for presenting weather data better involved
constructing the stratified route charts that would feature so centrally in the AAF’s
propaganda film. (Figure 4.12) Drawing on techniques used by Pan Am from the late
1930s, these charts traced the route in length and altitude, showing dimensions of the
pilots’ experience that were left out of synoptic maps. They marked the level and extent
of clouds, winds, fog, icing conditions, temperatures at different altitudes, and potential
convection areas. In mountainous areas, they also marked the height of landforms. These
charts helped pilots find and follow safe and advantageous altitudes to fly along preset
courses. During the war, complicated routes were carefully constructed to avoid giving
away the target too soon, to avoid known concentrations of anti-aircraft guns (flak), and
to provide for alternate targets in case the primary was obscured.102 These charts were
crucial in helping pilots avoid dangerous weather by going above or below, since they
were very often constrained from going around, as commercial pilots in peacetime could.
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Figure 4.12: A sample stratified route chart like those used by Pan Am
pilots in ferrying airplanes from US factories to the North Africa and ChinaBurma-India military theatres of operation. Pan Am had been presenting
weather information this way since the late 1930s. (Source: Pan American
Ferries, Inc. Report 1941-42, Volume 5. “Meteorological Department
Report.” Pam Am Collection, Accession II, Box 17. University of Miami
Archives and Special Collections.)

While the universities adjusted their training program to produce better
operational meteorologists, the responsibility for finding ways to communicate
effectively with pilots ultimately rested on individual weather officers in briefing huts
and flight lines. In daily work on the flight line some meteorologists improvised by
imitating forms of training culture; they discovered that cartoons worked as well in
briefing pilots as they did in training them. Maud Greenwood was one of about 100
WAVES who received advanced training as weather forecasters. After completing the
nine-month training program at the University of Chicago, she was posted to the Naval

Air Training Base at Corpus Christi, Texas, where she briefed student pilots on the
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conditions they would face on training hops. To encourage the rookies to pay attention,
she illustrated her forecasts with cartoons. As she remembered it, “The commander of the
aerology office saw my drawings, liked them and put me to work painting weather
pictures on the walls and special stands around the base. Next thing you know, I’m on my
way to Washington, D.C. as a meteorologist/artist to help with aerological publications.”
After the war, Greenwood sought to stay in aviation weather forecasting, but was told by
prospective employers that women could not deal with pilots.103 As the next chapter will
show, the mode of communication she helped create would powerfully shape the culture
of meteorology that rejected her.

Conclusion
World War II solidified and made permanent the connection between air power
and the Bergen School’s vision of modern meteorology. Facing a dire scarcity of expert
labor, academic meteorologists mass-produced (though imperfectly standardized) a new
kind of military technician, scientific officers who imagined weather in abstract,
mathematical terms. These men learned to value placeless weather knowledge that could
be produced at MIT and shipped to a “weather central” at Guam. From Guam, that
knowledge supported bombers as they crossed 1,500 miles of ocean to Japan. While this
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abstract training did not prepare men well for the daily chores of operations, it proved
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a viable foundation for a system that projected military power globally.
The nuclear age was populated by atmospheric scientists for whom a military
background was as typical as it was for pilots. In 1954, 80% of American meteorologists
had military ties, while a decade later, military weather research and operations employed
three times as many people as similar civilian activities.104
Only about 20 percent of the weather cadet generation stayed in meteorology after
the war, yet many who left went on to influential careers in remarkably diverse fields.105
Some weather cadets who became postwar American intellectual leaders include:
Kenneth Arrow (NYU), whose first published scientific paper, on using upper level
winds to optimize flight times, played no role in his Nobel Prize in Economics; W. Hubbs
Rehnquist, a member of Flight D-2 in the 1944 Pre-meteorology program at Denison
University who became a non-commissioned weather observer after sufficient numbers
of weather officers were already trained, later went to Stanford Law School, briefly dated
fellow student Sandra Day O’Connor, and eventually became Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court106; George M. Keller (MIT), who as head of the Standard Oil Company of
California acquired Gulf Oil, forming the Chevron Corporation in the largest corporate
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merger to that time107; Luna B. Leopold (UCLA), son of the naturalist and writer
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Aldo Leopold, became chief hydrologist at the US Geological Survey108; Edward B.
Lewis (Caltech), nicknamed “Doc” by his fellow weather cadets in 1943 because he
already had a Ph.D. in genetics, won the 1995 Nobel Prize for his observations on the
role of genes in embryonic development109; Herbert V. Schuster (MIT), whose postwar
plan to study chemistry led him to a doctorate in food technology, pioneered the
manufacture of private-label goods, those cheaper knockoffs of expensively advertised
name brand items110; and Clifton Keith Hillegass, the inventor and publisher of Cliffs
Notes, the study aid crucial to passing literature classes for many American students.111
Graduate level education in mathematics and physics proved remarkably useful in
Postwar American society.
Those weather cadets who remained in meteorology became a cohort that defined
American atmospheric science into the 1980s. Because of American diplomatic efforts to
use science in constructing the post-war international political order, these men would
also play a crucial role in the course of international meteorology.112 Though meteorology
had traditionally struggled to attract the best science students, the military selection
process directed a flood of exceptionally bright students into the field. Some of these men
107
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became the leaders of the expanding institutions of American atmospheric science,
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founding new academic departments, staffing the National Center for Atmospheric
Research founded in 1960, and building a strong atmospheric science program at NASA.
They played key roles in developing computer simulations of the atmosphere now central
to weather forecasting and understanding climate change, pioneered the development of
remote sensing and weather satellites, and founded companies that provided industrial
consulting services, including unreliable and often contentious weather modification
applications.113 Finally, they transformed the public image of meteorology after the war,
constructing the television weather report around the briefing styles and cartoons they
had used during wartime, then struggling with the consequences of commercial television
as they sought to secure the authority of professional meteorologists over the air.
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Chapter Five
Broadcasting Infrastructural Science:
Publicity and Professionalization after World War II

Frank Forrester, former military meteorologist and Pan Am forecaster, occasional
TV weatherman, scientist at the Hayden Planetarium, paused. In the midst of answering
1001 questions about the weather, he reflected on his science’s improving public image.
“Not too long ago the weatherman was caricatured as an ineffectual, bearded, fingerwetting and preoccupied sky gazer,” he wrote. “Today’s weatherman is much more
impressive. He is part of a complex corps of specialists who are constantly laboring to
expand and apply their science. Industries and armies have come to rely upon him for
guidance in their planning.”1 As he wrote in 1957, meteorologists had good reason to be
content. Meteorology was ensconced as a science essential to air safety and national
defense, valued in an increasing number of industrial settings. Numerical models of the
atmosphere, running on the expensive new digital computer, had recently started
producing operational forecasts for the US Weather Bureau and the military.2 The
International Geophysical Year was showcasing meteorology’s advances as a global
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science, drawing together scientists from more than thirty nations to study the
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atmosphere’s general circulation, among many other topics.3
However, the mid-1950s also gave American meteorologists some cause for
unease. President Eisenhower cut the federal budget in 1953, and Weather Bureau Chief
Francis Reichelderfer chose to reduce the number of ships patrolling for hurricanes off
the Atlantic coast.4 Then the weather shifted: hurricanes Carol, Edna, and Hazel swept
up the Eastern seaboard in 1954, the first major storms to hit America’s cultural and
political core in fifteen years. Whispers circulated that nuclear bomb testing had
damaged the weather.5 Inland, cloud seeders proclaimed their ability to control the skies.
Chemist Irving Langmuir, a Nobel Laureate with no meteorological training, boasted
about changing rainfall across the entire desert west, while many private companies sold
questionable weather modification projects to ranchers, power companies, and municipal
governments.6 Calling for more research, the usual calmative for worries over scientific
authority, offered no tonic for meteorologists since top graduate students were eschewing
the uncertainties of the winds for the glamour of particle physics.7 Worst of all, the
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increasing millions who turned on their new televisions often saw entertainers
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embellishing the weather forecast, rather than technically trained meteorologists
explaining the atmosphere’s behavior. Many stations employed comedians, cartoonists or
puppets; dozens of other stations hired “weather girls,” aspiring actresses and beauty
queens with no experience in meteorology who wrapped the forecast in poetry, songs and
double entendres. The public image of the weather expert was becoming a sexy young
woman holding not a degree in science, but a ukulele, as one photograph in Vogue
Pattern Book showed New York weather presenter Jan Crockett.8 Meteorologists thus
found their authority challenged by nature, commercial television, and femininity.
This chapter explores how meteorologists worked to present meteorology as a
mature, professional science in the wake of World War II. Meteorology’s ties to aviation
played an essential role in changing the science’s public image, as meteorologists touted
the reliance of industry and the military on meteorological expertise. Even more
influentially, demobilized weather cadets invented the television weather report by
adapting the pre-flight briefings and cartoon illustration style they had used to
communicate with pilots during the war. These illustrated weather reports became
popular with audiences and sponsors alike, rapidly spreading nationwide after the Federal
Communications Commission lifted its freeze on new TV stations in 1952. TV weather
emerged as the most commonly viewed scientific genre, and meteorologists had great
hopes that it would showcase their growing skill and knowledge. But station managers
interpreted cartoons as evidence that the weather was a bland subject that needed
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presentational spice. Between 1952 and 1955, women became perhaps half of all
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weather presenters, while a widely watched fraction of the men were cartoonists or
comedians with no meteorological training.
Meteorologists sought to control their public reputation through an agenda of
professionalization, primarily implemented by the American Meteorological Society.
Professionalizing meteorology involved excluding people who did not have training and
experience, as well as excluding nearly all women, regardless of their training and
experience. Ensuring the professional qualities of TV weather reporters was particularly
challenging, however, as meteorologists had no authority in the commercial television
industry. Meteorologists attempted to create leverage by inventing a “Seal of Approval”
program that certified the professional qualifications of broadcasting meteorologists. This
effort particularly excluded women, with implications for gender discrimination in
atmospheric science down to the present day.
The chapter thus describes the construction of meteorology’s public face, a façade
that hides the government, academic and industrial activities that make up weather
science and weather service. While academic meteorologists played some role in
constructing this mask, much more influential work was done by a haphazard series of
forecasters, station managers, advertisers, consultants and performers. The television
weather report developed from modes of aeronautical meteorology and infrastructural
science, and then concealed those origins.

Professionalizing Post-War Meteorology
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During the 1940s and 1950s, a series of officers and committees sought to
transform the AMS into a professional society, a society that could regulate the
employment, scientific practices, and public statements of weather experts. During the
1940s, the AMS launched a research journal, created a class of ‘professional’ members
with the exclusive right to elect AMS officers, and encouraged industries to hire
meteorologists. In the 1950s, AMS committees tried to codify rules for meteorological
consulting practices, began to publish consensus statements about the limits of scientific
capability, threatened to expel members who made “exaggerated claims” in public, and
created certification programs. While AMS efforts to discipline meteorology never
gained the statutory recognition that empowered professions like law, medicine or
engineering, they did produce considerable benefits for the career prospects of
credentialed meteorologists. These gains, however, came at the expense of people
systematically excluded from the institutions of meteorology, especially women.
Even before the end of the war, AMS president Carl-Gustaf Rossby and the
Society’s governing council reformed the AMS constitution to institutionalize the
authority and power of university-trained meteorologists. In a June 1944 letter “to the
Members of the American Meteorological Society from the Council,” which
accompanied a ballot for members to vote on changes in the bylaws and constitution, the
AMS Council proposed splitting the membership into two castes. “It is recognized that
the Society contains two broad groups of members,” the Council wrote performatively,
“one consisting of those employed as professional meteorologists, and the other
consisting of sub-professional and interested amateurs.” Though the two groups have

different needs, “it is clear that the future strength of American meteorology lies in
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unity rather than in independent action by separate groups.”9 Instead of separate popular
and professional groups, the Council argued, putting the professionals in charge would
strengthen American meteorology. “Since it was felt that the administration of the
Society should be in the hands of those most vitally interested in the science, it is
proposed that the President, Vice President, Secretary, and three of the five Councilors
elected each year be Professional Members.” Professional members would also be
charged $10.00 per year, nearly tripling the rate of regular membership in 1943.
By giving control over the Society to those experts with either education or
employment in meteorology, this constitutional change created an organization dedicated
primarily to the interests and concerns of its professional members, while retaining the
potential influence that could accompany a broader membership. Its language of
professionalization partly reflected long-established Weather Bureau usage, where the
‘professional’ and ‘sub-professional’ grades marked a key difference in rank and
responsibility; the professional grades worked as analysts, forecasters, and managers,
while the ‘sub-professional’ grades read instruments and recorded observations. Rossby
also used the word ‘professional’ to draw sharp lines between people with certified
education in meteorology (either in universities or military institutions like the Naval
Post-Graduate School) and people who did meteorology-related work but lacked formal
training. By creating clear boundaries between meteorological experts and the lay public,
the word professional, also helped to solve meteorology’s longstanding credibility
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problems,.10 Twenty-five years later, Horace Byers would applaud the stratification of
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the AMS: “Professional membership now distinguished the trained and experienced
meteorologists from the hacks and the dilettantes, and the Society was taking its place
among the distinguished learned societies.”11
Professionalizing meteorology also meant marginalizing women. During the war,
about 200 women had trained alongside the male weather cadets, in the same classrooms
by the same faculty. While military rules kept them from being posted overseas, women
worked as aviation forecasters, classroom instructors and scientific researchers just like
their male counterparts.12 In post-war employment, by contrast, women were offered only
‘sub-professional’ jobs below their experience and training. Maud Greenwood, for
example, had been a Navy forecaster responsible for giving trainee pilots pre-flight
weather briefings during the conflict. She hoped to be an airline forecaster after the war,
but was told, “a woman could not deal with pilots and dispatchers,” though she “could be
hired as a map plotter.”13 Within the Weather Bureau, women were rarely employed in
forecasting and supervisory positions.14 In education Rossby, like many male professors,
refused to accept women for graduate study, even women like Joanne Malkus who had
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earned a masters degree for research conducted during the War.15 While Malkus
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persevered against this discrimination to become a pioneering role model for later women
meteorologists, the discriminatory actions of the 1940s and 1950s reduced the numbers of
women in meteorology to a level that did not threaten the social standing of the science.
The handful of women working as professional meteorologists became unthreatening
curiosities. In all these regards, meteorology was part of the much larger pattern of
employment and educational discrimination against women after World War II.16
Casting meteorology as a profession also required expanding career options
beyond the Weather Bureau and the military. Rossby, with an almost paternal concern for
his male weather cadets, worked through the AMS to create job opportunities. He created
an employment file at AMS headquarters, intended for use as a placement service in
peacetime, and for quickly locating properly trained meteorologists during future wars.
Extensive records in the UMC files show Rossby’s attempts to encourage various sectors
of private industry to explore how meteorologists might be of value.17 Rossby
emphasized that the men of the weather cadet generation were a new class of weather
experts; their university training and wartime forecasting experience made them
‘professional’ meteorologists. From the pulpit of the AMS presidency, he also
encouraged the development of meteorology classes as part of the liberal arts curriculum,
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while working to integrate meteorology into the work of civil engineers and the
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training of research geologists, oceanographers, and hydrologists.18

A New Career: TV Weatherman19
The most visible new meteorological career was on television. Television stations
popping up across the country experimented with broadcasting weather forecasts, either
as part of the local news, or as a stand-alone show. In contrast to genres like the variety
show or detective drama, the TV weather report was little influenced by precedents in
radio. Rather, discharged military meteorologists adapted the wartime pre-flight briefing
for a new audience. As Robert Henson notes, “Dozens of these veterans showed up on
local weather programs in the late 1940s.”20 Influential early TV weathercasters who
served as military meteorologists during World War II included Louis Allen, Frank Field,
Harold Taft, Clint Youle, Jim Fidler, Frank Forrester, Nash Roberts, and Don Woods.
These men worked in major markets like Washington D.C and New York, as well as
smaller markets across the country like Tulsa and New Orleans.
Meteorologists had great hopes that television would prove a useful tool in
professionalization, by educating the public about the advances their science had made

18

For examples, see SIO Office of the Director (Sverdrup), 82-56, Box 1, Folder 46 "Sverdrup, Misc. -Meteorology Programs 1943-1944," Scripps Institute of Oceanography Archives.
19
A note on terminology: Historical documents display considerable slippage between various terms for
weather experts, both on and off TV. While there is some evidence that stations switched from using
“weatherman” to “meteorologist” during the 1970s in the wake of the Weather Underground violence,
different sources use “weatherman,” “meteorologist,” and “weathercaster” almost interchangeably.
“Weathercaster” came into widespread usage in the 1980s as a gender inclusive term that makes no
assertions about the presenter’s scientific training. I use “weathercaster” as the most general term for any
weather presenter on TV or radio and “meteorologist” to refer exclusively to academics or government
employees with scientific training who are paid to research or forecast weather. I use “weatherman” and
“weather girl” in the same way my actors used them in the 1950s and 1960s.
20
Henson, TV Weathercasting, 7.

during the war, and helping modern meteorologists break from historical associations
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with charlatans and weather prophets. Meteorologists’ research on atmospheric physics,
and the widely believed (and publicized) possibility that the digital computer could lead
to weather control, suggested to meteorologists that they might finally escape the stigma
they felt they had labored under for so long.21 Discussing the proper persona for a TV
weatherman, pioneering radio meteorologist James Fidler emphasized
There is no place for a ‘character’ insofar as the profession of meteorology is
concerned. The weatherman has too long been pictured in the public imagination
as a grotesque creature, so care must be taken that this new medium presents him
to the public in what (we trust) is his true personality.22
By performing a dignified, sober personality, TV meteorologists would persuade the
public of the prestige of their young science.
Meteorologists also hoped that TV could enable the public to understand the
complexities of forecasting the weather and thus to better tolerate the weatherman’s
failures. By demonstrating “to the public at large the how’s and why’s of the weather,”
forecasters could describe exactly how a weather forecast was prepared.23 Seeing the
maps and charts would enable the public to appreciate the forecast and its limitations.
Watching the forecaster at work, meteorologists hoped, would help the public “sense
some of the responsibility the forecaster feels as he struggles over his prognostic charts,”
while ultimately resulting in “increased public understanding of the weatherman’s work
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and greater tolerance of his inevitable ‘busts.’”24 While meteorologists’ early writings
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hint at building public empathy for the struggles of forecasters, they seem not to have
thought TV weathermen would become subjects of strong emotional connection. They
expected TV weathermen to be teachers, not celebrities.

TV Weather’s connections to Aviation
The television weather report as a genre evolved from the pre-flight briefings that
had been central to the daily work of aviation meteorologists. The weather cadets who
invented TV weather reporting adapted the narrative structure and the visual pedagogical
style they first used to communicate with military pilots.

Narrative Structure
Pre-flight briefings were the most common presentation for most military
meteorologists. As such, it provided a model for how to present the weather on television.
In a 1982 interview with a journalism scholar, Harold Taft recalled how he and two other
airline meteorologists approached WBAP-TV in 1949 with a plan for a weather show:
We thought it would be a good idea to use the briefing techniques that we used for
pilots during the war for television, because it was a natural medium for it. … We
would put a map up, we’d show ‘em what the weather was, what it was going to
be at the target, and what they’d expect when they returned. We gave ‘em a
briefing. Same thing we do today. … Give me a map, a piece of chalk, and a stick
and I’ll tell you about the weather.
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According to the interviewer, “Taft said he learned everything he knew about
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presenting the weather while briefing pilots in World War II.”25 Jim Fidler argued that
television meteorologists should adopt the same persona they had used to gain the trust of
pilots:
During the war it was found that the personality of the weatherman was
important; pilots had to have confidence in their weather officer, both in his
personality and in his professional ability. In television, the personality of the
weatherman assumes a similar, but even greater importance.26
Managing one’s personality, projecting a persona that displayed confidence in the
capacities of modern scientific meteorology, inspired the trust pilots needed to have in
their forecasters as they went to fight the enemy. Fidler attempted to project that same
attitude in his TV presentations.

Visual Style
The visual style of TV weather evolved from a mating between wartime
educational practices with synoptic maps, the long-established public representation of
meteorology, under the constraints of low-resolution TV screens. This produced a simple
aesthetic where the weatherman used a thick marker to draw simplified maps and
cartoons live on the air, while narrating yesterday’s weather, current conditions, and the
forecast.
The synoptic map, a map depicting simultaneous weather conditions across the
United States, was the main visual language for public meteorology prior to the
development of television, and the main way that Americans saw the nation’s weather.
25
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Producing such a map was an enormous feat of organizational and technological
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prowess, that involved coordinating instruments and observers at hundreds of locations,
communicating those observations to all the offices in the network, and then drawing and
printing charts for public distribution. Produced since the establishment of the federal
government’s weather service in 1871, synoptic maps became an iconic representation of
the Weather Bureau, symbolizing the Bureau’s scientific authority and capability.27
The Bureau worked hard to ensure the accurate and consistent production of these
charts across the United States, distributing these maps through public displays, direct
mail, and in newspaper reproductions. The Bureau also mailed tens of millions of
synoptic maps directly to subscribers. The central office in Washington produced the
largest and highest quality maps, both in terms of printing capability and completeness of
data. By the first decade of the 20th century, stations in other major cities used lithography
to produce a 1,000 or more copies of each day’s map, usually printed on a 11” x 16”
sheet of paper along with the text of the local forecast and tables of meteorological data,
while smaller stations might mimeograph a dozen maps a day.28 For a small subscription
fee, interested people could have the day’s weather map mailed to them by the local
Weather Bureau office.
By 1910, static appropriations and the increasing costs of printing encouraged the
Bureau to turn towards newspapers as the primary means of distributing synoptic maps.
Scattered American newspapers had printed weather maps since 1879; many papers had
27

Mark Monmonier, “Telegraphy, Iconography, and the Weather Map: Cartographic Weather Reports by
the United States Weather Bureau, 1870-1935.” Imago Mundi, 40 (1988): 15-31. See also, Katharine
Anderson, “Mapping Meteorology,” in Intimate Universality: Local and Global Themes in the History of
Weather and Climate, James Rodger Fleming, Vladimir Jankovic, and Deborah R. Coen, eds (Science
History Publications, 2006).
28
Monmonier, “Telegraphy,” 18.

printed maps for months or years, before abandoning them because of space
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constraints or the relative cost of the printing graphics. An 1894 survey of the four
newspapers running daily weather maps (in Boston, Cincinnati, New Orleans, and San
Francisco) showed that nearly 50,000,000 weather maps a year were circulating in these
cities alone. These maps were visually complicated, and rich with data from many cities,
including the state of the sky, temperature, barometric pressure, and wind direction.29 By
1912 the “commercial weather map” was carried in 147 newspapers with circulation of
2.9 million.30
The technical limitations of analog broadcasting made this kind of intricate map
impossible to broadcast on television. Since American television offered only 525
horizontal scan-lines, legible labels could not be less than 1/10th to 1/25th the height of
the screen.31 As a result, “broadcasters avoid complex displays likely to antagonize
viewers and undermine ratings.”32 The national weather maps faxed from the Weather
Bureau in the late 1940s were “unsuitable even for close-ups, and had to be redrawn and
simplified.”33 Consequently, early TV weather maps echoed the clear lines and relatively
thin amount of information that had appeared in many of the sketches and educational
maps of wartime meteorology textbooks.34 Weathercasters drew simplified maps live on
screen (Figure 5.1). A story in the Radio Farm Digest described how weatherman Louis
Allen started with
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an outline of the U.S. and a facile pen with a felt nib capable of interesting
line effects… and filled with instant drying ink. … With a friendly flourish of
rapid-fire pleasantry about fan mail (which he does get) and weather matters, he
attacks the map with an easy sweep of pen, sketching in a few of the major
current, and incubating, phases of weather: advancing cold front, lines indicating
a major temperature zone or so in the Northeast, etc.35
This performance was “an impressive act to a home audience,”36 remarkable because it
suggested a weathercaster had extensive knowledge at easy command. In fact, this
“spontaneous” appearance depended upon careful planning. As Doug Wallace, a
longtime weathercaster in Columbus, Georgia, put it,
Many viewers wondered how it was I was able to remember so much information
and do the show without use of notes. No problem. The truth is I did use a form of
notes to a great degree by simply making a light outline of most of the weather
data on the weatherboard, too light for the camera to pick up but heavy enough for
me to see. This was done with a soft carbon pencil.37
Chalk boards or large sheets of paper were most common in the late 1940s, while clear
plexiglass maps began to appear in the mid-1950s.
Presenting with a felt pen in hand made it easy to add comic embellishments to
enliven the presentation. These ranged from stylized pictograms like “hot” dripping with
sweat to cartoon depictions of the sun or a rain storm. The most obvious of these cartoons
were recurring characters. Don Woods created Gusty, a skittish sprite drawn from a
tornado of swirling strokes. The use of hand-drawn maps and cartoons also produced a
piece of original artwork every day. Weathercasters often gave away these objects to
viewers. Louis Allen received frequent requests for his daily doodles.38 Don Woods had a
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lottery at the end of each report, where he chose a name out of a bowl to receive the
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day’s picture of Gusty. He had more than a thousand entries when he retired. Late in
Doug Wallace’s career, the host of his morning broadcast arranged a daily drawing to
distribute his weather map to a lucky viewer. Winners sometimes sent him pictures of his
maps framed and hanging over their mantels.39 These contests connected the broadcast to
the local community, while adding a bit of drama at the end of the report.

Figure 5.1: Louis Allen, the prototype for the modern TV weatherman, developed a
visual style built around a hand-drawn simplified synoptic map, and a cartoon to
illustrate the forecast at the end of his segment. (Courtesy of the Bulletin of the
American Meteorological Society)

Louis Allen: prototype of the modern television weatherman
No ex-military meteorologist had a greater influence on the development of the
weather report than Louis Allen, who began broadcasting in Washington D.C. in 1948.
39
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Allen has been described as the “prototype of the modern television weatherman,”

211

because he combined formal meteorological training with an engaging television
persona.40 Allen earned a bachelor’s and master’s degree in meteorology, and thought
education was a crucial part of the weather report. Akin to the military comics that used
entertainment to make education memorable, he held his audience’s attention by
sketching a ‘doodle’ that symbolized tomorrow’s weather. Viewers requested copies of
his maps and doodles, writing, “the maps and the diagrams make a subject, otherwise
technical, very easy to follow,” and “All our neighbors gather ‘round our TV set every
evening just to see you,” more interested in learning about the weather than ever before.41
“At the end of each five-minute show, Allen preceded the official forecast by drawing a
quick sketch that symbolized the next day’s expected weather. For example, a picture of
two boys on swings denoted warm weather appropriate for outside play. (The doodle
concept grew out of drawings sent to Allen by his wife during World War II, when Allen
was a military forecaster.)”42 Allen did his sketch on camera, bringing a compelling bit of
action to the weather report. According to Charles C. Bates, a weather cadet who later
became a key figure in the development of seismic networks for monitoring atomic tests,
oceanographer and scientific advisor to the coast guard. Allen “met [his] competition
head-on by drawing on his background gained from visual teaching of the slow learner.
As a result, he climaxed his nightly 5-min weather show with a ‘doodle’ cartoon that
attracted an extensive following ranging from 5-year-olds to grandparents as well as the
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all-important sponsor.”43 Allen’s weather show became a model for other
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presentations, as his show-stopping “doodle” connected the leisure and pleasure viewers
associated with the comics to the informative and educational aspects of the weather
report. Allen’s doodles generated so much enthusiasm that cartoon weather reports spread
across the country. By 1952 a New York Times headline bemoaned that the “Televiewer
is Wilted by Wave of Weather Men, Pointing, Doodling and Spouting Temperatures.”44

An Unintended Consequence of Comic Art: Cartoonists and Weather Girls
The success of Allen’s cartooning encouraged many other stations to try similar
approaches to the weather. According to Robert Henson, “other weathercasters noticed
Allen’s doodling or came up with the notion themselves as an onslaught of cartoon
characters invaded weathercasts over the next few years.”45 Before long, meteorological
knowledge became secondary to cartooning skill and an engaging manner in becoming a
television weathercaster. In some cases cartooning skills even became crucial to getting
the job. Don Woods describes how he got his first job in TV meteorology:
Not only was Don Woods a professional meteorologist; but he could also draw!
Actually, Don found this little known talent after a few cartooning lessons and
persuasive motivation from the Kansas TV station - a job requirement. They
insisted that Don would draw a cartoon character for the weather section.46
The New York Times echoed this language of requirement, scowling that, “one
qualification for a television weather man is that he must be skilled in doodling. While
43
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talking about the weather map or chart, he has to draw circles and lines in rapid
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motions, presumably illustrating what he is talking about.” While the animation lent
“movement and variety to the show,” the reporter felt that it conveyed “not a lot of
intelligence.”47 Despite the Times’s scorn, map historian Mark Monmonier argues that in
the 1950s “skill as an illustrator was a marketable asset for the weathercaster who could
quickly sketch clouds, a lightning bolt, or a radiant ‘Mr. Sun.’”48
While Louis Allen used weather comics as an engaging pedagogical device, like
they had been during the War, television producers interpreted weather cartoons as
“sugar coating” to sweeten “a rather dull subject.”49 Comic books and cartoons were seen
as low culture, entertaining rather than educational.50 Since viewers liked weather comics,
it stood to reason they must not consider the weather to be an important subject. Station
managers began to use comic weather reports to leaven their serious news programs.
Using the data and official forecast available to anyone at the local Weather Bureau
office, men with no meteorological training became some of the most successful
weathercasters during the 1950s. Chicago cartoonist P. J. Hoff created beloved characters
like the Vice-President-in-Charge-of-Looking-out-the-Window (Figure 5.2), while Tippy
Stringer drew Senator Fairweather in Washington D.C.51
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Figure 5.2: This play kit distributed in Chicago in 1963 featured cartoon cut-outs so
children could re-enact P.J. Hoff's popular TV weather forecasts. (Author's
personal collection).
A major reason weather cartooning spread quickly could be seen nightly in New
York City. Tex Antoine broadcast in New York City from 1949 into the 1970s, armed
with no meteorological training, but a fabulously expressive pen and a compelling
personality (Figure 5.3). At the centre of his broadcast was “Uncle Wethbee,” a baldpated character with big eyes and a Texas mustache. Antoine drew and dressed Uncle
Wethbee for tomorrow’s weather. His mustache drooped in advance of rain and curled
with the return of the sun. In 1951, the Times explained the “saga behind the rise” of the
character:
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It all started two years ago when Antoine, who had a knack for drawing
cartoons, was asked by WNBT in midweek to come up with a five-minute
weather show by the following Monday. From an orange crate Antoine cut the
head of a character he named “Uncle Wethbee.” He also cut out different sets of
interchangeable mustaches and ties so that “Uncle Wethbee” could simulate a
visual effect for the various weather predictions.52

Figure 5.3: Tex Antoine wearing typical costume, a painter’s smock, interprets
Uncle Wethbee’s meteorological signs on behalf of his sponsor, the New York
Electrical company Consolidated Edison. (Source: Life Magazine, March 28th, 1955)
Antoine helped maintain his place in the public eye (and solidify the new visual
culture of public meteorology) by producing promotional books and pamphlets. He
promoted his weather broadcasts and his sponsor, Consolidated Edison, in a series of
yearly almanacs. The 1963 version was a 32 page, 5” x 8” stapled pamphlet. The
pamphlet led off with an iconography, explaining how to read the forecast from the
cartoon (Figure 5.4). “Uncle Wethbee’s expression and dress tell us what weather to
52
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expect. Since 1949 he and Tex Antoine have been working together. Unk predicts and
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Tex reports via Channel 4, WNBC-TV, Monday through Friday at 11:10pm. For official
information on weather conditions, naturally they depend upon the New York Weather
Bureau.” Each month featured historical records for Central Park, times for high tides at
the Battery, sunrise and setting times, a lunar calendar, a portrait of Uncle Wethbee
appropriately dressed for the season, and a bit of doggerel beneath Unk’s smiling mug,
like “We know that Spring will soon be here/ But Winter’s not quite gone, we fear.”
Interspersed with advice on home barometers and how to read a weather map were
explanations why electric dryers do it better, and the benefits of an automatic
dishwasher.53

Figure 5.4: Tex Antoine developed a complicated iconography to show the weather
through his Unk Wethbee cartoons. Free pamphlets helped to spread this visual
code, as well as messages from Antoine’s primary sponsor, the Consolidated Edison
Company. (Author's personal collection).
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Inexpensive or free materials like Antoine’s almanacs kept the forecaster and
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his comic style familiar to a wide audience, even when he was not on the air. Similar
sorts of guides have become a common product of TV stations across the United States
and around the world, as stations, sponsors and weathercasters trade on television
celebrity by producing a variety of almanacs and weather books, sometimes for sale,
sometimes distributed free as advertising.54

Cue the Weather Girls
Antoine’s success also led to a new kind of public face for meteorology: the
“weather girl.” Antoine’s continued high ratings on WNBT pushed the other New York
City stations to experiment. In 1952, WCBS and WABC hired attractive women to
present the forecast, an idea that quickly caught on nationally. By 1955, “women made
up a major fraction of all weather anchors, if not a majority,” according to the leading
historian of weathercasting, Robert Henson. 55 Life magazine noted, “between girls and
gimmicks, men are more and more being left out in the rain.”56 News directors
emphasized beautiful women, aiming to attract male viewers with models, actresses, and
beauty-pageant winners.57 Maxine Barrat presented the weather to Miami in a bathing
suit, while Ginger Stanley presented the weather immersed in a bathtub on CBS’s
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“Morning Show.” “Perhaps the greatest indignities of all,” Henson writes, “were
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experienced by Tedi Thurman of NBC, whose weathercasts on the Jack Paar ‘Tonight’
show of 1957 were just short of burlesque.”58 Peaking from behind a shower curtain, she
might report, "The temperature in New York is 46, and me, I'm 36-26-36."59 Situation
comedy writers invoked the familiar sexual attractiveness of female weathercasters in
episodes of The Dick Van Dyke Show and The Beverly Hillbillies.60
Since few early weather reports were recorded, The Beverly Hillbillies episode
“Granny versus the Weather Bureau” (1964) offers a unique source for exploring how
‘weather girls’ threatened the authority of meteorologists. The episode also suggests how
different kinds of viewers were expected to react to ‘weather girls,’ admittedly in
caricatured form. As the show opens, a gangly young man leaps out of his jalopy and
rushes into the family mansion, announcing “It’s time for the weather on television!” Jed
Clampett asks his daughter Elly May, “Since when is Jethro so interested in the
weather?” “Since he seen that pretty girl that talks about it,” she answers. The scene cuts
to an attractive young brunette whose pearls emphasize a swooping neckline, televised in
front of a simplified map of the northern hemisphere (Figure 5.5). With an alluring smile
and a provocative sway of her hips, she announces that a high-pressure system will hold
back the mass of moist air moving in across the Pacific. (“Hot diggity dog, ain’t she
pretty!” comments Jethro.) “By the way, there’ll be a full moon tonight,” she continues,
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While Jethro says “You sure will!” Granny complains that the girl hadn’t gotten the
forecast right all week.61

Figure 5.5: The flirtatious weather girl featured in The Beverly Hillbillies episode
“Granny versus the Weather Bureau, aired March 25, 1964.
Station managers realized that overt sexual appeals to male viewers risked
offending women. Fred Thrower, the executive vice president of New York’s WPIX,
believed that “women don’t like bosomy dames. Nor do they necessarily like to have
their husbands ogle them.”62 His station employed Gloria Okon, a woman “as wholesome
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as the bread, rolls and cookies she pushes,” according to the Times.63 Other station
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managers hoped that emphasizing fashion would make sexually attractive weather girls
appealing to (heterosexual) female viewers as well as men. According to WABC’s station
manager Joseph Stamler, “We feel that women—or ladies—have greater acceptance than
men, because, well, with the combination of an attractive-looking personality the men
prefer to look at and the women are attracted to because of the fashions they wear, we’ve
really got a two-fold program.”64 Fashion magazines embraced New York weathergirls as
celebrity models. A 1962 Vogue Pattern Book spread featured an image of a smiling Jan
Crockett strumming in front of a weather map, wearing “a figure skimming ‘Young
Fashionables’ coat dress of clear water-lily green worsted and silk, double-breasted with
self-covered buttons.” In an article emphasizing versatile clothing for fall, the magazine
noted that her job as a weather reporter gave her an advantage in “deciding whether to
bundle up or to dress for Indian Summer,” but that her “what-to-wear problems are
compounded by a kaleidoscopic daily routine as wife, mother, and television
performer.”65 Another picture showed Crockett taking her script from the suited, rather
dumpy-looking male meteorologist who actually produced the forecast. Regardless of
fashion or domesticity, the ‘weather girls’ represented hegemonic femininity, put on
screen to attract the heterosexual male gaze, not educate the public about meteorology.
The sexualized weather girls threatened the authority of credentialed
meteorologists, who felt they obscured male scientific labor while making weather
forecasting seem like a trivial activity unfit for scientific status. The huge amounts of
63
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men’s work in collecting, charting and analyzing weather data disappeared behind a
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pretty female face, which rendered the actual atmosphere almost irrelevant. Choosing a
weathercaster based on looks suggested that anyone could be a forecaster, and that
research, theorizing and observation were irrelevant. But most importantly, that pretty
face connoted a set of associations with subjectivity, sex, and emotional engagement.
‘Weather girls’ implied meteorology could not produce the objective, reliable predictions
considered the hallmark of true scientific knowledge.
For meteorologists in the 1950s, historical connections between the feminine and
subjectivity particularly threatened their credibility. Dynamic meteorologists asserted that
the atmosphere was fundamentally predictable, working to transform weather forecasting
from an intuitive, experiential art into objective calculations based on the basic equations
of physics. Yet commenting on weather girls in 1955, Life wrote that “the only thing as
variable as the weather is the ways of women.”66 Femininity invoked a long-established
discourse about the need to maintain emotional distance between the object of scientific
study and researcher, which stood in contrast to equally long-established cultural notions
of women as emotional and irrational beings. The imagined closeness of women to nature
was believed to make it impossible for them to detach themselves emotionally to produce
objective knowledge.67
Televised feminine weather experts contradicted an emerging set of images
depicting the meteorologist as heroic man protecting society from dangerous female
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weather.68 The panels of a 1958 Chesterfield Cigarette advertisement, “Men of
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America: Hurricane Alert,” credit the US Weather Bureau for a series of “live action
shots” that feature a thick-necked, clean-cut, cigarette-smoking man reading the teletype,
plotting a hurricane track, and issuing a “radar warning, storm will hit our shore.”69
(Figure 5.6) Frank Capra’s 1957 Bell Science TV program, The Unchained Goddess, had
personified the weather as the capricious Goddess Meteora, who unleashes a thunderous
wrath after a male scientist scorns her flirtatious affections. 70 Beginning about 1953, the
Weather Bureau publicly named hurricanes after women, an informal meteorological
practice that first came to widespread attention after the 1941 publication of George
Stewart’s novel Storm, a best seller and “book of the month club” selection that was even
excerpted in Boy Scout manuals.71 But the “weather girls,” like the poorly-predicted 1954
hurricanes Carol, Edna and Hazel, threatened claims that meteorologists produced
dependable knowledge essential to keeping society safe. Women weathercasters
subconsciously reminded viewers that forecasting remained a subjective and intuitive
enterprise, that the weather remained uncontrollable, and that meteorology might not be
so rigorous a science as its professional practitioners asserted.
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Figure 5.6: This 1958 cigarette ad is representative of images depicting heroically
masculine meteorologists protecting America from dangerous female weather
during the later 1950s. (Unknown publication, author’s personal collection)

The AMS Responds
The AMS reacted to weather girls and comedian weather presenters by launching
a Seal of Approval program. Serious discussions about the Seal began near the peak of

“weather girl” era, when the AMS Council, led by president Horace Byers, voted to
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establish an ad hoc Committee on Radio and Television at its meeting in New York in
January 1954. In May 1955 the Committee became permanent, and the Council agreed to
its suggestion that the AMS approve exemplary programs, rather than condemn lowquality broadcasts. Efforts to define a good weather program focused on the personality
of the presenter, emphasizing that presenters must maintain a “professional manner,” in
the words of Committee member James Fidler. The proper weathercaster should make
“an accurate presentation of the facts,” that was “audibly coherent” and “smooth to
watch,” while “always appear[ing] sincere and confident.” 72 Fellow committee member
Frances Davis seconded Fidler’s focus on the persona projected by a weather presenter,
implying that the authority of meteorology depended upon the representations shown on
TV. Under the assertion “Weather is no Laughing Matter,” Davis went public with the
AMS’s plan in a July 1955 article in TV Guide, writing
If TV weathermen are going to pose as experts, we feel they should be
experts. We think the weather should be discussed with dignity. Dignity,
not dullness. We think many TV ‘weathermen’ make a caricature of what
is essentially a serious and scientific occupation, [and] help foster the
notion that forecasters merely grab forecasts out of a bowl.73

Displaying a professional manner thus required a weathercaster to perform a confident,
dignified and technically accurate presentation of weather facts while projecting the
authority of natural science. University of Texas meteorologist K. H. Jehn, writing “as a
professional,” sought to add a pedagogical component to this burden. Believing that “the
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educational feature is essential,” Jehn hoped, “viewers will learn something about the
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weather at the same time that they hear […] the forecast for tomorrow.” He argued that
the “basic criteria for issuance of the seal” should include “a technically correct
presentation, with an educational feature and entertainment value.”74 At the time, Jehn
was a meteorology professor, not a broadcaster, but the AMS apparently appreciated his
contributions enough to appoint him chair of the Radio and Television Committee.
While it was easy to tell other scientists that the weatherman should be dignified
and accurate, educational and authoritative, the realities of commercial broadcasting gave
meteorologists little control over the presentation of the weather. As Frances Davis noted
as early as 1949, because broadcasting was a money-driven business,
the professional meteorologist in radio must be reconciled to having the
virtues of various products extolled before and after his weather broadcast,
and sometimes in the middle. And he will find it to his advantage
occasionally to tie the sponsor’s product in with the weather incidents
described in the body of his own script, contrary as it may be to his
professional principles.75
Photographs show sponsors’ logos displayed prominently on maps and behind
weathercasters during the 1950s76 while video clips from 1960s weather reports show
weathercasts supported by gasoline companies and local banks. The Savannah Bank and
Trust Company sponsored Cap’n Sandy on WSAV-TV in Georgia during the early
1960s. A series of different weathercasters played Sandy over the years, each wearing a
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captain’s hat and naval jacket while they narrated their hand-drawn weather maps.
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Pausing between describing the national and the regional weather conditions, Sandy
would introduce a message from his sponsor, like a one-minute pitch for a vacation loan
and a reminder to buy traveler’s checks, which the Cap’n said was “mighty good advice.”
Wilber the Weather-Bird, dressed in rain gear, might drop in with a forecast clamped in
his beak, and then Sandy would read “the official Department of Commerce Weather
Bureau forecast” before thanking “Arthur” for showing 88o and noting with a twinkle that
“Arthur-mometer is right up there today.”77 In the eyes of the station managers who hired
and fired, it was sponsorship that defined a successful weathercast, not the presentation’s
educational value or the dignified authority of a professional meteorologist.
The tensions between commercial reality and meteorologists’ conceits delayed the
Seal of Approval program for nearly four years. It was not until February 1959 that K. H.
Jehn, describing himself as “older and wiser now, and with nearly two years experience
in the ways of radio and television production,” was able to announce the criteria for
awarding Seals of Approval.78 First, all Seal applicants had to be Professional Members
of the AMS. In 1957, the AMS Council had changed the procedure for becoming a
Professional Member, requiring that a candidate be sponsored by two existing
Professional Members, “have completed a professional course in meteorology at an
institution of recognized standing and have been employed in meteorological or
climatological work at a professional level for at least two years, one of which must be
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the year prior to election.”79 After meeting those standards, a weathercaster would
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submit an application and fee to the AMS. Members of the Radio and Television board,
along with local AMS members in the broadcast region, would then evaluate “the
performer and his or her program” on four criteria: informational value, audience interest,
educational value, and professional attitude. Each criterion was judged unsatisfactory,
marginal, satisfactory, or excellent, and a performer had to score at least satisfactory in
all criteria to be accepted. The committee placed special emphasis on professional
attitude, defining it by noting: “He [the weathercaster] acts in such a way as to enhance
the prestige of meteorology as a science and a profession.” In a footnote, the Committee
emphasized that a professional attitude “is an expected attribute of a competent
meteorologist,” in contrast to merely a creditable weathercaster.80 Only professionals
were true meteorologists.
The Seal of Approval program’s statistics reveal how the practices of
professionalization excluded women. Because AMS Council members and committee
members generally retained their own records, evidence of who applied and who was
rejected is not readily available. But the names of successful applicants provide telling
evidence. Between January 1960 and December 1972, the AMS awarded 95 Seals to men
before approving the first woman. Of the first 200 approved weathercasters, from 1960 to
1979, just 3 were women. The rate of women in the next hundred seals more than
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doubled, but was still just 4%. By the end of 1984, twenty-five years after the start of
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the program, just 11 out of 352 seal holders (3.1%) were women.81
Today, as the Seal of Approval nears its fiftieth birthday, women weathercasters
continue to work beneath a “chromakey ceiling.”82 While the AMS has taken positive
steps to integrate women into meteorology, such as establishing a Board on Women and
Minorities in 1975 and awarding a significant percentage of its undergraduate and
graduate scholarships to women, women constitute only about 20% of the AMS
membership overall.83 Regarding professional certifications, women hold about 18% of
active television Seals of Approval, a higher percentage than ever before (Table 5.1).
Certification

Men

Women

Percentage

TV Seal of Approval (active)

671

149

18.2%

Radio Seal of Approval (active)

22

1

4.3%

Certified Broadcast Meteorologist (Total)

264

30

10.2%

Table 5.1: Gender of active AMS broadcast meteorologist certification holders,
September 2008.84
Yet two disturbing facts challenge this apparent progress. First, American women
weathercasters are much more likely to broadcast at less prestigious times; nearly three
quarters of women work the weekend, morning or noon shows, while almost 60% of men
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work prime time.85 Second, the AMS’s new, more advanced certification program has
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an even lower percentage of women than the AMS membership as a whole. Introduced in
January 2005, the Certified Broadcast Meteorologist program aims to
raise the professional standard in broadcast meteorology and encourage a
broader range of scientific understanding, especially with respect to
environmental issues. The goal of the CBM program is to certify that the
holder meets specific educational and experience criteria and has passed
rigorous testing in their knowledge and communication of meteorology
and related sciences needed to be an effective broadcast meteorologist.86
While improving public understanding of environmental issues is laudable, certifying the
education and professional standards of broadcasters is a problematic way to achieve this
end. As the history of the AMS Seal of Approval shows, professional certifications can
be exclusionary tools used to establish public authority. Once a profession has established
its authority, certifications reinforce existing social hierarchies, requiring new entrants to
gain the approval of older leaders. A certification program’s internal effects on the
behavior and demographic composition of professional members are much more direct
that its external effects on public education. The act of judgment is inextricable from the
act of exclusion; it is through such exclusions that gender boundaries are crystallized and
maintained.

Conclusion
The TV weather report is the most visible manifestation of a pervasive science
whose evolution has been driven by the needs of industry and the military. The influence
of aviation runs unacknowledged throughout the three-minute segments shown every
85
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night on the news, from the theory and methods that underlie the predictions, to the
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data and radar images shown on the maps, to the visual idioms of comic art like
shimmering heat waves and radiant suns. Although the vast majority of meteorologists
work invisibly behind the scenes to support the operation of technological systems, TV
weathercasters have become the science’s public face.
While most of meteorology’s growth in the 20th century is due to the science’s
role in supporting infrastructure, that growth has also revealed a deep popular interest in
weather. By the early 1980s, watching the weather on television had become so popular
amongst American viewers that TV weathercaster John Coleman launched a dedicated
24-hour cable station. Though often derided as a joke, The Weather Channel was
reported to fetch $3.5 billion when it was sold in 2008.87 Recent surveys show that 9698% of people use forecasts regularly, while the typical American adult accesses weather
forecasts about 115 times per month (or almost 4 times a day). More than 70% of people
obtain forecasts from local television news at least once a day, while cable TV, radio,
newspapers and the Internet are other common sources. Under normal circumstances, the
general public primarily uses this information for deciding how to dress, how to travel to
work or school, and simply because they are interested in tomorrow’s weather.88 But
when severe weather threatens, forecasts play a powerful role in shaping public

Michael J. de la Merced, “Weather Channel is sold to NBC and Equity Firms, New York Times, July 7th,
2008. See also Frank Batten, with Jeffery Cruikshank. The Weather Channel: The Improbable Rise of a
Media Phenomenon. (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 2002).
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On forecast usage, see: Jeffrey E. Lazo, Rebecca E. Morss, and Julie L. Demuth, “300 Billion Served:
Sources, Perceptions, Uses, and Values of Weather Forecasts,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological
Society 90 (June 2009): 785-798. Lazo, J.K., Chestnut, L.G. Economic Value of Current and Improved
Weather Forecasts in the U.S. Household Sector. Report prepared for the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration. Boulder (Colorado): Stratus Consulting Inc. 2002.
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responses, including evacuation decisions.89 Television weather forecasts have
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become central to how Americans interact with the environment.
As a result, television weathercasters have become the most visible symbols of
meteorology. Weathercasters report being involved in public outreach activities like
giving guest lectures, participating in science and career fairs, and mentoring students, at
a higher rate than any other group of American Meteorological Society members.90 While
the AMS’s efforts have been only partially successful in ensuring that weathercasters are
actually meteorological experts, many people treat them as such. Because celebrity is one
of mass culture’s key modes of credibility, the opinions of TV weathercasters have a
disproportionate influence. John Coleman’s status as founder of The Weather Channel
justifies reporting his denials of climate change, although his degree is in journalism.91
The history of television weather reporting challenges scholars to think more
deeply about the public understanding of science. In contrast to the audiences for
documentaries and science journalism, the near universal consumption of weather
forecasts suggests a much broader population that is interested in scientific information,
albeit science in its most attenuated form. The unique status of TV weathercasters as
communicators of science requires us to consider the role of celebrity in the production of
credibility. The publicity and professionalization of meteorology in the decades since
World War II reveals the turbulent confluence of visual culture, technoscience, and
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environmental perception. Meteorology feels so familiar and trivial from TV that we
forget its significance as an industrial governor.
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Conclusion

In the mid-1960s, comedian George Carlin created a satirical newscast so he
could comment on the world’s absurdities. One of his anchors was Al Capp, “the hippydippy weatherman, who brings you all the hippy-dippy weather, man.” Echoing the patter
familiar to any TV viewer, he’d announce that the temperature at the airport was such and
such, with winds from the west at so and so miles per hour. Then he’d pause, and puzzle
in his hippy-dippy way: “Why do they always tell us the weather at the airport? Nobody
lives there.”
At its simplest level, this dissertation is a prosaic answer to George Carlin’s
question. They tell us the weather at the airport because, since the 1930s, that’s where the
government’s official weather observation for each city takes place. The observation is
made there because the safety of air travel depends on good weather observations.
Meteorology is essential for reliable flight, and thus for economic productivity and
military power, so the government has made sure that good weather reports are available.
And airports are particularly good places to record the weather, say meteorologists.
Because airports have open, exposed areas remote from the distorting influences of the
“urban heat island” effect produced by buildings and chimneys and air conditioners,
weather observations are not contaminated by the effects of human habitation. The data is
more accurate, more true to nature, when it is collected far from where people live.
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But there’s a barb buried in Carlin’s joke. Even something as ordinary as the
weather report, he implies, has been distorted by the needs of the industrial system.
Meteorology serves machines, not men.
At a deeper level, this dissertation explores a hidden relationship between science,
industrial society, and the environment. It shows how the reliable operation of “second
nature,” those infrastructural systems that deliver food, water, energy and information to
us, require the monitoring and prediction of “first nature.” It explains how industrial
lifeways depend on certain kinds of scientific practices: routine observation, forecasting,
theorizing. A broad collection of obscure, little-celebrated technical practices are
essential if we want to live healthy lives of material abundance in densely populated,
energy-intensive societies. Aeronautical meteorology is an example of these technical
practices, representative of the many infrastructural sciences that define the industrialized
world.
However, aeronautical meteorology has also created knowledge that extends
beyond the industrial network it was built to support. The challenges of predicting the
weather at altitudes outside of ordinary human experience, and the meteorological
support necessary for long-range, long-endurance flights, encouraged theoretical research
into the atmosphere’s general circulation. As dynamical models grew, voraciously
demanding global datasets to feed their calculations, atmospheric scientists came to
understand the global atmosphere as a single, coherent entity potentially subject to
systematic change. Theoretical research, though initiated to address military and
corporate problems connected to flying, developed a culture and sustained institutions
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that began to make different inquiries. In connection with other scientific discoveries and
broader cultural movements, atmospheric scientistsdeveloped a new understanding of the
depth of human influence on the atmosphere. Their work has shown that there is nowhere
on Earth, not even at the remotest airfield, where we can collect data on weather that has
not been affected by human activities.
As the implications of climate change pull meteorology out of cultural obscurity,
there is a tentative but growing call for a much broader vision of atmospheric science.
Natural scientists, watching immediate disasters like Hurricane Katrina and creeping
crises like climate change, are concluding that better numerical models alone will not
save lives or produce the political and economic transformations necessary to minimize
dangerous human effects on the Earth’s systems. Pioneering social scientists are reaching
out, building capacity for integrated studies of weather, climate, and society. Founded by
aeronautical meteorologists among others, the American Meteorological Society has
begun to support a robust policy program that calls scientists’ attention to the power of
government in science and environmental issues. In journals and conferences,
atmospheric scientists are encouraging each other to bring their skills to bear in
interdisciplinary teams with economists, communications experts, and sociologists, to
work with local governments and non-governmental organizations, and to tackle practical
challenges like helping farmers respond to changing drought patterns or communicating
probabilistic severe weather forecasts in formats that the public can better use. These
efforts are a necessary corrective to a disciplinary culture that has produced Ph.D.s with
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rigorous training in geostrophic approximations and cloud dynamics, but little knowledge
of human interactions with the weather.
Yet it is this disciplinary culture, a disciplinary culture that prizes fundamental
explanations of physical and chemical phenomena in the atmosphere, that has also
produced astonishing gains for meteorologists over the last ninety years. In the decades
since the beginning of the modern disciplinary era, atmospheric science has become far
better funded, has supported many more highly-educated practitioners, and been
recognized as central to national defense. While these successes reflect the triumphs of
science generally in the United States during the 20th century, and though meteorology
never became as culturally prestigious as high-energy physics or molecular genetics,
meteorology’s re-emergence as a credible and respectable discipline was closely tied to
the creation of institutions pursuing theoretical research. During the 1920s, it is important
to remember, American meteorology was dismissed as a “guessing” science, its leaders
viewed as Weather Bureaucrats who were not invited to membership in the National
Academy of Sciences. Over the next four decades, numerous universities established
graduate programs in meteorology and created new academic research organizations like
NCAR. In the late 1950s, threatened by the cultural (and hence recruiting) appeal of highenergy physics,1 leaders in American meteorology sought to recast “meteorology” as
“atmospheric science,” expanding their science beyond weather to encompass
atmospheric chemistry, climate dynamics and ionospheric physics.2 These moves have
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helped atmospheric scientists to Nobel prizes in chemistry and even to the presidencies of
the National Academies.3 But they also led to the diminution of subjects and methods.
Ninety years ago, American meteorology’s central topics of inquiry included the
relationships between weather and health, agriculture, or human behavior as readily as
studies of the structure of the atmosphere. Meteorology’s transformation in support of
aviation focused scientists’ attention on the upper air, a simpler place where equations
could adequately describe the environment. The needs of the commercial airlines
sustained a small research community during the 1930s, while the coming of World War
II required a crash program that trained thousands of meteorologists in the universal
knowledge of dynamics, so they could be deployed and redeployed anywhere the global
battle might need them. These thousands of rapidly trained men solidified a disciplinary
culture that valued theoretical rigor over practical skill, which emphasized fundamental
causes, not local effects. The war established the epistemological values and social
hierarchies that would shape atmospheric science for decades, laying the ground work for
the challenging task that now faces us, producing an integrated science that recognizes
the complexity of human interactions with the atmosphere.
One advantage of historical research is that it records the entrances to paths that
might have been taken, but instead receded into the wilderness of contingency in which
we always wander. One such example is provided by C. Warren Thornthwaite, the Soil
Conservation Service climatologist who declined the opportunity to come to MIT just as
it was becoming the center of institutional power in meteorology. Thornthwaite’s calls
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for interdisciplinary experts competent to address problems at the intersection of climate
and society sound strikingly contemporary, even more than 60 years later. Thornthwaite
recognized the inevitable tensions between human desire and the limits imposed by
nature. Describing a strategy for humanely managing the Great Plains, a region defined
by climatic variability, Thornthwaite wrote,
It must be recognized that in the future there will be a recurrence of rainy years
that will attract settlers and invite extension of wheat production and land
speculation. Past experience has shown conclusively the need for setting up
restraints before the onset of a series of years favorable to commercial grain
production in order that the population of the future may be less vulnerable to the
terrors of inevitable future droughts.4
Here was a vision of a quite different atmospheric science, also infrastructural—still
engaged in observation and prediction in support of environmental management—but
focused on a very different community of users.
As the practices of aeronautical meteorology became dominant, and weather
moved to the airport, these users—farmers, poor people, people living in ecologically
sensitive landscapes—were built out of the new infrastructural science of meteorology.
Only now, under the threat of global catastrophe, are they being built back in. As citizens
of the industrialized societies, it is our obligation to understand such dynamics—those
changes in knowledge that make possible the operation of our infrastructure, but also
make parts of the world that materially affect us either visible or invisible. These shifts in
modes of knowledge-making, in the infrastructural sciences, affect every aspect of our
material lives. The infrastructural sciences build and maintain the environments where we
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live. Tracing their rise and their shifts should be a central task for historians of
technology and science.

